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Abstract
This thesis explores the turn in Robert Penn Warren's later poetry 
toward the problematic nature of language which he discerned in the 
unresolvable tension between the "sayable" and the "unsayable." War­
ren's struggle within this tension of language is not formulated in a 
clearly defined philosophy or theory; rather it is conceived through his 
attention to poiesls, to the act of poetic creation itself. Warren con­
ceives of language as fallen, fractured, and sometimes arbitrary, but he 
also envisions a power within this limitation by which language enacts 
and actuates those things which may not be spoken. This concern for 
language is shaped to a large extent by his understanding through Coler­
idge of the role of the imagination and is evidenced by his attention in 
this later poetry to the voice of the world and to the act of naming.
The poet, in Warren's word, "yearns" for the moment of articulation 
which both acknowledges the boundaries of the sayable and is empowered 
by the absent presence of the unsayable. The poet's quest after the 
unsayable is open-ended; thus, we find a poetry which resists closure 
and totalization through an on-going questioning of what it means to 
dwell in the world.
By tracing out the development of this line of thought from War­
ren's 1946 essay on The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, "A Poem of Pure 
Imaginations An Experiment in Reading," through his 1969 poem, Audubon: 
A Vision, and in his subsequent poetry and criticism, it is argued that 
Warren's increased attention to language as both the problem and the 
power within the act of poetic creation discloses a subtle but discern­
ible shift out of a modernist critical paradigm in which language is the 
tool of the poet and toward a more postmodern conception of language as 
the endless play of difference.,- Furthermore, by reading warren within a 
certain heritage of thought tha^ runs from Coleridge through Kierkegaard 
and Heidegger, it is claimed that Warren's poetry both anticipates cer­
tain emphases in postmodern thought and contributes toward the possibil­
ity of theological articulation within the postmodern condition.
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Chapter One 
Language as "The Matter Itself
Robert Penn Warren's later poetry discloses an increasing under­
standing that the fundamental problem and power of poetry both lie 
within the limits and limitations of language. In a 1967 interview, 
Warren stated, "Most writers are trying to find what they think or feel. 
They are not simply working from the given, but working toward the 
given, saying the unsayable, and steadily asking, 'What do I really feel 
about this ? ' " i Whether or not this is true of other contemporary Ameri­
can poets, this was certainly the case for Warren, whose later poetry 
displays a shift away from considering language as the "given" from 
which the poet works and movement toward the problematic of language. 
Language becomes the "given" toward which the poet must unavoidably 
work; it is what the poet seeks to find through the act of poetic crea­
tion. Warren described himself on more than one occasion as a 
"yearner," a man who wanted to believe in some sort of theological creed 
but could not. This yearning, though, displays itself most prominently 
in his developing struggle with language. As a poet, he yearns to rec­
oncile himself with the problematic nature of language so that he might 
make a meaningful articulation in the midst of the world. He yearns to 
be able to say the unsayable.
The development of Warren's understanding of language and of the 
act of poetic creation in his poetry and criticism may be seen as a sub­
tle shift from a predominantly modernist poetics - in which "Form
1 "How a Poet Works" in JRoJbert Penn Warren Talking: Interviews 1950-1978, ed- by
Floyd C. Watkins and John T. Hiers (New York! Random House, 1980), 90. Further ref­
erences to this volume will appear in the text under the abbreviation RPW Talking.
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(Being) is ontologically prior to temporality, identity to difference, 
the Word to words"2 - and toward a more postmodern poetics concerned 
precisely with temporality, with difference, and with the ongoing and 
dis-closive task of "telling the story," as Warren urges at the end of 
Audubon. It is a shift from mimesis to poiesis, that is, from a mimetic 
narrative of reality, in which language corresponds to and represents 
the contents of reality, to a poetic re-creation of reality in which 
language illuminates our understanding of what Warren describes as 
"being here" and actuates the response of the reader. It is also a 
shift in the way of understanding the poet's relationship with language : 
no longer is the poet the master of language as the tool used to craft 
the "well wrought urn," but instead he finds himself in the service of 
language, listening so that he might begin to speak. Rather than simply 
using language to question "reality" as something that is distinct from 
language, the poet queries language itself so that he might understand 
not only the "real" but being as it discloses itself in the very fallen­
ness of language.3 Rooted in such a de-centered and dis-closive ques­
tioning, Warren's linguistic turn shows an affinity with a postmodern 
poetics which remains open to the condition of "being-in-the-world."4 
In the midst of the world, the concern of the poet is not so much commu­
nication - "What shall I say?" - as it is articulation - "How can I 
speak?" How does the poet say the unsayable?
Within the course of Warren's development as a poet, novelist, and 
critic, this linguistic turn would seem to mark off Warren's later work
2 William V. Spanos, "Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: iV Preface" in
Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature, ed. by William V. Spanos
(Bloomington, IN, and London; Indiana University Press, 1979), xv. Subsequent refer­
ences to this volume of essays will appear in the text under the abbreviation MHQL.
 ^See the discussion of "The Whole Question" in Chapter Six.
4 I acknowledge that this is Martin Heidegger's phrase. We will use it throughout
this thesis in connection with Warren's notion of "being here" to further delineate 
his understanding of being.
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from his earlier work. This distinction must be seen, though, as 
reflecting both continuity and discontinuity in his development. When 
considering the course of Warren's work, critics usually divide his 
career into three distinct phases or periods.s while scheraatizations 
vary, these distinctions seem to fall out according to the publication 
of Warren's selected volumes.e The first phase would include Warren's 
work up to the publication of his first selected volume. Selected Poems: 
1923-1943. Warren's poetry during this period is marked by the High 
Modernism of T. S. Eliot, whose poetry had impacted him as a student at 
Vanderbilt, and by the meters and diction of the Metaphysical poets - 
such as Andrew Marvell - who were regarded so highly by Eliot and other 
Modernist poets. The influence of both the Metaphysical and the Modern­
ist poets on Warren's early thought is made evident in his B.Litt. the­
sis, completed in 1930 as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, which dealt with 
the satires of the Elizabethan poet and dramatist John Marston.? In his 
study, Warren isolated two critical issues in the work of Marston which 
persisted as central issues for the New Critics: "the place of
'fiction' in poetry and the relation of style to content" (72). War­
ren's analysis of these matters both anticipates his own turn toward a 
more narrative voice and foreshadows his arguments regarding pure poetry 
in his 1942 essay, "Pure and Impure Poetry."s warren's early poetry and 
criticism clearly display his sense of the power of poetic language and 
his struggle to find his own voice. That voice is probably heard most
5 See Victor Strandberg, The Poetic Vision of Robert Penn Warren (Lexington: The Uni­
versity Press of Kentucky, 1977), 1-20; Randolph Paul Runyon, The Braided Dream 
Robert Penn Warren's Late Poetry (Lexington; The University Press of Kentucky, 1990),
1-10; and J.D. McCIatchy, "Robert Penn Warren; Rare Prosperities" in White Paper: On
Contemporary American Poetry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 82-85. i
6 I would therefore include Warren's last two selected volumes in his final phase, 
what I am referring to as his later poetry.
7 "A Study of John Marston's Satires" (unpublished B.Litt. thesis, Oxford University,
1930). This thesis is held in the Duke Humphreys Library of the Bodleian Library in 
Oxford.
8 In New and Selected Essays (New York: Random House, 1989), 3-28.
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clearly in his 1944 poem, "The Ballad of Billie Potts," which is gener­
ally acknowledged to be a watershed for Warren's early work for at least 
two reasons. First, it was the final individual poem Warren would com­
plete and publish for at least ten years.9 Second, Warren experiments
with his style and with his voice, dropping the Metaphysical cadences of 
seventeenth century England for the popular rhythms of the Kentucky 
taackwood's banter. But this poem also reveals the poet's growing suspi­
cion about the unavoidable problems of language, as is suggested by the 
poem's attention to the problem of naming, an issue to which he returned 
in his later poetry.lo
Following his long hiatus from short poems during the late Forties 
and early Fifties, Warren's second phase was initiated by the publica­
tion of Promises: Poems 1954-1956 (1956) and included his 1960 volume,
You, Emperors, And Others: Poems 1957-1960, and his next selected
volume. Selected Poems: New and Old, 1923-1966, in which incorporated a
new volume. Tale of Time: New Poems 1960-1966. This period included
what Warren considered to be some of his best and some of his worst 
poetry. 11 If these poems reveal anything of the struggle of transforma­
tion within his work, they show how Warren seems to have been groping 
toward the problem of language, as the poem "Dragon Country: To Jacob
Boehme" (Promises) suggests.
While Warren's final phase is intimated in his 1968 volume. Incar­
nations, it opens up with full force in his 1969 multi-poemed poem.
9 During this period, Warren wrote some of his most important critical essays and pub­
lished both his Pulitzer Prize winning novel. All the King's Men (1946), and his only 
collection of short stories. Circus in the Attic (1948). He also continued his col­
laborative work with Cleanth Brooks on their college textbooks, publishing Modern Rhe­
toric in 1949. It was in the midst of this "dry spell," though, that Warren published 
his book-length poem. Brother to Dragons (1953).
10 por example, Warren seems to suggest toward the end of the poem that the name bears 
a doubleness ! as "the little black mark under your heart," it reveals the traces of both original sin and personality. See our discussion of this mark in Chapter 5.
For example, Warren considered You, Emperors, and Others to be his worst volume of 
poetry. See Joseph Blotner, Robert Penn Warren: A Biography (New York: Random House,
1997), 337-38.
Audubon: A Vision. This poem, which adumbrates several issues raised
in Incarnations and returns to the notion of the artist which Warren 
explored in his Coleridge essay, "A Poem of Pure Imagination: An
Experiment in Reading" (1946), sets the course for Warren's subsequent 
poetry by raising to a higher degree of self-consciousness the poet's 
meditation upon the act of creation and upon the simultaneous problems 
and possibilities of language. It is this final period, what we call 
Warren's later poetry, that will concern us in this thesis.
While these divisions are helpful in understanding the course of 
Warren's career, we are concerned more specifically with the shift in 
Warren's thinking about language and the way that this shift shapes his 
later poetry. Our purpose in this first chapter, then, is to place this 
shift within both the continuity of Warren's own development and the 
continuity of development from the Modern to the Postmodern. Although 
Warren's later work is seemingly dismissed by contemporary criticism 
because of his involvement in the New Critical enterprise, we want to 
place our argument within the broader context of the development of 
Anglo-American poetics and Continental philosophy. We also want to 
sketch out the development of Warren's own thought about language and to 
confront the relative absence of this concern within the abundance of 
critical work on Warren's later poetry- Although Warren's later thought 
overcomes many of his early, Modernist positions, it does so in a way 
that is continuous with that early work. We may speak of an early War­
ren and a later Warren, much like critics speak of the early Heidegger 
and the later Heidegger; however, our purpose is not to construct an 
opposition between two distinct philosophies. The roots of his later 
concern for the problem of language and the power of poetic creation are 
found in this early period. It is not as if Warren overcame his early
Modernist context by defeating it once for all and leaving it behind.
Rather, he seems to have overcome Modernism by incorporating its irony
in his struggle with language so as to raise it to a new, "post-modern"
reality. 12 By "working toward the given," Warren seems to have been
drawn by a love for language and by the voice of its calling, thereby
heeding the exhortation offered by T.S. Eliot in "Little Gidding":
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time.is
1.1 Warren and the End of Modernism
Although this turn toward language has not been widely recognized 
in Warren criticism, we do receive some clear indications of this shift 
from Warren himself in his assessment of the end of modernism, delivered 
in 1966 as the Eugenia Dorothy Blount Lamar Lecture at Wesleyan College 
under the title, A Plea in Mitigation: Modern Poetry at the End of An
Fra.14 "We are witnessing," he declares, "...the end of a poetic era, 
the end of 'modernism,' that school of which the Founding Fathers were 
Eliot, Pound, and Yeats" (1). Warren attributes the death of modernism 
to the failure of insight, to the hardening of principles into ortho­
doxy, and to the institution of a period style (1). What began with a 
sense of prophetic urgency ended by recognizing the blindness of its 
insight, to borrow Paul de Man's phrase, and by becoming the center 
against which it formerly worked- The modernist emphasis upon form 
alone could not finally provide the ontological space within which the
12 See the translator's note in Martin Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics" in The End 
of Philosophy, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (London: Souvenir Press, 1975), 84.
13 T.S. Eliot, Collected Poems 1909-1962 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), 208.
14 Macon, Georgia: Wesleyan College, 1966. There has been very little critical
interaction with this essay. However, for two short discussions of it, see Strand­
berg, The Poetic Vision of Robert Penn Warren 272-73 and Tj. A. Westendorp, Robert 
Penn Warren and the Modernist Temper; A Study in his Social and Literary Criticism in 
Relation to his Fiction (Delft; Eburon, 1987), 80-82.
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poet, as opposed to the scientist, might resolve difference into iden­
tity and be able to speak the final Word.
It is important to notice, though, the place of language in War­
ren's assessment of the death of modernism and the turn toward a new 
poetic era, a "post-modern" age. In the revolt against the age, Warren 
says, "the world changes, the tonality of experience changes, and we 
seek a language adequate to the new experience. Except for an undefined 
malaise, we may not even know that language no longer conforms to 
experience" (1). Warren acknowledges a profound sense of the failure of 
correspondence and referentiality between language and experience.
There is a sense of the deep divide between the one and the other, and 
in the balance hangs the formation of the self. How can we "discover 
identity.,.on the vast and shifting chart of being" (2) if "language no 
longer conforms to experience"? In the gap there is a sense of disori­
entation:
When we are disoriented, when we cannot thus locate our­
selves, when we no longer find language adequate for defin­
ing ourselves, it is natural for us to feel angry with the 
last age - the age that gave us our recent language and most 
intimate images. We are angry with that age because it gave 
us language and images for only its own time and not for 
eternity. The age did not keep its promises. It dwindled 
before our eyes. It dwindled even into us, alas - and that 
is the hardest thing to forgive (2).
The death of the modern is marked by a sense of linguistic crisis, 
marked by gaps in which we "no longer find language adequate...." How­
ever, it is not as if language itself has changed; rather, there is a 
new awareness that language does not always perform the way that we 
think it should. Sometimes it will give us adequate images, but at oth­
ers it withdraws and holds itself in reserve. The promises about the 
way that we may use language "dwindled before our eyes." But that age
and its promises "dwindled even into us," and the poet who declares the
end of that age is faced with the question? how then m a y  i speak?
This linguistic crisis, though, was simply one part o f  a broader
sense of crisis which pervaded the modern age. Warren observes that
"the most obvious fact about modern poetry is that it is an alienated
art" (4)= There was a type of alienation peculiar to the artist in the
rapidly modernized world, to which the poet responded by exercising his
"will to style" in the search for an "essential" poetry which only led
to further obscurity. But, Warren points out that there was another
sort of alienation which affected not simply poets but all men as they
faced historical, social, cultural, and epistemological crises. The age.
saw "the collapse of the old order" (5), though this did not happen all
at once. However,
the blood-bath of 1914-18 was the dramatic image of the end 
of the old order, the petering out of history, and the life- 
story behind all the written stories and poems was in the 
image of a lonely man etched against the red sky of a his­
torical crisis" (6).
It was the first World War which authoritatively pronounced the collapse 
of the old order, and the effect that it had upon poetry, philosophy and 
theology shaped the course of all subsequent thought. warren was not 
alone in recognizing this collapse so vividly portrayed in the ravaging 
of western Europe. The demise of "the old order" had already been 
announced - almost prophetically - in the ironic critiques of Kierke­
gaard and in the meditations of Nietzsche, who pronounced the death of 
God in the modern world, in the early part of this century, Edmund Hus­
serl, the German philosopher who formulated Phenomenology as a philo­
sophical method for opening up the realm of the pre-conceptual apprehen­
sion of phenomena, observed what he called the "crisis of European
thought."15 Martin Heidegger, Husserl's student and successor at the 
University of Freiburg, declared the end of the Western metaphysical 
tradition in his own efforts to overcome the onto-theological tradition. 
This same period was for Heidegger a critical time. George Steiner sug­
gests that the two primary influences on Heidegger's development were 
the appearance of Karl Barth's Epistle to the Romans in 1918 and the 
impact of the first World War with the resulting economic debacle of 
Weimar Germany.le This sense of crisis, however, has persisted through­
out Continental thought, seemingly reaching a culmination in the mid- 
Sixties - the same period in which Warren declared the end of Modernism 
- in Emmanuel Levinas' statement, "For everyone, this century will have 
witnessed the end of philosophy."i?
But, this sense of crisis also opened up new possibilities. War­
ren remarked in a later interview that the first World War marked both a
time of ferment and awakening for writers in the American South.is Dur­
ing this period of crisis at the "end" of history.
There was a questioning of all sorts of attitudes, new and
old, in the South, and there certainly wasn't agreement on 
answers. But the world of the South was changing in that 
generation- It woke up in many ways and discovered its past 
in many, sometimes fallacious, ways, but ways that generally 
involved real issues {Sanoff 73).
It was in the midst of this crisis and questioning that Warren was awak­
ened as a writer. In 1921 Warren entered Vanderbilt University and soon 
came under the tutelage of John Crowe Ransom and the influence of Allen 
Tate, both of whom strongly encouraged his writing and helped to shape
See Spanos Xi.
16 George Steiner, Heidegger (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 12, 74.
17 Quoted in Maurice Blanchot, "Our Clandestine Companion" in Face to Face with Levi­
nas, ed. by Richard A. Cohen (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1986),
41.
18 See Alvin P. Sanoff, "'Pretty, hell! Poetry is Life'; A Conversation with Ameri­
ca's first poet laureate" in U.S. News and World Report, 23 June 1986, 73.
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his early critical outlook. Warren has commented on numerous occasions 
that one of the most significant events of this period for him was the 
publication in 1922 of T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land. "It certainly was 
a watershed in my life and the lives of many of my friends," Warren said 
in 1970.19 This single poem expressed and solidified the perspective of 
a generation upon their world and provided, together with Eliot's ear­
lier poem. The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock (1917), a foundation for 
American modernist poetry. During his years at Vanderbilt (1921-25), 
Warren became a member of the group of poets which published the jour­
nal, The Fugitive (1922-25), and later became one of the Twelve South­
erners who contributed to the Agrarian manifesto, I'll Take My Stand 
(1930).
The American South, however, was not the only place that "woke up" 
during that generation to experience significant changes. During the 
years prior to and immediately following the first World War, there was 
a significant amount of literary activity among American expatriate 
writers which led to the formation of a distinct Anglo-American 
poetics.20 This poetics not only formed the core of the literary Modern­
ism of which Warren declared the end in 1966 but also began to sketch 
out the primary lines of postmodern thought. The promises made by Mod­
ernist poetics were promises that it could not keep, so it carried 
within itself the seeds of its own demise. On the whole, it was shaped 
by the impact of various movements within Continental literary theory 
and philosophy upon American writers such as Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound,
19 Ruth Fisher, "A Conversation with Robert Penn Warren" in Talking with Robert Penn 
Warren, ed. by Floyd C. Watkins, John T. Hiers and Mary Louise Weeks (Athens and Lon­
don: The University of Georgia Press, 1990), 180. Further references to this volume 
will appear in the text under the abbreviation Talking.
20 See Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, From Puritanism to Postmodernism: A His­
tory of American Literature (New York: Viking, 1991), 249-68. For another helpful
historical overview of the development of American poetry in this century, see Donald 
Hall's "Introduction" to Contemporary American Poetry (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books,
1962), 17-25.
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William Carlos Williams, and T.S. Eliot. The fundamental influences 
were found in the psychoanalytical research of Sigmund Freud, who pub­
lished The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900, and in the Symbolist writ­
ing of such writers as Edgar Allen Poe, William Butler Yeats, and the 
French symboliste poets who flourished in the last decade of the Nine­
teenth century - chiefly, Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul Verlaine, and Arthur 
Rimbaud. As a result of this influence, the modernist poetry of this 
era is marked by a concern for the concrete quality of literary language 
and and its power concentrated in the symbol as "the instant complex of 
language and image" (Ruland and Bradbury 258). However, this concern is 
focused upon the role of the poet as the "radical agent of culture and 
the measuring edge of language" (Ruland and Bradbury 258); it is the 
poet as craftsman who experiments with "language's own combinative and 
kinetic powers" (Ruland and Bradbury 261) in order to create a full 
intellectual and emotional impact. This emphasis upon language within 
symbolist theory arose in part from an awareness of a "crisis of 
language":
In the modern crisis of language and poetry lay the heart of 
the modern crisis of culture, for the relative vitality of
language revealed the validity or the worthlessness of cul­
ture itself. Both Pound and Eliot acknowledged this sense 
of crisis; and for Pound it was the artists...who had to 
resolve it (Ruland and Bradbury 258).
Modernism appropriated the Romantic notion of the artist or the poet as 
one who is alienated from the mainstream of industrial culture - what 
Warren called the poète maudit - and by virtue of his alienation he
alone is able, through his attention to the crisis of language, to
resolve the crisis of culture. Warren points out that this sense of 
alienation and of crisis led to a radical irony which, hearkening back 
to Kierkegaard, "veins the whole tissue of modernity" (7). The center
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did not hold and the promises were not kept. This irony was marked not 
only by a sense of historical or cultural irony but also by "two more 
specific unmaskings, the ironies derived from Freud and Marx, equally 
radical" (8). In both of these, Warren observes, the writer could not 
escape "a sad self-irony" and a "recognition of his otherness" (8). Out 
of this irony, there arose a deeply self-conscious poetry, concerned to 
a great extent with itself and with the role of the poet. In continuity 
with the Romantic poets, modern poets were "compelled to inspect the
role of poet, and the nature of poetry" (9).
The appropriation of symbolism and the influence of psychoanalysis 
upon these writers not only produced a new poetry but also led to a new 
concept of criticism which reflected the changes in aesthetics and epis- 
temology.21 The new literary theory shaped by these forces was fundamen­
tally formalist in its doctrine. If the role of the poet was to resolve 
the crisis of culture through a response to the crisis of language, or 
to reconcile the overwhelming oppositions of life in the modern indus­
trial world, then the power of the poem was found in its form and in the
ability of form to bring about reconciliation of such oppositions. 
According to Terence Hawkes,
Early Formalism built on the groundwork of Symbolism, and of 
the Symbolist concern with form as a viable communicative 
instrument; autonomous, self-expressive, able by extra­
verbal rhythmic, associative and connotative means to 
'stretch' language beyond its normal 'everyday' range of 
meaning. 22
However, the Formalist criticism developed during the Twenties and Thir­
ties also had roots in the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. His for­
mulation of the imagination and the symbol was appropriated by formal­
ists because it was seen to provide a means not simply of stretching
21 See Ruland and Bradbury 258.
22 Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Routledge, 1992), 60,
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language but more importantly of reconciling tensions within the form of 
the poem.23 This Formalist criticism was developed in two distinct 
groups, the one being independent of - and apparently completely unaware 
of - the other. In Russia, the Moscow Linguistic Circle and the Petro- 
grad Society for the Study of Poetic Language (known by the acronym 
OPOYAZ) formulated a critical theory preoccupied with the possibilities 
of literary structure. Roman Jakobson's work is representative of what 
became known as Russian Formalism and so helps us to see what distin­
guishes this school of thought from New Critical Formalism, According 
to Hawkes, Jakobson's "approach to poetry is essentially that of the 
linguist, and 'poetics' for him forms part of the general field of lin­
guistics" (76), His formulation of the linguistic notions of polarities 
and equivalents reflects the influence of Neo-Kantian philosophy and its 
concern for unity in the midst of multiplicity.24 However, his work also 
shows a degree of kinship with Ferdinand de Saussure's revolution in 
linguistic theory in its fundamental distinction between langue and 
parole and with the later development of Structuralist anthropology in 
the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss.
The combination of Coleridge's thought with later Symbolist theory 
also shaped the development of Formalist criticism during the Thirties 
and Forties among writers and critics in the American South and among 
the Cambridge Critics in England. Whereas the work of the Cambridge 
Critics, like that of the Russian Formalists, focused upon the philo­
sophical issues of theory, the New Criticism, as formulated by John 
Crowe Ransom and other Southern writers, was distinctly the product of 
poets who set out not to create a linguistic philosophy but to delineate
23 For a discussion of the influence of Coleridge upon Russian Formalism, see Emerson 
R. Marks, Coleridge on the Language of Verse, Princeton Essays on Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 19-27 and 70-71.
24 For a helpful bibliography on Formalism, see Hawkes 169-71.
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a way of reading poetry that both honored the poem as a poem and also 
elevated it to a form of communication which was able to rival the sup­
posed priority of scientific language. Although critics have tended to 
speak of the New Criticism as a single movement, Warren was quick to 
point out in A Plea in Mitigation that "the so-called New Criticism was 
never monolithic. It was shot through with irremediable tensions and 
disagreements, both as to methods and values" (1 1 ).25 There were a var­
iety of emphases included under the single rubric of the New Criticism, 
both regarding how such a criticism ought to be "done" and what values 
ought to undergird it. However, Warren acknowledges that, on the whole, 
there was a sense of identity in the project: "What gave an impression,
sometimes false, of unity in the New Criticism was a special applica­
tion, in sharp focus, of principles derived from Coleridge - not to men­
tion I.A. Richards, Freud, or Aristotle" (11). while it would be beyond 
the scope of the present discussion to examine all the tenets associated 
with the New Criticism, it is helpful to introduce the primary values 
and principles which relate to the development of Warren's struggle with 
language and his relentless pursuit of the act of poetic creation.
I.A. Richards' Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) was perhaps 
the earliest statement of what can be called New Critical values and 
method. According to Warren, Richards found "that in the 1920's [sic] 
no student at Cambridge University could make sense of a poem" (11). In 
response, the New Criticism revolted against the biographical and his­
torical emphases which had predominated literary criticism by concen­
trating instead upon the work itself and by prioritizing the function of 
poetic language within the text. While New Critics focused intently 
upon the power of poetic language in distinction from the supposed prec-
25 Warren remarked in a 1957 Paris Review interview that "there's no bed big enough" 
that would hold the variety of critics reportedly associated with the New Criticism, adding that "no blanket would stay tucked." See Talking 32.
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edence of scientific language, they insisted that meaning is generated 
by the function of language within the form of the text. So, paradox 
was not a quality of language as much as it was an aspect of poetic 
structure which shapes language for its use. Of all the writers asso­
ciated with the New Criticism, Ransom was perhaps the most openly philo­
sophical in his w o r k . 26 Trained in Kantian aesthetics, he sought in lan­
guage a concrete means of responding to the way that logical positivism 
privileged scientific discourse over the poetic. William J. Handy help­
fully analyzes the Kantian basis of the New Critical enterprise in his 
study, Kant and the Southern New Critics. 27 Handy points out what he 
calls the "source principle" of the New Critics;
If one principle could be singled out as basic to the theory 
and practice of John Crowe Ransom and his students, Tate and 
Brooks, that principle necessarily would be concerned with 
the nature of the language of literary art. Perhaps it 
might be stated like this : The very core of the artistic
intention is concretion, which is a 'growing together' 
intention, not an intention to abstract (33-34, emphasis 
his ).
The language of science abstracts, but the language of literary art 
makes concrete statements which are reconciling by nature. So, Ransom 
states in The World's Body that "the poet wants to particularize his 
objects in order to understand them fully, and images of this sort are 
habitual to our p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n . "as Kant's influence upon this notion 
of concretion, though, was refracted through Coleridge's poetics and 
then again through Richards' Coleridge on Imagination (1934). It was 
the symbol - or metaphor - which the New Critics considered to be the 
concretizing element within the form of the poem. It is metaphor which
26 For a discussion of Ransom's critical positions, see Mark Jancovich, The Cultural 
Politics of the New Criticism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 30-44.
27 Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963.
28 Quoted in Handy 57.
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leads to understanding. This impulse toward understanding identifies 
another central tenet of the New Criticism, that literature ~ and poet­
ry, in particular - is an essential form of knowledge.
Following the reasoning emphasized by Bergson and Hulme, 
these critics hold that knowledge of the actual world of 
man's everyday experience is necessarily distorted when it 
is translated into the abstract notations of any scientific 
account-...[Rather,] they believe that the artist "knows" 
the actual world in a much more natural state (Handy 64-5).
Thus, language within the form of the poem may be said to embody a mean­
ing which is concrete and particular. The limitations of language are
overcome by the artistry of the poet so that the poem might convey 
knowledge. Drawing again from Romantic poetics in general and from 
Coleridge in particular, Cleanth Brooks also emphasizes the organic 
nature of the work, within which form and content are unified so as to 
communicate this knowledge.29 The New Critics objectified the text and 
called for a close reading which observes the various tensions and para­
doxes within the form of the poem. Though New Critics sought to avoid
"the intentional fallacy" by avoiding such things as aspects of the
author's life and the question of his intention in the determination of 
meaning, they nonetheless placed a great deal of emphasis upon the poet 
as the master of language.30
The New Criticism clearly played a central role in the modernist 
literary enterprise which Warren critiques in A Plea In Mitigation. 
Warren points out that it was a criticism ineluctably tied to the actual 
poetry that was being written during this period. And just as the prin-
29 See Brooks entry on the New Critioism in the Enayalopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 
ed. by Alex Preminger, Frank J. Warnke, and O.B. Hardison, Jr. (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1965), 567-68.
30 "The Intentional Fallacy" was the title of an essay by W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., origi­
nally published in the Sewanee Review in 1946 and included in his The Verbal Icon: 
Studies in the Meaning- of Poetry (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1954), 3-18.
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ciples which undergirded that poetry did not keep their promises and
came to an end, so did the New Criticism. Like the Modernism of which
it was a central part, the New Criticism also contained within itself
the seeds of its own demise.
As for what the New Criticism may have done for us, that is 
now a closed chapter. What was temporarily useful has 
served its turn and what is permanently sound has been 
absorbed. What was merely fashionable has become old- 
fashioned - the formal schématisations, the over-refinement 
of terms, the hair-splitting of exegesis, the academic mass 
production of "certified" critics, the dogmatic hardening.
But such things always follow as disciples expound a revela­
tion. We are now waiting for a new revelation (12).
By the mid-Sixties, Warren considered the New Criticism to have served 
its purpose and to have come to end. Its rigid emphasis upon form as a 
means for knowledge served its purpose, as did its rhetoric against log­
ical positivism and scientific discourse. However, its concern for the 
limitations and power of language in the poem was an important contribu­
tion that has been absorbed into the very heart of critical inquiry. 
While analyses and assessments of the New Criticism vary in regard to 
the merits of the contributions of these critics, there is little dis­
puting the role of the New Criticism in setting the course for literary 
criticism since. It is ironic that various forms of Post-Structuralist 
criticism have flourished at Yale University in the wake of the New 
Criticism which had earlier flourished there; critics as varied as Har­
old Bloom, J. Hillis Miller, and Paul de Man have positioned themselves, 
to a large degree, in opposition to the work of their older colleagues 
Brooks and W a r r e n . 3i
1.2 Warren and the Post-Modern
In the waning of the New Criticism, though, Warren perceived a
3i See Blotner 380-81.
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need for a "new revelation" which would bear a new sense of prophetic
urgency and of fresh vision. Warren characterized the critical scene at
the time of his lecture as being marked by a pluralism of taste and a
diversity of style and voice within the poetry itself (18). And it was
a time still marked by a sense of crisis. "The problems of that age are
still with us," he says.
For a half century we have somehow survived new wars, new 
revolutions, new depressions, new failures of faith, and the 
corrosive effects of new knowledge. But even if we have 
muddled through in the sad human way, we should realize that 
the problems are still with us, aggravated and eating deeper 
under the scar-tissue of complacency....One remaining piece 
of high ground after another is flooded, with little said.
It is true that the remnants of a period style tend to blunt 
perception, and we may feel the nausea of repetition, the 
nausea of emptiness. It is true that we can overcome that
nausea only by opening ourselves to what new experience is
available to us in our time and by taking the risks of our 
time (19-20).
One of the central "risks of our time" is the confrontation with the 
problem of language. Modernism was not able to seal the gaps and heal 
the fissures that make up language; instead, it seems to have grown more 
complacent to the issue of language underneath the calloused scar-tissue 
of its own rhetoric. To continue to mimic the style and voice of the 
modern would only lead to "the nausea of emptiness." However, Warren 
acknowledges that the only way for the poet to overcome that nausea is 
by constantly opening himself up to new experiences with language and by 
taking the risks which those experiences might call for. One of the 
risks the poet must take is the confrontation with the limits of the 
sayable and the plunge into the "unsayable." This is a decidedly theo­
logical task: in light of the "new failures of faith" experienced in
modernity (perhaps this is the core of modernity), the poet must seek
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out a "faith" which confronts the risk of failure.32 Therefore, the 
question of language is a theological question. As the poet continues 
to explore the problem and the possibilities of language, he is explor­
ing theological problems and possibilities.
In his early poetry, Warren tended to play the role of the poet- 
teacher, for whom "language is the means for gaining access to reality 
and to truth."33 But through his analysis of the demise of modernism and 
his unceasing concern for the problem of language, he assumes the role 
of the poet-artist, for whom language "has become the problematic and 
is...the new object of contemplation" (26). Warren displays this 
heightened sense of artistry most notably in his 1969 poem, Audubon; A 
Vision. During his later poetry, Warren's artistry approaches the dis­
tinction made by Nietzsche: "One is an artist at the cost of regarding
that which all non-artists call 'form' as content, as 'the matter 
itself. "'34 By turning to language as the matter itself, Warren appears 
to be seeking a new poetics, what Spanos calls "a poetics of and for our 
occasion" (xii, emphasis his),
Warren's analysis in A Plea in Mitigation of the modern crisis 
and its implications for the pursuit of knowledge bears certain import­
ant similarities to the critique offered by the French philosopher Jean- 
François Lyotard in his 197 9 study. The Postmodern Condition: A Report
32 Compare Heidegger's statement, "It is the true task of theology, which must be dis­
covered again, to seek the word that is able to call one to faith and preserve one in 
faith." Quoted in David E. Kleiran, "Back to Literature - and Theology?" in Postmodern­
ism, Literature and the Future of Theology, ed. by David Jasper (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 180.
33 See Kevin Vanhoozer, "A Lamp in the Labyrinth: The Hermeneutics of 'Aesthetic'
Theology," Trinity Journal 8 (Spring 1987), 26.
34 Quoted in Frank Graziano, "The Matter Itself: Warren's Audubon: A Vision" in
Homage to Robert Penn Warren: A Collection of Critiaal Essays, ed. by Frank Graziano
(Durango, CO: Logbridge-Rhodes, 1981), 17.
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on Knowledge. 25 Lyotard analyzes the shift in "the status of 
knowledge... as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age 
and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age" (3). warren, 
like Lyotard, believes that such a shift will inevitably result in a 
change in the nature of knowledge; post-modern poetics will be distinct 
from the modernist poetics which had come to an end. Lyotard uses the 
term postmodern^e to designate "the state of our culture following the 
transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have 
altered the game rules for science, literature and the arts" (xxiii).37 
At some points, Lyotard seems to place the modern and the postmodern in 
opposition to one another. The modern is characterized by an appeal to 
a metanarrative, whereas the postmodern is marked by a deep incredulity 
toward any metanarrative (xxiv). On the whole, though, Lyotard cannot 
distinguish too radically between the modern and postmodern. In the 
essay, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?," he states
that the postmodern "is undoubtedly a part of the modern" (79).38 a work 
of art - including a poem, perhaps - "can become modern only if it is 
first postmodern" (79). So, "postmodernism thus understood is not mod­
ernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant" 
(79). Lyotard associates this nascent state with a concern for the 
unpresentable. The modern and the postmodern are alike concerned with 
the response to the unpresentable, but they differ with regard to the
35 Trans, by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and History of Literature;
Vol. 10 (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1984). We acknowledge that Lyotard 
offers one perspective on the multi-faceted phenomena of the postmodern; however, his 
work is particularly significant for our present study because of its contemporaneity with Warren's later poetry and criticism.
36 For a histoiry of the term, see Charles Jencks, What is Post-Modernism?, 3rd edn 
(London: Academy Editions; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 8-10 and 14-16.
37 For Warren, these transformations in American society and culture were rooted in 
the Civil War. In The Legacy of the Civil War, he states that the Civil War was not 
only "the secret school for 1917-18 and 1941-45" but more importantly was "that mystic cloud from which emerged our modernity." See Robert Penn Warren, The Legacy of the 
Civil War; Meditations on the Centennial (New York: Random House, 1961), 46, 49.
38 Included as an Appendix in the 1984 edition of The Postmodern Condition. Page ref­
erences are continuous with previous references to this volume.2 0
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nature of that r e s p o n s e .39 in this way, we might understand the continu­
ity of Warren's work as both modern and as approaching the postmodern.
His concern for language and the unsayable in his later poetry is antic- 1
ipated in his earlier work, but it is distinguished by a turn away from i
that sort of nostalgia which would yield easy answers and would fill up 
the unsayable with the said.
While the New Criticism would fall under Lyotard's critique as a 
modernist form of legitimating knowledge, it would appear to be only a 
few steps removed from Lyotard's fundamental premise. The New Critics 
opposed the way that science seeks to legitimate itself as the grand 
narrative which alone provides access to truth through calculation and 
formula rather than through insight and creativity. Lyotard shares that 
incredulity toward science, though he broadens the term to include any 
discourse that legitimates itself and its knowledge by reference to some 
metanarrative. The New Critics were concerned with what Lyotard calls 
"the nature of the social bond" (11) and with the way that the social 
bond is established and legitimated. Within modernity, that bond has 
been legitimated according to the "language games" of scientific dis­
course - that is, according to its rules of legitimacy. However, Lyo­
tard acknowledges that "scientific knowledge does not represent the 
totality of knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in com­
petition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge, which I will call 
narrative..." (7). Among the New Critics, it was Ransom in particular 
who called into question the supposed "totality of knowledge" of sci­
ence, contending that the language of science abstracts and denies the 
complexities of modern life, whereas the language of poetry "seeks to 
remind the reader of the paradoxes and contradictions which scientific 
rationalism must forget..." (Jancovich 75). What the New Critics called
39 shall return to Lyotard's discussion of the unpresentable in Chapter Six.
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poetic or literary language, Lyotard calls narrative.
With regard to the question of knowledge, Lyotard proposes that 
narrative offers a form of immediate legitimation which is incommensu­
rate with the question of legitimacy as scientific knowledge has formu­
lated it (23). He points out "the preeminence of the narrative form in 
the formulation of traditional knowledge," so that "narration is the 
quintessential form of customary knowledge..." (19). While Lyotard 
examines five qualities of narrative knowledge, the fourth has particu­
lar relevance for our discussion here. "Narrative form follows a 
rhythm," he says; "it is the synthesis of a meter beating time in regu­
lar periods and of accent modifying the length or amplitude of certain 
of those periods" (21). Lyotard's use of terms rhythm, meter and accent 
suggests that his notion of narrative bears a certain poetic quality. 
Narrative seems to open itself to those qualities of language which can­
not be located strictly within the denotative, performative and pre­
scriptive designations of "language games." It is this poetic quality 
of narrative that is tied in a curious way to the question of time.
It exhibits a surprising feature: as meter takes precedence
over accent in the production of sound (spoken or not), time 
ceases to be a support for memory to become an immemorial 
beating that, in the absence of a noticeable separation bet­
ween periods, prevents their being numbered and consigns 
them to oblivion (22).
It is the poetic quality of narrative which denies the reliance of a
past referent to determine either the meaning or the legitimacy of the
narrative. Or, as Lyotard goes on to state:
The narrative's reference may seem to belong to the past, 
but in reality it is always contemporaneous with the act of 
recitation. It is the present act that on each of its 
occurrences marshals in the ephemeral temporality inhabiting 
the space between the "I have heard" and the "you will hear"
(22).
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The narrative is ultimately self-referential, within the repetitive act 
of its recitation- Its reference is found in the moment of this act.
The implication of this position for language is that language bears a 
certain self-referentiality, but Lyotard seems to suggest that this does 
not necessitate the "loss of meaning" in postmodernity; rather it 
defines the rules and limits of meaning. For the postmodern, meaning is 
not established by metanarratives but is repeated and variously articu­
lated within each separate "little narrative" (petit récit),
In Warren's later poetry, we find a similar exploration of the 
limitations and possibilities of language within the act of poetic crea­
tion. Warren's pursuit of the unsayable leads from one poem to the 
next, as each is a moment of telling the story, as the poet urges at the 
end of Audubon. We also find that his view of language critically 
informs his earlier notion of "the inevitable osmosis of b e i n g . T h a t  
is, he understands language to be the sphere of one's interpenetration 
with the world and the means of the "osmosis of being." Like Audubon's 
notion of the membrane between himself and the world (Audubon I[B]), 
language both separates (subverts and decenters) and connects; it is a 
knowledge not simply by form but by difference. This is the duality or 
doubleness of language opened up by the necessary tension between the 
sayable and the unsayable. Even as existence is always seen as "being 
in the world" for Warren, so the poet experiences the condition of 
dwelling within language. Rather than becoming an object of his contem­
plation, though, language is seen to be, to borrow Heidegger's phrase, 
the house of being. Language is the means of engagement with the world.
However, Warren's poetry approaches the postmodern in another sig-
40 “Knowledge and the Image of Man," in Robert Penn Warren: A Collection of Critiaal
Essays, ed. by John Lewis Longley, Jr. (New York: New York University Press, 1965),
241.
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nificant way. At the heart of the postmodern critique is the issue of 
theological articulations how can we speak theologically in the after- 
math of the death of logocentricity? What shape can theological think­
ing take in the aftermath of modernity? David Klemm points out that the 
modern social system has defeated theology "as a voice having something 
to contribute....Theology has not, however, been defeated by postmodern 
criticism, and it misconstrues the situation if it thinks so. If theol­
ogy has an adversary, it is not postmodern discourse" (181). Warren's 
questions about the "unsayable" are at the heart of this theological 
concern in postmodernity. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish bet­
ween warren's search for a way to "love God," as he suggests in "Masts 
at Dawn" (NSP 236), and his yearning after the "unsayable." For him, 
each is an absent presence, and the sense of such an absence is crucial 
to our reading of his later poetry. Rather than denying this absence or 
"emptiness," as he called it in "A Plea in Mitigation," the poet must 
face it in all of its potential tragedy, Klemm comments that the proper 
response to theology in the postmodern condition is "to face the situa­
tion, for tragic knowledge is the narrow gate through which we might 
rediscover 'the word that is able to call one to faith and preserve ouk 
in faith' [Heidegger]" (182). Warren's turn toward language is a turn 
toward theological thinking. Floyd Watkins has suggested that the con­
secutive shifts in Warren's poetry from the metaphysical lyric to the 
narrative to the meditative disclose a turn from "more worldly" concerns 
to more openly religious and theological issues.4i Warren's concern for 
the Fall and for original sin, both of which reappear throughout his 
poeLry, must be seen as an attention to the problematic of language. If 
language is bound by a fall of some sort and bears a "sinful" quality in
41 See Floyd G. Watkins, "'The Body of This Death' in Robert Penn Warren's Later 
Poems," KR NS 10/4 (Fall 1988), 33.
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its inabilities, then how can the poet speak of that which is other than 
the sayable? How can he speak of God? Warren's poetry is not overcome 
by any sense of tragedy but sees this as the narrow gate through which 
the poet might impart a stronger sense of the unsayable.42
1.3 The Critical Silence
Despite the concern that we find in Warren's later poetry for lan­
guage and the unsayable, this aspect of his work is relatively absent 
from the critical studies of his poetry. While there are studies which 
do consider language in warren's poetry to a degree, there is not a sin­
gle study which grapples with the problem of language in light of the 
postmodern critique and of the notion of the unsayable. Fred R. Thie­
mann's 1995 doctoral dissertation, entitled Original Sin and Redemption: 
Philosophy of Language in Robert Penn Warren's Poetry, perhaps comes the 
closest to such a study. 43 However, Thiemann argues that Warren had a 
clearly conceived notion of language "connected to his interest in 
Christian symbolism" (3), which envisioned language as fallen yet incar- 
native. Thiemann fails to come to terms, though, with the notion of the 
unsayable and its place in Warren's varied meditations on language. He 
also fails to explore the possible continuities between warren's poetry 
and the course of critical inquiry regarding language through the course 
of this century, Thiemann is not alone in this; critics have, on the 
whole, failed to consider Warren's work in light of the concurrent 
developments in critical theory, which has consistently returned to the 
problem of language. While there are occasional exceptions to these 
statements, criticism has been largely silent about these issues.
One difficulty that has perhaps encouraged this silence is War­
ren's aversion to systematic, philosophical, and abstract statements.
42 See Lyotard 81.
43 Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Microform, 1995.
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Warren was not a critical theorist, nor was he a philosopher of lan­
guage. Warren was a poet, and his thought consistently hovers about 
poetry and the role of the artist in the act of creation. Because he 
was not a theorist constructing a system, we must resist the temptation 
to root a theory of language or linguistic philosophy in Warren's poetry 
or criticism. Warren was himself quite wary of attempts to do such a 
thing.44 He told Ruth Fischer in 197 0,
I don't think of a philosophy as a finished product. Cer­
tainly not for a man like me. It's a way of thinking about 
your life as you live....But I am always struck by the 
attempt to freeze any writer in a formal philosophical posi­
tion when the essence of the process of writing is to con­
stantly modify and enrich or maybe narrow or do something to 
it {Talking 187-88).
Cleanth Brooks recognized the danger of attempting to freeze Warren in a 
formal philosophical position, suggesting that such a reduction would 
distort any understanding of Warren or his poetry. While he acknowl­
edges that Warren's work may "form a highly unified and consistent body 
of work," Brooks goes on to say that it would nonetheless "be impossible 
to reduce it, without distorting simplification, to some thesis about 
human life. The work is not tailored to fit a thesis. "45 Instead of 
attempting to freeze Warren in a formal philosophical position or to fit 
his work into some thesis about human life, we want to explore the way 
that, through the process of writing, his struggle as a poet with lan­
guage was continually modified and the way that this struggle either
44 In a 1980 interview, Richard Jackson asked Warren about the problematics of lan­
guage: "On a more metaphysical level, language is very problematic in its relation to
truth....Is there, for you, a 'suspicion' about language, as some modern philosophers 
call it?" In his response, Warren evades any thorough-going philosophical analysis of 
the issue: "You have raised many deep questions here. I'll simply stick to the sim­
plest of answers,..." See Richard Jackson, "On the Horizon of Time," in Acts of Mind: 
Conversations with Contemporary Poets (University, AL: The University of Alabama
Press, 1983), 58-60.
45 cleanth Brooks, "Experience Redeemed in Knowledge," in The Hidden God: Studies in
Hemingway, Faulkner, Yeats, Eliot, and Warren (New Haven and London: Yale UniversityPress, 1963), 98.
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enriched or narrowed his conception of being in the world. If we are to 
speak of a philosophy in Warren's work, we may only do so as that which 
Warren was trying to work out or toward in the continually exfoliating 
process of poetic creation.
Another difficulty which has exacerbated this critical silence has 
been the ways in which Warren's poetry is generally read. It would 
appear that assessments of his work fall into one of two categories. On 
the one hand, it would appear that Warren's work is most often read 
within the confines of Southern American literary interests which have 
"canonized" Warren within the literary and critical values of that tra­
dition. 46 Within this canonical reading, there have been a variety of 
emphases. For instance, some have considered aspects of literary regio­
nalism and the Southern literary tradition within Warren's work,4? oth­
ers have focused on Warren's role in the New Criticism, some placing 
Warren at the center of the movement, others finding Warren on the 
fringes.48 still others have emphasized Warren's place within the devel­
opment of American letters.49 we recognize that each of these emphases 
has made important, even necessary, contributions to Warren scholarship; 
however, we are more concerned with the mixture of psychological and
46 Most critical volumes dealing with Warren's work have been published by Southern 
University presses, chiefly The University Press of Kentucky and the Louisiana State 
University Press. Several Southern literary journals have published special issues 
devoted to Warren and his work. See, for example, W  XLVIII/1 (Winter 1994-95) and 
Southern Quarterly 31/4 (Summer 1993).
47 See Joseph R. Millichap, "Robert Penn Warren and Regionalism," MQ XLVIII/1 (Winter 
1994-95), 29-38, and James H. Justus, "Warren's Terra," MQ XLVIII/1 (Winter 1994-95), 
133-146.
48 Jancovich considers Ransom, Tate, and Warren to be the primary figures of the New 
Criticism. See especially Chapter Twelve of The Cultural Politics of the New Criti­
cism. However, D.G. Myers argues that viiile Warren "is not one the major critics 
associated with the New Criticism" (371, emphasis his), he is nonetheless an important 
critic. See his "Robert Penn Warren and the History of Criticism, " Midvmst Quarterly 
34/4 (1993), 369-82.
49 Three recent studies have given shape to this concern. See John Burt, Robert Penn 
Warren and American Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); William Bed­
ford Clark, The American Vision of Robert Penn Warren (Lexington: The University
Press of Kentucky, 1991); and Hugh Ruppersburg, Robert Penn Warren and the American 
Imagination (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1990).
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pseudo-theological emphases which have dominated canonical readings of 
warren's poetry and the ways in which these have obscured the develop­
ment of Warren's understanding of language and the unsayable as a deeply 
theological issue.
On the other hand, though, it would appear that Warren's work is 
not being read by a wider critical audience which has "excommunicated" 
his work from contemporary dialogues about language and poetics for the 
very reasons that the former group has "canonized" Warren. There has 
been a rejection of Warren's earlier work due to his association with 
Southern paternalism, to his involvement with the New Critical enter­
prise, and to his exhibition of metaphysical concerns. His later work, 
especially his poetry, has simply been ignored While there are a few 
notable exceptions to this second response, this criticism on the whole 
seems to have excommunicated Warren without giving his later poetry a 
fair hearing and so has failed to understand the significant contribu­
tion that Warren makes to these ongoing critical dialogues.
Among the canonical criticism of Warren's poetry, religious or 
theological issues are a commonplace. As early as 1945, W.P. Southard 
argued that Warren is "a religious poet" whose meditations run from the 
loss of innocence to the yearning after salvation and the participation 
in some sacrament.so James Justus argued as recently as 1981 that the 
whole of Warren's work presents a vision of "an orthodox Christianity 
chastened and challenged by the secular faiths peculiar to the twentieth 
century: naturalism...and existentialism."si However, Victor Strand-
berg and Robert Koppelman are significant for our present study because 
of the way that they mix the psychological and pseudo-theological in
50 "The Religious Poetry of Robert Penn Warren," KR 7 (August 1945), 653-676. For 
another early look at the religious in Warren's poetry, see Louis D. Rubin, Jr., "The 
Eye of Time: Religious Themes in Robert Penn Warren's Poetry," The Diliman Review 
HI/3 (July 1955), 215-237.
51 The Achievement of Robert Penn Warren (Baton Rouge and London: LSUP, 1981), 1,
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their reading of Warren's poetry. Strandberg's contribution to Warren 
criticism should not be underestimated; he has repeatedly called atten­
tion to the distinctly "poetic vision" of warren's work. In 1965 
Strandberg published the first book-length study of Warren's poetry, 
entitled A Colder Fire: The Poetry of Robert Penn Warren,22 and followed
that in 197 7 with The Poetic Vision of Robert Penn Warren. In the 
twelve intervening years, there had not been another single volume 
devoted to Warren's poetry, though by 1977 Warren had published eleven 
separate volumes of poetry.
Strandberg's approach to the poetry is structured around what he 
perceives to be the master concept of Warren's poetry, which is the self 
and its yearning for identity. This approach is premised upon a psy­
chological criticism rooted in Jung and intermixed with the language of 
Christian theology and mysticism. By prioritizing the self in such a 
way, Strandberg fails to consider the important place of language in 
Warren's ontological questions. In his first volume, Strandberg summa­
rizes his position in a way that is reiterated throughout his work:
In Eleven Poems on the Same Theme,...Warren begins to 
develop that synthesis of psychology and religion which was 
to become his fundamental and lasting solution to the 
dilemma of naturalism. The idea of an unconscious, undis­
covered self beyond the reach of naturalistic extinction 
evolves here....This concept of a collective self bears 
striking parallels to Jungian psychology...(2).
In both volumes, he urges that Jungian psychology cannot properly be 
called a source for Warren's vision; however, he also emphasizes in both 
that Jung's thought provides "a relevant means of clarifying" Warren's 
poetry.53 For Strandberg, the most clarifying element of Jung's system 
would appear to be the notion of the undiscovered self, which he terms
52 Lexington: The University of Kentuoky Press, 1965.
53 Colder Fire 78 and The Poetic Vision 134.
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at one point as Warren's "master metaphor" {A Colder Fire 75) and at 
another as simply one of Warren's "ground themes" (The Poetic Vision 
ix).
What makes Jung's formulations so helpful for Strandberg is their 
theological nature (The Poetic Vision 186). So, for both Jung and War­
ren the unconscious is "a primary source of religious experience" and 
the repression of the unconscious is the sin of modern man, for it alone 
"holds the secret of ultimate identity" (A Colder Fire 2-3). In The 
Poetic Vision, Strandberg identifies "the Fall from Eden" as "Warren's 
most obsessive master theme" (43). The Fall splits the unified self 
into two, into the conscious self and the unconscious or undiscovered 
self. Redemption becomes, then, the reunification of the self, Strand­
berg points out, though, that Warren's brand of theology is undergirded 
by a reconceptualization of Romantic mysticism which envisions a sacra­
ment capable of producing "some kind of redemption from the fallen con­
dition delimiting the self" (A Colder Fire 67). Tied to an "essentially 
Romantic sensibility" (The Poetic Vision 190), Warren's theological con­
cerns take on a mysticism which enables him to
proceed...past the quasi-Romantic trauma of the Fall...into 
a Blakean or Wordsworthian 'higher innocence' that might yet 
redeem the fallen creation. The sign of that higher 
innocence is the ability of the Warren persona, his inner 
being unified now by a reconciliation between the conscious 
and unconscious zones of the psyche, to connect himself 
vitally to the outer world, unclean and ruined as it may be, 
in "such a sublimation that the world which once provoked... 
fear and disgust may now be totally loved."(The Poetic 
Vision 190). 54
Strandberg illustrates his conception of mysticism in the later poetry
54 Strandberg ' s reference to both Blake and Wordsworth is curious because each has a 
distinct and quite different notion of the Fall. For Blake there is only a fortunate 
fall and for Wordsworth nature is not truly fallen. Also, each has a unique concept 
of innocence. 3 0
by referring to Warren's phrase, "the osmosis of being," from his 1955 
essay, "Knowledge and the Image of Man." Under this sacramental rubric, 
Strandberg sees Warren's poetry as finally reconciling the irreconcil­
able things of our experience into "an osmotic relationship that binds 
everything into unity and complicity together" (209). Strandberg con­
cludes his first volume by stating, "I think we may say that Warren's 
whole career as a poet has been evolving towards some kind of religious 
affirmation" {A Colder Fire 276). This religious affirmation finally 
qualifies Warren's interest in psychology: "Warren's interest in psy­
chology, in confronting man's darkness, is subordinate to his intensely 
religious concerns: knowledge of the self, of the meaning of existence,
of man's fate" (277). It is Warren's penchant for "moments of mysti­
cism," Strandberg says, that will prove the value of his poetry.
In all of Strandberg's meditations upon Warren's poetry, he fails 
to consider the centrality of language itself as a fundamental ontologi­
cal and theological issue for Warren. While he correctly identifies the 
Fall as a "master theme" in Warren's poetry, he does not explore it as 
either a theological or a linguistic condition. Rather, it is a psy­
chological limitation which consigns the self to search for its uncon­
scious aspects. In the later poetry, though, the limitation of the self 
is seen to be a linguistic limitation which bars the poet from the 
"unsayable." While much of what Strandberg considers to be deeply psy­
chological is evidenced in Warren's poetry prior to what we are calling 
his linguistic shift, he nonetheless overlooks even the early traces of 
this concern. In his reading of "The Mango on the Mango Tree" (Selected 
Poems: 1923-1943), he interprets "the Babel curse" as the universal
isolation of the self which is resolved in the "committing of the self 
to the universal oneness" (A Colder Fire 113-14), He fails to recognize
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this curse as a universal linguistic isolation which ultimately derives 
from the Fall. The impact of this "Babel curse" upon the self must be 
seen in the context of the poet's struggle with the fallen condition of 
language; the self's desire for identity cannot be removed from the 
poet's struggle for articulation before the unsayable. Redemption, 
then, is not the "reunification of the self" but the experience of grace 
in the poetic moment. It is the ability to speak in the face of the 
unsayable. The notion of redemption in Warren's poetry cannot be con­
strued as a movement "past the quasi-Romantic trauma of the Fall" into 
any form of "higher innocence." Warren's notion of the Fall is neither 
"quasi-Romantic," nor does it conceive of the Fall as something that can 
be moved past. Instead it is inescapably confronted in the limits of 
the sayable. Warren avoids the final resolution, unification, or recon­
ciliation that would move beyond this "mortal limit," as he called it in 
one of his latest poems. Such a movement would bring all poetry and 
speaking to an end. Strandberg, however, purports that the undiscovered 
is finally discoverable and discovered in Warren's poetry through a sort 
of Romantic mysticism. While he reckons Coleridge to be a primary 
Romantic influence, Strandberg neglects the shaping influence of Coler­
idge upon Warren's understanding of language as it relates to the symbo­
lic imagination. Coleridge's notion of the symbol provided the basis 
for Warren's understanding of "the tension of the world" as an inescapa­
bly linguistic condition. Strandberg does discuss the relationship bet­
ween the self and the world, but only in terms of the "osmotic" rela­
tionship; he misses, though, the importance of the world's voice by 
which it declares itself and by which the unsayable insinuates itself.
More recently, Robert Koppelman has exhibited similar concerns. 
Koppelman is part of what might be called the "new generation" of Warren
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critics; his work acknowledges the developments in Post-Structuralist 
critical theory and its emphasis upon language and helpfully perceives 
the way that these developments have altered the landscape of critical 
discourse. However, he reads Warren against that discourse rather than 
in continuity with its development. In his Robert Penn Warren's Modern­
ist Spirituality, 55 he acknowledges the importance of language in War­
ren's later poetry but, like Strandberg, he fails to confront the issue 
of the unsayable by insisting instead that Warren gives way to state­
ments of final meaning. Koppelman sets out to trace Warren's explora­
tion of "life as significance" (4): "Warren's quest for meaning traces
a spiritual process of conversion, remarkable for a twentieth-century 
figure who resisted religious orthodoxy but was forever returning to the 
language of absolute meaning: 'Truth' and 'God'" (4). This "modernist
spirituality," which is "always grounded in the reality of lived experi­
ence in the world," is formed within a "commitment to literature as a 
faithful and honest search for meaning" and looks toward a "redemption 
through engagement with literature and participation in the world" (4). 
Koppelman describes this spirituality in a variety of ways throughout 
his volume: it is "a sense of identification with and connection to a
power or force that is larger than one's self and that encompasses all 
of life..." (29); it bears the quality of "an ever-widening ripple 
[with] concentric circles of meaning and significance..." (34); it 
involves a "questing beyond the literal meaning of the words on the 
page..." (77). In his exploration of this spirituality in both Warren's 
fiction and poetry, Koppelman makes links to the Jungian notion of the 
undiscovered self (63, 69) and to Freudian dream imagery (59, 141).56
55 Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1995. See also his "All the 
King's Men, Spiritual Aesthetics, and the Reader," MQ XLVIII/1 (Winter 1994-95), 105- 114.
56 Runyon also emphasizes the Freudian aspects of Warren's imagery and poetic sequenc­
es. See The Braided Dream 9-10 and 224-226.
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However, what is more significant for our present study is the way
that Koppelman ties this spirituality to language, evidenced by what he
calls Warren's "belief in the interconnection of poetic and spiritual
language" (6). Koppelman clearly acknowledges Warren's sense of the
problems and limitations of language. He argues that
it is the work of Warren's last poetic phase that most viv­
idly dramatizes his literary quest for the nature of Truth 
and an exploration of the linguistic means available to an 
artist who is seeking to articulate the unlimited possibili­
ties of human experience and of nature itself (71).
So, in this later poetry, the poet reaches a "kind of redemption" by his
sense of approach to and connection with those unlimited possibilities 
which are beyond the self. This process is what Koppelman terms "a 
spiritual aesthetic" (72). Koppelman emphasizes that "the last 'grand 
phase' comes closest to redeeming both the narrative self (the subject 
of his poetry) and the very poetic language that helps to make the 
redemptive vision available to readers" (72), This is available, 
though, only because, according to Koppelman, Warren has reached a 
"degree of 'belief' in something beyond the duality of language" (80). 
Koppelman suggests that Altitudes and Extensions, Warren's final volume, 
reveals "how Warren's lifelong struggle with language reflects the 
poet's desire to dramatize spiritual experience and the extent to which 
language limits and confines our capacity to communicate that kind of 
experience" (89). His understanding of language in Warren's poetry, 
though, still rests upon a mimetic paradigm; the power of language is 
found in its power to represent something other than itself, an object 
of contemplation. In his discussion of "The Whole Q u e s t i o n , "5? he argues 
that the speaker is seeking a language "that will better represent 
experience" (91). Even when representation fails, this is seen to be
57 See our discussion of this poem in Chapter Six.
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beyond the "ordinary" function of language. Koppelman opposes this view 
of language to what he understands to be contemporary conceptions of 
language in critical theory. The following quotations suggest his sus­
picion of these current dialogues:
Warren acknowledges both the misuse and the real limitations 
of language, but he seldom rests in what contemporary liter­
ary critics might seize upon as evidence of deconstructive 
angst. Instead, Warren is far more concerned with address­
ing the very genuine and intensely meaningful experiences 
that engrave themselves in our memories, touch the deepest 
core of our being, and, yet, frustrate our linguistic 
attempts to communicate our truest self with others. War­
ren's poetry derives its power and relevance, I feel, from 
the way it emphasizes experience and the drive toward commu­
nication of experiences when it could just as easily - 
indeed far more easily - disintegrate into cerebral if not 
cynical treatises on the artifice of all language (91-92, 
emphasis his).
...Warren's late poetry envisions the truth of human experi­
ence as a special kind of knowledge that depends upon ten­
sion and irony if it is to be approached through the medium 
of poetry. As has been noted earlier, Warren's uncertainty 
about the literal truth of language does not necessarily 
mean that he held the post-structuralist view that relegates 
all experience to linguistic constructs. Rather, irony and 
tension are, for Warren, crucial linguistic moves for the 
poet who seeks what he called an "earned" vision of human 
experience (104-105).
Warren's faith in literary language as a form of truth and a 
means toward discovering the truth is the guiding principle 
that underscores his participation in both literature and 
what Jacques Derrida called "différence," or that which can­
not be represented directly by language (150),
By pitting Warren's "modernist" notion of language against the supposed 
postmodern conceptions of linguistic angst and critical cynicism, Kop­
pelman fails to see what Warren's notion of language and the "unsayable" 
might constructively contribute to these discussions. Though he pro-
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poses a "spiritual aesthetic" at work in Warren's poetry, he views lan­
guage merely as the significant means for seeking truth (151). There 
remains a divide between theological thinking and language. Warren 
seems far more preoccupied with the actual experience of confronting the 
limits of language than Koppelman is willing to admit. As a poet, he is 
not simply interested in the ability of language to transport the reader 
to a new experience. Language is the experience. Koppelman is also far 
more optimistic about "discovering the truth" than Warren seems to be 
when he questions in Audubon
Why,
Therefore, is truth the only thing that cannot
Be spoken (NSP 224-25)?
Koppelman proposes that Warren's power and relevance lies in his state­
ments and propositions about knowledge, experience, language and mean­
ing, whereas Warren contended that meaning is, "as in life,...often more 
fruitfully found in the question asked than in the answer given."ss it 
is in the process of steadily asking, "What do I really feel about 
this?" (RPW Talking 90) that the poet offers himself to language, not in 
his constant assertion of answers. This poetic of questioning provides 
a perspective on theological thinking in postmodernity, calling for a 
sense of humility before the mystery of the "unsayable."
The predominance of such psychological and "modernist" spiritual 
emphases among canonical criticism of Warren has led in part to Warren's 
excommunication from the very sorts of discussions to which Koppelman 
alludes. It would appear that since the Sixties, Warren has fallen into 
a sort of "critical gap," Despite Strandberg's helpful survey of criti­
cal responses to Warren's poetry (The Poetic Vision 1-20), there is a 
conspicuous absence of discussion about Warren and his poetry in most
58 “Afterthought" in Being Here: Poetry 1977-1980 (New York: Random House, 1980),
107-8.
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critical volumes which deal with "contemporary" American poetry since 
the Sixties. This appears to be especially the case when these volumes 
focus upon the issue of language; Warren's poetry is nowhere to be 
found in these discussions. When Warren's work is dealt with, it is 
dismissed because of his association with the New Criticism. For exam­
ple, Frank Lentricchia identifies Warren as once of the central figures 
of the New Criticism.59 Apparently unaware of Warren's own reassessment 
of that school of critical theory, Lentricchia suspends Warren's contri­
bution to critical dialogue after 1957. Rather, Warren is one of Harold 
Bloom's "dangerous precursors, the impossibly demanding father-figures 
who must be symbolically slain in an act of 'misprision,' or willful 
misreading" (319). Lentricchia points out that, despite Bloom's levell­
ing "a variety of attacks on his New-Critical forebearers" (319) 
throughout his career, his own work is built upon their influence 
through Yale University. In a curious turn, though, Harold Bloom has 
turned out to be Warren's "most recent and distinctive advocate," as 
McClatchy observed in 1989, who holds "that alone among living writers 
Warren deserves to be counted with the best American poets of our 
century."60 Bloom himself has written.
Before the publication of Incarnations: Poems 1966-1968, I
would have based my judgment of Warren's aesthetic eminence 
primarily upon his most ambitious novels, All the King's Men 
and World Enough and Time. The poetry seemed distinguished, 
yet overshadowed by Eliot, and perhaps of less intrinsic 
interest than the best poems of Ransom and Tate. But from 
Incarnations on, without a break, Warren consciously has 
taken on his full power over language and the world of the 
senses. In his varied achievement, his poetry now asserts 
the highest claim upon us.ei
59 After the New Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 4.
60 "Robert Penn Warren: Rare Prosperities," 82.
61 "Sunset Hawk: Warren's Poetry and Tradition" in A Southern Renascence Man: Views
of Robert Penn Warren, ed. by Walter B. Edgar (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana
State University Press, 1984), 59 [repr. in Modern Critical Views: Robert Penn War­
ren, ed. by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985), 195-210].
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In the aftermath of Lentricchia's reading, Bloom has seen beyond the 
anxious influence of Eliot and the restrictions of Southern patriarchy 
to consider Warren on the strength of his later poetry. Bloom refers to 
Warren as "a sunset hawk at the end of a tradition" who has come to 
terms with "the poet's agonistic striving" (78-9). If Bloom's réévalua­
tion offers an encouraging exception to the critical excommunication of 
Warren, so does Richard Jackson's reading of Warren's later poetry.62 
Jackson's work is unique in so far as it places Warren's poetry within 
discussions of temporality and language initiated by Martin Heidegger 
and carried on throughout postmodern discourse.63 in fact, Heidegger is 
one of the primary illuminating thinkers in Jackson's studies. For 
example, at the end of "The Generous Time," he states, "Warren's vision 
of Time, finally, is one of 'generosity,' a 'handing over,' as Heidegger 
calls it, of the self through the language of the poem, a handing over 
of the history the self generates through its own verbal presences"
(27). Jackson's work is also exceptional in the way that it places war­
ren within a context broader than Southern literature or the New Criti­
cism. In "The Deconstructed Moment in Modern Poetry," he groups Warren 
together with contemporary poets such as Philip Levine, Mark Strand, 
Charles Simic, David St. John, John Ashbury, A.R. Ammons, and James 
Wright - all of whom reject a spatialized time for a moment which 
retrieves through language a dynamic and pluralistic temporality (307).
1.4 The Persistence of Warren's Poetry
62 See his "The Shards of Time: Robert Penn Warren and the Moment of the Self - A
Review Essay," Southern Humanities Review 14/2 (1980), 161-67; "The Deaonstructed 
Moment in Modern Poetry," Contemporary Literature 23 (Summer 1982), 306-22; and "The 
Generous Time : Robert Penn Warren and the Phenomenology of the Moment, " Boundary 2
9/2 (Winter 1981), 1-30 (repr. in The Dismantling of Time In Contemporary Poetry 
(Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1988), 23-64).
63 In his study of Warren's novels, Barnett Guttenberg makes passing references to 
Heidegger and to a sort of existentialism at work in the fiction. See his Web of 
Being: The Novels of Robert Penn Warren (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1975).
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Regardless of the amount of critical work done on Warren's poetry 
or of the vehement denunciations of his work, we find that it is still 
before us. His poetry bears a quality which resists being put away as 
an historical artifact. When asked about the influence of Heidegger 
upon his own work, Jacques Derrida remarked, "Heidegger's texts are 
still before us; they harbor a future of meaning which will ensure that 
they are read and reread for centuries."64 This futurity marks Heideg­
ger's works as great philosophical texts: "The future of the great phi­
losophies remains obscured and enigmatic, still to be disclosed. Up to 
now, we have merely scratched the surface" (113). Warren's texts, too, 
harbor such a future of meaning which calls for a rereading of his poet­
ry. There is something about them that remains enigmatic and obscure, 
something that is yet to be disclosed. Despite the amount of criticism 
that has been devoted to these texts, there is something about them that 
urges us to begin again. Derrida says of Heidegger's texts, "No matter 
how rigorous an analysis I bring to bear on such texts, I am always left 
with the impression that there is something more to be thought" (113-14, 
emphasis his). Certainly there has been a laudable amount of rigorous 
analysis of Warren's poetry since Strandberg's first book appeared over 
thirty years ago. And yet, the greatness of Warren's poetry is that 
there is something more to be thought - not simply something about the 
texts themselves but something in light of his poetry. What might that 
"more" be?
Rather than offering a quick and simple response to this most 
important question,65 we must return to Warren's work itself and ask it 
what it means to "say the unsayable." Our goal is not to attempt to 
construct a linguistic philosophy grounded in Warren's ideas; neither is
64 See Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), 110.
65 See Derrida's response to Kearney, Dialogues 114.
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it to attempt an exhaustive reading of all of warren's later work, so 
that there will be little left to be said about Warren's poetry. Rath­
er, our hope is to read this poetry, in the light of several of Warren's 
essays and of several later essays by Heidegger, so as to ask what sort 
of poetics it contributes to both aesthetic and theological thinking in 
the postmodern context. As we begin to work toward Warren's understand­
ing of language and the act of poetic creation in his later poetry, our 
questioning must begin with Warren's 1946 essay, "A Poem of Pure Imagi­
nation: An Experiment of Reading," Warren's linguistic concepts are
rooted in and shaped by - but not limited to - Coleridge's own confron­
tation with the problem of language in his theory of the imagination and 
the symbol.
40
Chapter Two 
Warren, Coleridge and 
The Search for Language
'I could spend my life very happily studying 
Coleridge..." (Robert Penn Warren, 1977).i
2.1 Critical Introductions
Warren began working more consciously toward his later struggles 
with language and the "unsayable" in his 1946 essay on Coleridge's poem. 
The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. Originally prepared as the 1945 Bergen 
Lecture at Yale University while Warren was Consultant in Poetry in the 
Library of Congress, "A Poem of Pure Imagination: An Experiment in
Reading" provided the critical soil out of which grew his later thinking 
about the doubleness of language in the act of poetic creation as it 
brings to light the " u n s a y a b l e . "2 While such Modernist critics as 
Eliot, Richards, and Ransom each appropriated Coleridge's thought in his 
own way, it was Warren more than any other who plundered Coleridge's 
aesthetic and theological formulation of the imagination and the symbol 
for his own critical and poetic vision. In the essay he sought to pro­
vide a reading which was consistent with this Coleridge's philosophy and 
which went to the heart of Coleridge's concern for the act of poetic 
creation. Warren's understanding of the function of the imagination and 
the symbol in poetic creation forms the foundation for his thinking 
about language in the poem. It is no exaggeration, then, to say that 
this essay provides a focal point for the development of his thinking 
about the task of the poet who confronts the limitations of language.
Coleridge's impact upon this on-going struggle for articulation is
1 Talking- 246.
2 NSE 335-423. Subsequent references to this essay within notes will appear under the 
abbreviation "APPI." 4 1
obvious in one of Warren's later poems, "Pear and Trembling."3 The poem 
begins with an archetypical moment in Warren's later poetry:
The sun now angles downward, and southward.
The summer, that is, approaches its final fulfillment.
The forest is silent, no wind-stir, bird-note, or word.
It is time to meditate on what the season has meant.
This concrete moment in nature, unstable and turning, is neither time­
less nor isolated in space but is actuated in the poet's simultaneous 
encounter with language and nature. It is a moment of ripeness both at 
the end of the day and at the turning o f  the s e a s o n . 4 Within this 
moment the speaker posits, "It is time to meditate on what the season 
has meant." He then continues in the second stanza:
But what is the meaningful language for such meditation?
What is a word but wind through the tube of the throat?
Who defines the relation between the word sun and the sun?
What word has glittered on whitecap? Or lured blossom out?
Warren's speaker senses that his own language is inadequate for a medi­
tation upon the meaning of nature's turning. His own words are con­
spicuously arbitrary - "What is a word but wind..." - and so he yearns 
for a language in which word and thing are co-terminous - "What word has 
glittered on whitecap?" At the heart of his linguistic struggle is the 
problem of referentiality. He acknowledges that there is a "relation 
between the word sun and the sun," but who or what defines "the rela­
tion"? In light of the problem of referentiality, the speaker queries 
the limits of the meditation of the heart throughout the rest of the 
poem and probes the linguistic moment in nature:
Walk deeper, foot soundless, into the forest.
Stop, breath bated. Look southward, and up, where high leaves
Against sun, in vernal translucence, yet glow with the freshest
3 Rumor Verified: Poems 1979-1980 (New York: Random House, 1981), 97. See Chapter
Four for a continued discussion of this poem.
 ^This notion of ripeness is central to Incarnations; Poems 1966-1968. See espe­
cially "Where the Slow Fig's Purple Sloth" (4), "Riddle in the Garden" (7), "Where 
Purples Now the Fig" (19), and "The Leaf" (24-28).
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Young tint of the lost spring. Here now nothing grieves.
Can one, in fact, meditate in the heart, rapt and wordless?
Or find his own voice in the towering gust now from northward?
When boughs toss - is it in joy or pain or madness?
The gold leaf - is it whirled in anguish or ecstasy skyward?
Can the heart's meditation wake us from life's long sleep.
And instruct us how foolish and fond was our labor spent -
Us who now know that only at death of ambition does the deep
Energy crack crust, spurt forth, and leap
From grottoes, dark - and from the caverned enchainment?
In these stanzas Warren raises two of the issues that are at the heart 
of his linguistic concerns in his later poetry: the desire to find
one's voice before the "unsayable" and the recognition of the outward­
ness of l a n g u a g e .5 in his notion of "the caverned enchainment" there 
are also clear Platonic overtones, an issue to which he turned both in 
his study of Coleridge and in his later poetry. Warren intimates here 
that in order to speak the poet must be able to listen to language in 
the world and in his own heart. Only at the death of his ambition for a 
"pure language" will language avail itself in its fallen yet powerful 
speaking.
The issues raised in this poem about language and reference seem 
to be informed by Warren's continued interaction with Coleridge, This 
is especially the case in the second stanza which bears a striking simi­
larity to a passage from one of Coleridge's lecture note fragments, con­
tained within the volume, Shakespearean Criticism. Coleridge states, 
"The sound sun, or the figures s, u, n, are purely arbitrary modes of 
recalling the object....But the language of nature is a subordinate 
Logosf that was in the beginning, and was with the thing represented.
S Regarding the latter, see our analysis in Chapter Six of "Myth of Mountain Sunrise" 
in which Warren uses the same imagery of eruption.
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and was the thing represented."6 in a curious anticipation of Saussur- 
ian linguistics, Coleridge acknowledged the arbitrariness of the lin­
guistic sign and its reference. However, in answer to this he proposed 
the notion of the logos which was at once aesthetic and theological. In 
Coleridge's theory, the logos, that primary and personal agent of crea­
tion and revelation declared at the beginning of St John's gospel, heals 
the wound of the Fall which has split word and thing apart and defines 
the reconciled relationship between the two. The logos is both "with 
the thing represented" and "was the thing represented," making it the 
essential symbol for Coleridge. Coleridge draws from this three differ­
ent ways of approaching language: a purely arbitrary, human language, a 
more fundamental language of nature, and an essential language contained 
in the logos. While Warren never proposed to espouse any orthodox 
Christian theology, he was nonetheless impacted both by the aesthetic 
sensibility and by the theological cast of Coleridge's thinking about 
language, the imagination and symbol.
Coleridge's influence upon Warren is also attested to by the 
impact of Warren's essay not simply upon the New Criticism in America 
but more so upon the wider field of Coleridge and Romantic studies. Of 
all of Warren's critical essays, this one would appear to have been the 
most widely read, having received a variety of responses both from crit­
ics of the New Criticism who see this as a representative text and from 
critics of Coleridge's poetry. Stephen Prickett in Romanticism and 
Religion regards it as the "best discussion of the Ancient Mariner as an 
artistic whole...."? Stanley Cavell states that he knows "of no better 
discussion of the question of [the killing of the Albatross], and its
6 Quoted in Gerald L. Bruns, Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language: A Critiaal and 
Historical Study (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), 53.
1 Stephen Prickett, Romanticism and Religion: The Tradition of Coleridge and Word­
sworth in the Victorian Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 16.
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motive, than Robert Penn warren's...."s Homer Obed Brown considers War­
ren's essay to be "one of the finest examples of New Critical explica­
tion, while at the same time it places Coleridge's poem in the larger 
context of his literary, philosophical and theological theory."9 He 
goes on to praise Warren's critical foresight:
Robert Penn Warren set up the issues for future criticism, 
but what is more, he provided the basis for, indeed a solic­
itation of further attempts at interpretive totalization, 
for the necessity of reading it in some sort of integrative 
and structurally unitary way (255).
Jonathan Arac counters Brown's argument, though, by proposing that War­
ren's repetition of New Critical presuppositions and exclusion of vari­
ous parts of Coleridge's own theory pertains to "the whole problem of 
cultural reproduction" which institutionalized the New Criticism and 
established textual canons.lo one of Warren's earliest detractors was 
Elder Olson, one of the Chicago Critics who sought to counter the New 
Criticism through a primarily Aristotelian aesthetic.ii According to 
Olson, the essay "seems..to be valuable principally as exhibiting what 
happens to poetry in interpretation, and not particularly valuable as a 
comment upon the poem" (138). Olson rejects warren's argument that the 
poem is symbolic and maintains that "Warren's interpretation clearly 
makes the poem what Coleridge calls 'allegory'" (142). William Empson 
was also among Warren's detractors. Although he found the essay on his 
second reading to be "better than it seemed in my vague memory of it,"
8 "In Quest of the Ordinary: Texts of Recovery" in Romanticism and Contemporary
Criticismr ed. by Morris Eaves and Michael Fischer (Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni­versity Press, 1986), 194.
9 "The Art of Theology and the Theology of Art: Robert Penn Warren's Reading of 
Coleridge's The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," Boundary 2 8/1 (Fall 1979), 238.
"Repetition and Exclusion: Coleridge and New Criticism Reconsidered," Boundary 2
8/1 (Fall 1979), 261.
11 "A Symbolic Reading of the Ancient Mariner" in Critics and Criticism: Ancient and
Modern, ed, by R.S. Crane (Chicago; The University Of Chicago Press, 1952), 138-144. 
See also R.S. Crane's entry on "The Chicago Critics" in Encyclopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics, ed. by Alex Preminger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 116-17.
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Empson still considered Warren's work to be a prime example of Symbolist 
criticism, which "invites irrationalism."12 More recently, David Perkins 
has attempted to point out what he calls Warren's "New Critical naivete" 
in his tacit assumption "that his interpretation of the poem would have 
been Coleridge's also."13 Perkins also argues that "Warren's concepts of 
symbolism were not drawn from Coleridge but from well-known theories in 
psychology, anthropology, and the arts and, in the literary milieu, from 
symbolisme, Yeats, Ernst Cassirer, C.S. Lewis, Susanne Langer, and so 
forth" (431).
Despite these praises and denunciations of Warren's critical work, 
the great value of this essay for our present study is found not only in 
his analysis of the imagination and symbol but also in the character of 
his experimental reading. While Warren's work displays a degree of 
aptitude in a kind of literary-historical scholarship, this is eclipsed 
by the overriding sense of the poet's ultimate concern for the nature of
poetic creation. Warren's reading of The Ancient Mariner is filled with
a high degree of self-consciousness. Inasmuch as the poem embodies what 
he called "the question of the poet to himself," his essay seems to pose
to himself the question of the act of poetic creation in the poet's con­
frontation with the unsayable. In A Plea in Mitigation, warren identi­
fies the Ancient Mariner as one of several Romantic poems which "plagued 
the question" of the role of the poet and the relation of poetry and 
truth (8-9), He sharpens this distinction in "A Poem of Pure Imagina­
tion" by contending that, in its dealing with these issues, it was a 
central poem among Romantic poetry. The Ancient Mariner certainly is 
not, in his estimation, "one of the 'great formless poems' which the
12 "The Ancient Mariner: An Answer to Warren," ed. by John Haffenden, MR NS 15/1
(1993), 155-56.
13 "The 'Ancient Mariner' and its interpreters: some versions of Coleridge," Modern
Language Quarterly 57/3 (September 1996), 425-48.
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Romantics are accused of writing, and not a poem which would fit into T. 
S. Eliot's formula of the dissociated sensibility of the period" (394). 
warren takes the poem to be "central and seminal for the poet himself" 
as well as "central for its age, providing not a comment on an age, but 
a focus of the being and issues of that age" (394). Warren pinpoints 
the "focus of the being and the issues of that age" when he states that 
he considers the poem to be "a document of the very central and crucial 
issue of the period: the problem of truth and poetry" (380). Although 
he sees the roots of this issue in the Platonic dialogue Ion, Warren 
claims that this was "directly or indirectly, an obsessive theme for 
poetry itself" during the Romantic period. He suggests that these poets 
sought to establish "a holy alliance between poetry and truth," but this 
effort was frustrated by the rise of the scientific world view, so that 
during this period, "There were two truths, and they themselves might 
very well be in deadly competition: the truth of religion and the truth 
of science" (381). In this competition, the Romantic poets maintained 
"that poetry gives truth; or if they were as subtle as Coleridge, they 
sought to establish an intimate and essential connection between truth 
and poetry on psychological as well as metaphysical grounds" (381).
This issue continued to be a central issue for Warren as well as for New 
Critics and Modernist critics who were the heirs of this Romantic vision 
in a similar cultural and social milieu. They struggled to create a 
space in which poetry might speak its truth in the midst of a world 
which relied upon science alone as a truth-register. Warren, however, 
sees in the work of Coleridge, as opposed to that of Shelley or Word­
sworth, an effort toward reconciliation between all areas of thought: 
"But the main problem of reconciliation for Coleridge was that between 
poetry and religion, or morality, for since those were his twin pas­
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sions, it was necessary for him to develop some vital connection between 
them if he was to be happy" (381). With his own aesthetic and theologi­
cal concerns, Warren sought a similar reconciliation between poetry and 
the unsayable.
Warren's outline of Coleridge's detailed solution to the recon­
ciliation of the poetic and the theological in the act of poetic crea­
tion indicates the way that Warren began to come to grips with the 
struggle to "say the unsayable." For Warren - as for Coleridge - the 
struggle with language centred on the problem of representation and ref­
erence. Warren worked with a great awareness of the crisis of moderni­
ty: the experience of alienation after the "death of God," in which
individuals, as well as words and things, seem to be irreparably sepa­
rated. This crisis, however, was the same confrontation with the lin­
guistic consequences of the Fall experienced by Coleridge. As Warren 
moved away from viewing language as a tool for prying open reality and 
toward contemplating language itself as the problematic for the poet, 
the fractured and arbitrary nature of language opened up a fundamental 
problem for the poet: what is the nature of the poet's task if language
both reveals and hides, if, like Derrida's pharmakon, it both heals and 
wounds? If, as Jefferson surmises in Brother to Dragons, "language 
betrays," then what is a poet to do?i4 is there an "adequate" language 
available? Does "poetic language" transcend these limits, or does it 
merely incarnate them all the more concretely? Does "poetic structure" 
coerce the recalcitrance of language into a yielding, subservient 
instrument? Warren's wrestling with these issues began to take shape in 
his study of Coleridge's "Rime of the Ancient Mariner;" however, this 
study did not yield firm answers, as much as it established for Warren
Near the beginning of Brother to Dragons, Jefferson interrupts himself and says 
"Yes, what was I saying? Language betrays. / There are no words to tell Truth." 
Brother to Dragons: A New Version (New York: Random House, 1979), 7.
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what are the appropriate questions for the poet to ask. In this chapter 
we will trace out Warren's argument regarding the imagination and symbol 
in the light of the development of Coleridge's linguistic philosophy.
In the next chapter, we shall explore the way that Warren continued to 
develop the central issues raised by his reading of Coleridge in his 
1969 poem, Audubon: A Vision. It is this poem which opens up the aes­
thetic and theological questions of language raised in Warren's later 
poetry.
2.2 Warren and The Ancient Mariner
While Warren's essay concentrates primarily upon the function of 
the imagination within The Ancient Mariner, it also seeks to vindicate 
Coleridge's formulation of the imagination from previous interpretations 
of the poem through "an experiment in reading." He sets out to present 
a "new" reading of the poem, one that he considers to be consistent with 
Coleridge's aesthetic as a whole. But, this reading is also polemical. 
He strives to show the limitations and problems of several previous 
interpretations of this enigmatic poem, primarily those of Griggs and 
Lowes, for whom "...the poem is nothing more than a pleasant but mean­
ingless dream" (340).is Warren's objection to the readings of both crit­
ics is rooted in the priority he places upon the role of the imagination 
in Coleridge's overall philosophy and in the poem itself. Griggs' read­
ing represents what Warren calls "a brand of hyperaesthetical criticism" 
of the poem, which he describes as inherent to a theory of "'pure poet­
ry' - some notion that a poem should not 'mean' but 'be,' and that the 
'be-ing' of a poem does not 'mean'" (337). Ultimately, The Ancient Mar­
iner is for Griggs "a journey into the supernatural for the sake of the 
journey" (340). Warren also rejects Lowes' moralistic criticism of the
Warren quotes from both; The Best of Coleridge, ed. by Earl Leslie Griggs (New 
York, 1934), and John Livingston Lowes, The Road to Xanadu (Boston, 1927).49
poem, summarizing his reading of the moral of the poem as, "a man should 
not have to suffer so much just for shooting a bird" (339). In light of 
Lowe's statement in The Road to Xanadu that the poem's "inconsequence is 
the dream's irrelevance" (340), Warren asserts that the poem is for him 
"an illusion for the sake of illusion" (340). Warren also responds to 
what he considers to be other fallacious interpretations based upon 
false critical pretences. For example, Warren wants to distinguish what 
he means by the "theme" of the poem from the idea of "the personal 
theme" which seems to have held a central position in interpretations of 
the poem. He cites Kenneth Burke's concern in The Philosophy of Liter­
ary Form for "the sexual and opium motives" in Coleridge's composition
(349). Furthermore, when Warren turns to consider the nature of the 
Mariner's act, he strongly rejects both literalist and allegorical read­
ings. He especially cites Gingerich's reading which attributes the Mar­
iner's act to a necessitarian philosophy; "the Mariner does not act but 
is constantly acted upon, that 'he is pursued by a dark and sinister 
fate' after having done the deed 'impulsively and wantonly' and presum­
ably under necessity" (356). Warren's skepticism about these various 
readings hinges upon their limited interpretation of Coleridge's theory 
of the imagination and the symbol. He says of Griggs and Lowes that 
"they take the word imagination here at their own convenience and not in 
Coleridge's context and usage" (341).
The second part of his polemic is to vindicate what he calls "a 
discursive reading of the symbol which is the poem" (398). Warren's 
experimental reading sets out not only "to establish that The Ancient 
Mariner does embody a statement" (337-38) but also "to establish that 
the statement which the poem does ultimately embody is thoroughly con­
sistent with Coleridge's basic theological and philosophical views as
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given to us in sober prose..." (339).us The statement of the poem con­
sists in the primary and secondary themes which he identifies. The 
primary theme -—  which is not more important than the secondary but is, 
according to Warren, "at the threshold of the poem" —  is that of the 
sacramental vision or the "One Life" (348). According to Warren, this 
identifies "the issue of the fable," or the basic narrative of crime, 
punishment, repentance, and recognition. The sacramental vision of The 
Ancient Mariner brings to light the metaphysical and theological issues 
of the mystery of original sin and of the Fall of humanity in Adam, the 
primary symbol for humanity in Coleridge's thought. The secondary theme 
of the imagination has to do with "the context of values" which the poem 
"may be found ultimately to embody." These values undergird the meta­
physical nature of the sacramental vision which extends his interpreta­
tion of the imagination to the theological notions of the fall and of 
original sin found throughout the poem. Warren's professed goal, 
though, is to define the way in which these two themes undergo a "final 
symbolic fusion in the poem" (349), because it is this symbolic fusion 
which reveals something about the nature of literary creation as Coler­
idge understood it.
Warren's emphasis upon the symbolic fusion also helps us to under­
stand the way Coleridge came to characterize his own struggle with lan­
guage. These two themes and their fusion - which Warren calls "the cen­
tral and crucial fact" of the poem (380) - reveal what happens when the 
poet wrestles with language in order to create a poem, warren says 
toward the end of the essay that he has tried "to show, by dwelling on 
details as well as on the broad, central images, that there is in The 
Ancient Mariner a relatively high degree of expressive integration"
This was the crux of Olson's objection to Warren's reading of The Ancient Mariner. 
"We may indeed worry about whether. ..it is not an absurdity to conceive of a poem - i.e., any imitative poem - as having a theme or meaning," See Olson 139n.
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(390). He goes on to say, "For I take the poem to be one in which the 
vital integration is of a high order....It is, in short, a work of 'pure 
imagination'" (394), By looking for a high degree of "vital integra­
tion" in the poem, Warren seeks to apply Coleridge's own aesthetic, as 
he understands it, to the interpretation of the poem, to take his theory 
of the imagination and his formulation of the symbol as the most helpful 
perspective. Warren says that to look at this poem "in the light of the 
poet's lifelong preoccupations, we may come to conclude, with Leslie 
Stephen, that 'the germ of all Coleridge's utterances may be found...in 
the 'Ancient Mariner'" (394). Warren's interpretation of the poem cer­
tainly leads us to Coleridge's utterances about language and its role in 
his aesthetic theory. As Coleridge's stress upon the symbol shaped his 
own life-long struggle to validate a linguistic theory, so it was this 
theory which shaped Warren's own coming to terms with the problem of 
language.
2.3 The Imagination as Living Power
While Warren does not analyze in his essay the development of 
Coleridge's linguistics, he does pay particular attention to the imagi­
nation as the root of Coleridge's thinking about the symbol and poetic 
language. While Warren does not provide a "detailed exposition of the 
stages of [the imaginations's] growth and clarification" (342) but 
instead considers its poetic function within The Ancient Mariner, we 
want to explore these stages of growth and clarification more in depth 
in specific relation to the development of Coleridge's linguistic theo­
ry, using Warren's essay as our pretext. Warren begins his discussion 
of the imagination by quoting the "key passage" on the imagination from
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Chapter 13 of the Blographia Literaria (1817).i7 rn this chapter, 
Coleridge expounds the idea of imagination as a reconciling and complet­
ing power in light of his attempt to construct a true transcendental 
philosophy. He begins from the Kantian presupposition that nature is 
composed of two contrary forces, "the one of which tends to expand infi­
nitely, while the other strives to apprehend or find itself in this 
infinity..." (1.297). These are not contradictory in the sense that 
they "must neutralize or reduce each other to inaction" (1.299); follow­
ing Kant, these are opposites or contraries which are "real without 
being contradictory" (1.298). If these two forces are contrary without 
being contradictory, then the problem of transcendental philosophy is 
"to discover the result or product of two such forces" (1.299). Their 
relationship is generative of "one power with its two inherent 
indestructible yet counteracting forces, and the results or generations 
to which their inter-penetration gives existence in the living principle 
and in the process of our own self-consciousness" (1.299).
That this "one power" is what Coleridge conceives to be the imagi­
nation becomes evident at the end of this chapter, where he makes his 
clearest distinction between the primary and the secondary imagination.
The imagination then I consider either as primary, or sec­
ondary, The primary imagination I hold to be the living 
power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo 
of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet 
still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agen­
cy, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its 
operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to 
re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet 
still, at all events, it struggles to idealize and to unify.
It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects)
17 Biographie Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions, CC 
7, ed. by James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 2 vols (London: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul;
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Subsequent references to this volume
will appear in the text under the abbreviation BL.
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are essentially fixed and dead (1.304).
It is by means of the primary imagination that we are able to perceive 
ourselves in the midst of an intelligible world and are able to exercise 
a conscious will. The exercise of the human will as a finite repetition 
of the eternal will of God as displayed in the act of creation, is cen­
tral in all of Coleridge's thinking about the imagination and is a key 
feature in Warren's subsequent thought. The secondary imagination, as 
an exercise of the creative will to idealize and unify, is an echo of 
the former, by which we perceive all things. This specific creative 
will co-exists with the conscious will, and differs only in the degree 
and mode of its activity. In "Appendix C" of The Statesman's Manual, 
Coleridge describes the imagination as that "completing power which 
unites clearness with depth, the plenitude of the sense with the compre­
hensibility of the understanding..." (69)is When the understanding 
becomes "impregnated" with the imagination, it then "becomes intuitive, 
and a living power" (69). Apart from this power of the imagination, the 
understanding would function at the level of fancy alone. Coleridge 
says in Chapter 9 of the Blographia that as a result of his early rela­
tionship with Wordsworth and his reading of Wordsworth's poetry he came 
"to suspect —  that fancy and imagination were two distinct and widely 
different faculties, instead of being, according to the general belief, 
either two names with one meaning, or at furthest the lower and higher 
degree of one and the same power" (1.82). Coleridge described the fancy
as
no other mode than a mode of memory emancipated from the 
order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by 
that empirical phenomenon of the will which we express by 
the word choice. But equally with the ordinary memory it 
must receive all its materials ready made from the law of
18 The Statesman's Manual in Lay Sermons, OC 5, ed. by R.J. White (London; Routledge 
and Kegan Paul; Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1972), 3-114.
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association (1.305).
The fancy, instead of being re-creative and unifying, is merely descrip­
tive. In terms of his later linguistic observations, the fancy seeks to 
give permanence to things by formulating linguistic abstractions. In 
the hands of the fancy, language is used as a tool. Understanding the 
importance of this distinction in Coleridge's philosophy, Warren is con­
cerned to preserve the its integrity in his reading of The Ancient Mar­
iner. He rebuts the argument of several critics who confuse Coleridge's 
distinction;
Actually, a little reflection instructs us that the word was 
for Coleridge freighted with a burden of speculation and f
technical meaning. His theory of the imagination, upon 
which his whole art-philosophy hinges, 'was primarily the 
vindication of a particular attitude to life and reality'"
("APPI" 341).
Coleridge's concern for the imagination is evident in his earliest
work and bears an important relationship to Coleridge's subsequent
thinking about language. He begins Chapter 14 of the Blographia by
recounting the growth of his thinking about the power of poetry;
During the first year that Mr. Wordsworth and I were neigh- 
boursis our conversations turned frequently to the two car­
dinal points of poetry, the power of exciting the sympathy 
of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of 
nature, and the power of giving the interest of novelty by 
the modifying colours of imagination (II.5).
At this early stage, Coleridge links the emotive power of poetic lan­
guage to a "faithful adherence to the truth of nature" and to a commit­
ment to the modifying power of the imagination, by which poetry dis­
solves, diffuses, and dissipates what is given in order to re-create.
Warren quite aptly argues against any strict division of Coleridge's 
work into a distinct poetic or creative phase and a distinct critical
19 The year is probably 1797.
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phase, which would place Coleridge's concern for the imagination as a 
late development, perhaps the direct result of his time spent in Germa­
n y .  20 In a footnote Warren appears to gloss Coleridge's comment in the
Blographia;
First, Coleridge says flatly that he had become aware of the 
special power of the imagination at an early date, his 
"twenty-fourth year."...The whole discussion of the origin 
of the Lyrical Ballads makes it clear beyond doubt that the 
basic conception of the imagination had been arrived at 
early ("APPI" 400-401).
However, this preoccupation is apparent even as early as 17 95, in his
"Lecture on the Slave-Trade," in which he states,
To develope the powers of the Creator is our proper employ­
ment - and to imitate Creativeness by combination our most
exalted and self-satisfying Delight. But we are progressive 
and must not rest content with present Blessings. Our 
Almighty Parent hath therefore given to us Imagination that 
stimulates to the attainment of real excellence by the con­
templation of splendid Possibilities that still revivifies 
the dying motive within us, and fixing our eye on the glit­
tering Summits that rise one above the other in Alpine end­
lessness still urges us up the ascent of Being, amusing the 
ruggedness of the road with the beauty and grandeur of the 
ever-widening Prospect. Such and so noble are the ends for 
which this restless faculty was given us - but horrible has 
been its misapplication.21
Even here, Coleridge is thinking in terms of the revivifying power of 
the imagination as "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act 
of creation in the infinite I AM." He seems to look forward from the 
notion of the imagination as "living power" to his later conception of 
language as "living words."
This passage also betrays the theological significance of the
20 See Footnote 3, "APPI" 400-401.
21 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lectures 1795 On Politics and Religion, CC 1, ed. by Lewis 
Patton and Peter Mann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Princeton; Princeton Univers­
ity Press, 1971), 235-36.
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imagination for Coleridge, His symbol of the Alpine summits which end­
lessly rise one above the other reveals what he conceives to be the real
power of the imagination: it is by means of the imagination that we move
"up the ascent of Being" and gain "the ever-widening prospect."22 warren 
does not ignore this dimension of the imagination. In fact, he takes
I.A. Richards to task for "casting into psychological terms what in 
Coleridge's thought appears often in theological and metaphysical 
terms...," and though Coleridge "defended the use of the word psycholog-
:
icalf he was not content to leave the doctrine of the creativity of the
mind at the psychological level" (345). Warren goes on to describe the
theological import of the imagination in terms of the imago dels
There is a God, and the creativity of the human mind, both
in terms of the primary and in terras of the secondary imagi­
nation, is an analogue of Divine creation and a proof that 
man is created in God's image....Reason, as opposed to the 
understanding, is, in Coleridge's system, the organ whereby 
man achieves the 'intuition and spiritual consciousness of 
God,' and the imagination operates to read Nature in the 
light of that consciousness, to read it as a symbol of God.
It might be said that reason shows us God, and imagination 
shows us how Nature participates in God (345).
Human creativity, for Coleridge, was not merely a psychological phenome­
non shaped strictly by sense experience in an empirical world; rather, |
its roots are embedded in man's creaturely nature, being made in the 
image of God, Because of this, the imagination is an innate part of the 
human make-up by which the mind is able to "read" nature as a "symbol of 
God." Coleridge's insistence upon the innate nature of the imagination 
- based upon the analogue of the human mind to the divine - defined his 
understanding of language and distinguished it from the predominant 
mechanistic and materialistic theories of language in seventeenth and
22 Note the almost Heideggerian concern for being in its relationship to the imagina­
tion and language.
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eighteenth century philosophy.
2.4 Language as Living Words
Coleridge's earliest reflections on language reveal a mixture of 
his philosophical, theological and poetic concerns. According to Good- 
son, though, poetic language was his "originating question": "In the 
beginning Coleridge was occupied with language in its poetic 
setting...."23 These reflections on language were shaped by his interac­
tion with the works of Locke, Hartley, and Berkeley, and were concerned 
with problems which the Rationalists and Empiricists sought to solve, 
such as the relation of thing to thought, the distinction between pre­
sentation and representation, and the differences between sensation, 
perception and feeling.24 Coleridge was particularly influenced by the 
differences between the idealism of George Berkeley and the empiricism 
of John Locke. Coleridge adamantly rejected Locke's fundamental repu­
diation of the rationalist theory of innate notions, the repudiation 
which formed the singular presupposition of his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690).25 Locke proposed that such a notion was built upon 
a "universal consent" that
there are certain principles, both speculative and 
practical..., universally agreed upon by all mankind: which
therefore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions 
which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and 
which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily 
and really as they do any of their inherent faculties 
(1.2.2).
Locke argues, however, that the mind is in its first being a tabula
28 A.C. Goodson, "Coleridge on Language: A Poetic Paradigm," Philological Quarterly 62/1 (1983), 48.
24 ihe Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by Kathleen Coburn, Vol 3: 1808-1819
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 3605n. Please note that references to the
Notebooks are to the entry number and not to the page number. Subsequent references to this volume will appear in the text under the abbreviation CW III.
25 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 
1959). References are to the book, chapter and paragraph numbers in the text.
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rasa, void, of these ideas, and contends that principles only enter the 
mind through the use of reason by means of the senses; as he says, "the 
foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses"
(111.11.23). He states.
The senses at first let in particular ideas and furnish the 
yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar 
with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names 
got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding further, 
abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general 
names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with 
ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise 
its discursive faculty (1.2.15).
Locke then goes on to discuss the relationship between language and 
ideas in Book III, "Of Words." He argues that man has by nature organs 
which are "so fashioned as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which 
we call words" (III.l.l), but this is not to say that language is in any 
way innate. Words signify only ideas in Locke's theory, "those names 
becoming general which are made to stand for general ideas, and those 
remaining particular where the ideas they are used for are particular" 
(III.1.3). But, if the "whole extent of our knowledge or imagination 
reaches not beyond our own ideas, limited to our own ways of perception"
(111.11.23), then language, as well as the imagination, cannot extend to 
have any vital interaction with things. Rather it is an obscure and 
unclear relation between word and thing which ultimately divides the one 
from the other. Locke contends that "it is a perverting the use of 
words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their sig­
nification, whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we 
have in our own minds" (III.2.5).
This radical division between word and thing in Locke's philosophy 
violated Coleridge's concern for a unified vision which could sustain 
the identity of word and thing. For Coleridge, language is the wheels
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upon which Ezekiel's chariot was carried along, as he describes it in 
The Statesman's Manual. Coleridge, therefore, states in the Blographia 
that he summarily rejected Locke's system because he could not find in 
it "an abiding place for my reason" (1.141). This statement is signifi­
cant in light of his linking the imagination with reason. Ultimately 
Locke's system could not make a place for the imagination as Coleridge 
understood it. After his time in Germany, Coleridge continued to 
express his great concern over the influence of Locke's philosophy. For 
instance, Coleridge rejected James Mackintosh's views because of the 
letter's adherence to Locke's notion of the non-innateness of all 
ideas.26 in a notebook entry from 1801, Coleridge proposed an "Essay on 
Locke" in which he would seek to vindicate the power, ability and role 
of the creative imagination. According to Coburn, Coleridge believed 
that the "creative human mind brings what is dim and unrealized into 
clarity," as is displayed most prominently in Shakespeare, as well as 
the Bible.27 it is the living power of the imagination which vivifies 
and links the act of perception with the creative will. Even in 1807, 
Coleridge wrote in his notebook.
Time, Space, Duration, Action, Active, Passion, Passive, 
Activeness, Passiveness, Reaction, Causation, Affinity - 
here assemble all the Mysteries - known, all is known - 
unknown, say rather, merely known, all is unintelligible/ 
and yet Locke & the stupid adorers of thi-e- that Fetisch 
Earth-clod, take all these for granted. ...28
In rejecting Lockean empiricism, Coleridge entertained the philo­
sophical system of the eighteenth century English philosopher, David
26 See The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by Kathleen Coburn, Vol 1: 1794-
1804 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 634. Subsequent references to thisvolume will appear in the text under the abbreviation CN I.
27 See CN I.930n.
28 The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by Kathleen Coburn, Vol 2: 1804-1808 
(London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 3156. Subsequent references to this volume will appear in the text under the abbreviation CN II.
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Hartley, who espoused the doctrine of association. Associationism, with 
roots in Aristotelian thought, observes in "the spontaneous movements of 
thought and the principle of their intellectual mechanism" a "law of 
association as established in the contemporaneity of the original 
impressions" and then seeks to center this as "the basis of all true 
psychology" (1.91). Abrams identifies this law as part of the overall 
mechanical theory of literary invention which was prevalent in i
eighteenth century efforts "to import into the psychical realm the 
explanatory scheme of physical science, and so to extend the victories 
of mechanics from matter to mind."29 Coleridge, however, apparently saw 
in Hartley's formulation of this doctrine a possible response to the 
starkness of Locke's position. His interests in this law were naturally
■ f
drawn by the question of human perception. According to Abrams, Hartley 
"set out to demonstrate rigorously that all the complex contents and 
processes of mind are derived from the elements of simple sensation,
:
combined by the single link of contiguity in original experience"
{Mirror 162). In Chapters 5 through 9 of the Blographia, Coleridge 
recounts the history of the law of association, tracing its development 
from Aristotle to Hartley. In Chapter 5, Coleridge goes back to Aristo­
tle in order to find "the fullest and most perfect enunciation of the 
associative principle" (I.100) and summarizes Aristotle's "general law 
of association" in this way: "Ideas by having been together acquire a /f
power of recalling each other; or every partial representation awakes 
the total representation of which it had been a part" (1.102-103).
Coleridge is critical of what he calls the "principle of contemporanei­
ty, which Aristotle had made the common condition of all the laws of 
association..." (I.110). Ultimately Coleridge saw the law of associa-
29 M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1953), 159.
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tion as "the universal law of the passive fancy and mechanical 
memory..." (1.103-104), which denies the power of the imagination and 
the importance of its relationship to human language. Coleridge also 
points to Descartes as another exponent of the law of association; he 
sought
to establish it as a general law that contemporaneous 
impressions, whether images or sensations, recall each other 
mechanically. On this principle, as a ground work, he built 
up the whole system of human language as one continued pro­
cess of association....As one word may become the general 
exponent of many, so by association a simple image may rep­
resent a whole class (1.94-95).
If impressions merely "recall one another mechanically," then the con­
scious will is denied its role in the act of poetic creation. If lan­
guage is simply "one continued process of association," between ideas in 
the mind, then word and thing are still divided. The problem with the 
Aristotelian and Cartesian formulations - as well as those of Hobbes and 
Vives - is precisely this rift between subject and object, thought and 
feeling, word and thing.
However, Coleridge turned away from Hartley's system, especially 
because of its inadequate formulation of the relation between word and 
thing. Coleridge's early devotion to Hartley was mitigated first by his 
readings in the mystical and theosophical traditions - especially in 
Plotinus and Boehme - and then later by his reading of Kant and Schell- 
ing. Warren points out, however, that this early deference to Hartley 
can hardly be seen as a complete adoption of his thought as a system. 
Warren quotes a statement made by Coleridge "during the years imme­
diately leading up to the composition of The Ancient Mariner: 'I am a 
complete necessitarian, and I understand the subject almost as well as 
Hartley himself, but I go farther than Hartley, and believe the corpore­
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ality of thought, namely that it is motion'" ("APPI" 356). The way in 
which Coleridge understood himself to "go farther than Hartley" is pre­
cisely in the relationship between idea and thing, or word and thing.
By specifying the corporeal nature of thought as motion, Coleridge is 
anticipating his later discussion of the symbol in The Statesman's Manu­
al. Thought functions by symbols, which "are the wheels Ezekiel 
beheld." In the Blographia, Coleridge summarizes the Hartleyan associa­
tionism and outlines why he eventually rejected it. His rejection cen­
tered upon the system's implications for language. Hartley's theory 
extended the materialist tradition which had originated in Aristotle's 
philosophy and had impacted the eighteenth century primarily through 
Descartes and Hobbes. Coleridge refers at the beginning of Chapter 6 of 
the Blographia to "Hartley's hypothetical vibrations in his hypothetical 
oscillating ether of the nerves" (1.106) and goes on the explain why 
such a mechanical system is not only untenable but is not - in his opin­
ion - properly philosophical. Hartley proposed that ideas are vibra­
tions in the mind which correspond to external objects; so, the idea or 
vibration a is produced by and corresponds to the external object A. If 
each vibration has a distinct cause, then how could ideas be associated 
to one another? Coleridge summarizes it in this way:
To understand this, the attentive reader need only be 
reminded that the ideas are themselves, in Hartley's system, 
nothing more than their appropriate configurative vibra­
tions. It is a mere delusion of the fancy to conceive the 
pre-existence of the ideas in any chain of association as so 
many differently colored billiard-balls in contact, so that 
when an object, the billiard-stick, strikes the first or 
white ball, the same motion propagates itself through the 
red, green, blue, black, etc., and sets the whole in motion.
Nol we must suppose the very same force which constitutes 
the white ball to constitute the red or black; or the idea 
of a circle to constitute the idea of a triangle; which is 
impossible (1.108).
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In his Observations on Man (1754), Hartley applied his doctrine of asso­
ciation to language: "Words and Phrases must excite Ideas in us by
Association, and they excite Ideas in us by no other means."30 if the 
only relationship between words and ideas is a law of association which 
depends upon the notion of contemporaneity, then words and ideas (or 
things) are still divided from one another.
By 1797 George Berkeley had become Coleridge's favored muse.3i 
Warren points out that in a letter of December of 17 96 to John Thelwall, 
we "find Coleridge saying flatly, 'I am a Berkleyan'" ("APPI" 357). 
Coleridge suggests on a number of occasions that he preferred Berkeley's 
metaphor of perception more so than that of Locke. In a notebook entry 
from 1809, he stated his understanding of the difference between the two 
philosophers: "Berkeley's Idealism may be thus illustrated: Our per­
ceptions are impressions on our own minds standing to the external cause 
in the relation of the picture on the Canvass to the Painter, rather 
than in that of the Image in the Mirror to the Object reflected" {CN 
III.3605 fl20v). Berkeley's system was rooted in an idealist metaphysic 
in which, according to McKusick, "God is an active presence in the vis­
ible universe, and the act of perception is nothing other than the 
apprehension of the ideas by which he manifests himself" (27). What 
appealed to Coleridge was the way this system subverted both the materi­
alist and mechanistic views common to the Deism which descended from 
Locke, Coleridge was drawn to what he considered to be the theological 
possibilities of Berkeley's notion of "outness" and of his formulation 
of what he called the Divine Visual Language, Coleridge adopted Berke­
ley's notion of outness when formulating his own theory of the symbol.
80 Quoted in Goodson, "Coleridge on Language" 55.
81 For a helpful summary of Berkeley's thought and its influence on Coleridge, see 
James G. McKusick, Coleridge's Philosophy of Language, Yale Studies in English 195 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 26-32.
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However, Coleridge was also deeply influenced by Berkeley's concept of 
nature as the Divine Visual Language, in which he surmised that nature 
is the primary way of communication between God and man - in this way 
Berkeley is able to hold that Christian faith may justly be based on 
sense-experience alone - and that these appearances form a kind of lan­
guage which is analogous to human language.
This view accorded with Coleridge's sacramental or "organic" view 
of nature and reality which Warren observes to be so central to The 
Ancient Mariner. Berkeley held, however, that natural signs were arbi­
trary, as arbitrary as signs in human language. Coleridge seems to have 
agreed with this notion of linguistic arbitrariness. In a notebook 
entry from 1801, Coleridge writes.
It seems to elucidate the Theory of Language, Hartley,32 just 
able to speak a few words, making a fire-place of stones, 
with stones for fire - four stones - fire-place - two stones 
- fire - /arbitrary symbols in Imagination...(CW 1.918).33
The arbitrariness to which Coleridge refers is the assigning of the same 
stones different functions, and yet these symbols function powerfully - 
for Hartley - by means of the imagination. Coleridge distinguished, 
though, between such arbitrary, "human" signs and natural signs. He 
understood natural signs, or the language of nature, to be far less 
arbitrary than signs in human language. So, in the lecture fragment, 
"Genius and Public Taste," Coleridge suggests that, though human lan­
guage so often functions by purely arbitrary modes, the language of 
nature is more than arbitrary because it is "a subordinate L o g o s . "34 
Coleridge was able to make this adjustment to Berkeley's position 
through his interaction with various texts, not least of which was the
32 Coleridge is referring here to his son, and not to David Hartley.
33 See also Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Anima Poetae (London: William Heinemann, 1895), 
13.
34 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Shakespearean Criticism, ed. by Thomas Middleton Raysor, 2 
vols. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1960), 11.185.
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first chapter of John's Gospel which declares that the Logos was in the 
beginning, was with God, and was God. He also drew upon his reading of 
the eighteenth century English philologist John Horne Tooke and his deep 
knowledge of the theosophico-metaphysical tradition , particularly in 
the works of Jacob Boehme and Plotinus. McKusick, though, points out 
how Berkeley's doctrine provided the means by which Coleridge was able 
to respond to Hartley: "But Coleridge adopted Berkeley's philosophy for
the sake of its idealism, as a way of emancipating himself from the tyr­
anny of Hartleyan associationism, and he does not hesitate to press its 
conclusions farther than Berkeley ever dared" (29).
Prior to leaving for Gottingen in 1798, Coleridge began to inter­
act with the work of Tooke, whom Coleridge knew not only as a philolo­
gist but as a political radical. Coleridge may well have been aware of 
Tooke before he was tried for treason in 1794, but it wasn't until 
several years later that Coleridge actually met T o o k e . 35 it was Tooke's 
Ejtea UrepoevTa or The Diversions of Parley (published in two volumes,
1786 and 1805, respectively) which provided an abundance of critical 
grist for Coleridge's deliberations about language. In the Diversions 
of Parley, Tooke states, "The business of the mind, as far as it con­
cerns Language, appears to me to be very simple. It extends no further 
than to receive impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Peelings. 
What are called its operations, are merely the operations of L a n g u a g e . "35 
That the functions of the mind are verbal was appealing to Coleridge; 
however, it was Tooke's concept of "winged words" which proved espe­
cially helpful for Coleridge as he sought for a non-mechanistic view of 
language. His own concept of ejteot ^oovxa, or "living words," seems to 
have been an adaptation of Tooke's notion. In his Fifth Lecture of the
35 See Coleridge, Leatures 1795: On Politics and RBligion 19; McKusick 38-39.
36 Quoted in Goodson, "Coleridge on Language" 54.
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1808 "Lectures on Shakespeare and Milton," Tomalin reports,
Horne Tooke had called his book Epea Pteroenta, 'winged 
words.' In Coleridge's judgment it might have been much 
more fitly called Verba Viventia, or 'living words,' for 
words are the living products of the living mind and could 
not be a due medium between the thing and the mind unless 
they partook of both. 37
What is curious about Coleridge's enthusiasm for Tooke's linguistics,
though, is that his position was primarily a materialist one. McKusick
points out that Tooke was "the first English philologist to apply
Locke's philosophy to the study of language" (33). It was Tooke's
indebtedness to the empirical/materialist tradition - as well as his 
political exploits - that probably led to Coleridge's eventual disavowal 
of Tooke's position. Even as late as 1830 Coleridge commented on his 
debate with Tooke's argument: "Tooke affects to explain the origin and
whole philosophy of language by what it is, in fact, only a mere accid­
ent of the history of one or two languages. "38 what Coleridge calls an 
"accident" refers to Tooke's emphasis upon etymologies and the ways in 
which related words break off from one another. Tooke placed this 
accident at the center of his argument, whereas Coleridge merely found 
it helpful for explaining the relationships among words. Goodson 
explains that this "accident, the fulcrum of Tooke's argument, is the 
supposed loss of the original meanings of the particles of the English 
language; the term includes for him all the parts of speech except nouns 
and verbs"(54). Tooke's resulting philology then is a mechanistic one, 
"effectively reducing the speaker's role in language to bricklaying" 
(54), It was this mechanistic simplicity, engendered by Locke's divi­
sion between word and thing, which Coleridge found to be unbearable.
37 Coleridge, Shakespearean Criticism 11.74.
38 See Coleridge, Table Talk and Omniana, ed. by T. Ashe (London: Bell, 1884), 70, 
Also quoted in Goodson, "Coleridge on Language" 53.
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While Coleridge's time in Germany during 1798 and 17 99 may justly 
be considered a watershed in his critical development, that development 
was nonetheless a direct outgrowth of his earlier thinking about poetic 
language and the power of the imagination in the act of poetic creation. 
In the winter of 1799, Coleridge wrote to Thomas Poole from Germany, 
commenting on his life as a student there. He cites the lectures of 
Blumenbach and Eichhorn as particular interest. His greatest fascina­
tion, though, appears to have been the lectures of Tyschen, under whom 
Coleridge studied many northern languages. In Chapter 10 of the Bio- 
graphia, Coleridge says that
my chief efforts were directed towards a grounded knowledge 
of the German language and literature. Prom Professor 
Tyschen I received as many lessons in the Gothic of Ulphilas 
as sufficed to make me acquainted with its grammar and the 
radical words of most frequent occurrence; and with the 
occasional assistance of the same philosophical linguist I 
read through Ottfried's metrical paraphrase of the gospel, 
and the most important remains of the Theotiscan, or the 
transitional state of the Teutonic language from the Gothic 
to the old German of the Swabian period (1.207-209).
In the same year, Coleridge commented that he considered the older 
Northern languages to be the best languages for poetry, because these 
had an ability to express "only prominent ideas with clearness,... oth­
ers but darkly" {CN 1.383) During his time in Germany, then, we find 
not a privileging of his critical questions about language over his con­
cern for poetry and the imagination, but a further blending of the two. 
His exposure during this time to both a different critical tradition and 
a different poetic tradition in Germany provided a perspective from 
which he could critique the work of earlier English influences such as 
Hartley, Berkeley, and Tooke. The full impact of this year revealed 
itself not in a single burst or a sudden transformation but in the grad-
6 8
liai development over the next five to ten years of his notions of the 
imagination and the symbol.
In the midst of his time in Germany, Coleridge was still attempt­
ing to come to terms with Tooke's influence. In a notebook entry from 
that period, Coleridge wrote, "Mind - min - meinen - mahnen - mahen / 
vibratory yet progressive motion" {CN 1.378). In echoes of the Scotist 
tradition and its sense of concrete language, Coleridge reveals here his 
great interest in etymologies, an interest engendered by Tooke and prob­
ably influenced here by the teaching of Tyschen. Tooke's emphasis upon 
etymologies may be seen here as a critique of the notion of words as 
mere vibrations. He reaches back to the Hartleyan view of the law of 
association in which words (as ideas) are seen as vibrations in the mind 
which correspond to external objects. However, he also appears to be 
probing the nature or limits of linguistic arbitrariness, a concern 
raised by Berkeley. Given the arbitrariness of signs, there is nonethe­
less an apparent progressive motion in language in which words are 
related to one another; by recourse to etymologies, Coleridge attempts 
to show how meaning is formed in this linguistic difference. However, 
by 1800, Coleridge saw that both Tooke's and Hartley's systems were 
lacking. There still existed this radical division between word and 
thing. Coleridge wrote to William Godwin on 22 September of that year, 
urging him to return from writing drama to the work of "a bold moral 
thinker." The work which he proposed for Godwin was a bold linguistic 
project:
I wish you to write a book on the power of words, and the 
processes by which human feelings form affinities with them 
- in short, I wish you to philosophize Horn Tooke's System, 
and to solve the great Questions - whether there be reason 
to hold, that an action bearing all the semblance of pre­
designing Consciousness may yet be simply organic, & whether 
a series of such actions is possible - and close on the
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heels of this question would follow the old 'Is Logic the 
Essence of Thinking?' in other words - Is thinking impossi­
ble without arbitrary signs? & - how far is the word 
'arbitrary' a misnomer? Are not words &c parts & germina­
tions of the Plant? And what is the Law of the Growth?-In 
something of this order I would endeavor to destroy the old 
antithesis of Words & Things, elevating, as it were, words 
into Things, & living Things too.39
Coleridge's charge to Godwin betrays his own commitment to the power of 
words as "living Things." Their power comes from the exercise of pas­
sion within the will, so that these signs which may be seen as merely 
arbitrary are only an integral part of "the Plant." This image captures 
the organic nature of Coleridge's thinking, especially in his view of 
language. Thinking is able to realize the thing thought because both 
the thing and the thought are each part of the same plant. For thinking 
is not possible without words; so, the passion of the will transforms 
arbitrary signs into the parts and germinations of the plant. Thus, the 
"old antithesis of Words & Things" is destroyed because the words are 
elevated by the will and become a part of the whole of thinking.
Coleridge is anticipating here what he called in 1802 "the verbal 
imagination," a phrase which aptly describes his understanding of the 
relationship between language and the imagination. As he was concerned 
for the creative power of the mind, Coleridge's understanding of lan­
guage was linked to his formulation of the imagination. The roots of 
his understanding of the imagination are most obviously found in the 
influence of Kant. Although Coleridge wrote during his stay in Germany 
of his great admiration for Blumenbach, Eichhorn, and Tyschen, his 
thinking for the rest of his life was carried on under the shadow of 
Kant. In Chapter 9 of the Biographia, after having surveyed his inter-
39 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by Earl 
Leslie Griggs, 5 vols {Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1956-1971), 1.625-25. Subsequent references to this will appear in the text under the abbreviation CL.
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action, with the doctrine of association from Aristotle to Hartley,
Coleridge confessed.
The writings of the illustrious sage of Konigsburg, the 
founder of the Critical Philosophy, more than any other work 
at once invigorated and disciplined my understanding. The 
originality, the depth and the compression of the thoughts; 
the novelty and subtlety, yet solidity and importance, of 
the distinctions; the adamantine chain of logic;... [all] 
took possession of me as with a giant's hand (1.153).
Even as early as 1801, the preeminence of Kant is apparent. Shortly 
after writing his four philosophical letters to Josiah Wedgwood in 
February of 1801 in which he outlined his argument with materialism and 
empiricism, Coleridge wrote to Thomas Poole to inform him that "I have 
not only completely extricated the notions of time and space; but have 
overthrown the doctrine of association as taught by Hartley..." {CL
11.706). Kant would have been attractive to Coleridge for a variety of 
reasons. First, Kant's thinking stands in the Platonic tradition, which 
would have accorded well with Coleridge's own reading of Plotinus and 
his own neoplatonic tendencies. Also, Kant's distinction between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal realms as contrary but not contradictory 
entities provided the terms for Coleridge's own unified vision of 
"multeity in unity," as he stated it in the third essay of "On The Prin­
ciples of Genial Criticism," the living and generative power of which is 
the imagination. However, Warren justly observes that it is invalid to 
claim that Coleridge's concept of the imagination was derived solely 
from Kant. "Germany gave Coleridge form and authority, perhaps, but not 
the basic motivation for his final views" ("APPI" 401). Kant's 
influence was not the only "form and authority" which Coleridge derived 
from Germany; the philosophy and aesthetics of the German romantic phi­
losopher Friedrich Schelling also figured prominently in the shaping of
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his thought. Coleridge seemed to have been caught for many years in a 
dialogue between Kant and Schelling. Frank Lentricchia suggests that 
this tension is responsible for what he calls "a contradiction embedded 
in Coleridge's philosophical identity."4o However it would appear that 
such a tension - between Schelling's pantheistic, dynamic aesthetic on 
the one hand and Kant's more systematic, phenomenological views on the 
other - is exactly what shaped Coleridge's theory of the symbol.
2.5 Coleridge and the Symbol
Coleridge's theory of the imagination provided a means of breaking 
down the antithesis between word and thing through the exercise of the 
conscious will and gave birth to his conception of words as living 
things. This position was engendered by Kant's notion of a generative 
tension between contraries which does not negate reason or understanding 
but provides a basis for true thought. Out of this tension within the 
imagination, the symbol arises and forms the dynamic core of Coleridge's 
theory of poetic creation. Warren elucidates this relation of the sym­
bol to his theory of composition in his analysis of the primary and sec­
ondary themes. Warren calls his experiment a "symbolic reading because 
of its fusion of the two themes. Aware of Coleridge's concern for pre­
cision in terminology, Warren emphasizes that the term "symbol" held a 
specific import in contradistinction from terms such as "metaphor" or 
"allegory." He cites "Coleridge's emphasis on diversity within unity" 
as evidence of this concern for the symbol and contends that failure to 
realize the centrality of this in "Coleridge's theory of composition has 
led a number of critics to try to read The Ancient Mariner in terms of a 
two-dimensional allegory..." (350).
Warren rejects any allegorical reading of the poem, "the sort of
Frank Lentricchia, "Coleridge and Emerson: Prophets of Silence, Prophets of 
Language," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 32 (1973), 37.
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The symbol serves to combine...the "poet's heart and intel-
What distinguishes the symbol from allegory is the notion of arbitrari­
ness. Allegory is based upon a purely arbitrary way of reading which 
looks for the "mere sign, a 'picture language.'" The symbol, though, 
cannot be arbitrary. He says that "a symbol implies a body of ideas 
which may be said to be fused in it" and that, therefore, "the symbol is 
not arbitrary - not a mere sign - but contains within itself the appeal 
which makes it serviceable as a symbol" (352). He states this point 
more strongly a little further on, saying that "the symbol...cannot be 
arbitrary - it has to participate in the unity of which it is represen­
tative. And this means that the symbol has a deeper relation to the 
total structure of meaning than its mechanical place in plot, situation, 
or discourse" (353).
Warren derives his description of the symbol from a number of 
Coleridge's own statements. In The Statesman's Manual, Coleridge
7 3
reading which gives us such absurdities as the point-to-point equating |
of the Pilot with the Church and the Pilot's boy with the clergy..."
(350). According to Warren, "The method of allegory - if by allegory we î:
understand a fixed system of point-to-point equations - is foreign to p
[Coleridge's] conception of the role of the imagination....Allegory is, 
to adopt Coleridge's terms, the product of the understanding, symbol of p
the imagination" (351, emphasis mine). By means of definitions, Warren
'j'states :
lect." A symbol involves an idea (or ideas) as part of its P;
potential, but it also involves the special complex of feel- #
ings associated with that idea, the attitude toward that 
idea. The symbol affirms the unity of mind in the welter of 
experience; it is a device for making that welter of experi-
--I-ence manageable for the mind - graspable. It represents a ■p'focus of being and is not a mere sign, a "picture language" p
(352).
describes the imagination as a "reconciling and mediatory power" which
"gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and con- ;<;]
'1substantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors" (29). p
Ï-
Symbols are rooted in the imagination and by their nature have a recon- I
oiling and mediating effect. By "reconciling" Coleridge does not pro­
pose that two contrary forces are collapsed into one another; rather, by 
the mediating effect of the imagination these are brought together and 
held in tension, so that there is a manifest unity in multeity. The 
imagination is that "one power" which is "inexhaustively re-ebullient" 
rather than being restful or neutralizing {BL 1.299-300). The symbol 
then is the result of these two forces. It is "a tertium aliguid, or
I
finite generation....Now this tertium allquid can be no other than an 4
inter-penetration of the counteracting powers, partaking of both"
(1.300). The symbol, then, as the child of the imagination, is this 
"finite generation," a moment of "an inter-penetration of the counter­
acting powers, partaking of both." This is what he means when he states 
that the symbol is consubstantial with the truth it represents. The old 
antithesis between word and thing is broken down in the concrete "this- 
ness" of the symbol itself, Mary Ann Perkins helpfully points out that 
Coleridge "rejected Kant's view of the symbol as representation which 
cannot put us in touch directly with noumenal reality, only with mate­
rial for r e f l e c t i o n . "41 Coleridge believed that the symbol could put us 
in touch with noumenal reality by bringing two counteracting forces into 
contact and holding them in tension, the one partaking of the other.
However, following Kant, these counteracting forces are contrary without 
being contradictory; therefore, the symbol is not a dialectical synthe­
sis in which the two contraries are subsumed into one another, nor is it
Coleridge's Philosophy: The Logos as Unifying Principle (Oxford: Oxford Univers­
ity Press, 1994), 47.
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sustained antithesis in which one is privileged over the other. This 
seems to fit with Coleridge's definition of the symbol in The States­
man's Manual: a symbol
is characterized by a translucence of the Special in the 
Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Uni­
versal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the 
Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of 
the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it 
enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that 
Unity, of which it is the representative (30),
This shaped Coleridge's notion of linguistic reference: he cannot radi­
cally divide between word and thing because they participate in one 
a n o t h e r .42 The symbol is that reconciling and completing moment in 
which the two counteracting forces -—  special/individual, general/espe­
cial, universal/ general, or eternal/temporal —  inter-penetrate one 
another and partake of one another. This was the power of Ezekiel's 
vision for Coleridge; the symbols are the "Wheels which Ezekiel beheld" 
precisely because of the nature of the relationship between the wheels 
and the Spirit. Symbols and the truths "of which they are the conduc­
tors," "move in conjunction" with one another just as the wheels and the 
Spirit do in Ezekiel's vision. It is this symbolic moment, fostered by 
the imagination, which constitutes the poetic moment and
"procure[s]...that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which 
constitutes poetic faith" (BL II.6, emphasis mine).
Warren's dual emphasis upon a symbolic reading and a sacramental 
vision is not arbitrary but is part of Coleridge's own understanding of 
the symbol. It is crucial to understand Coleridge's sacramental lan­
guage in his formulation of the symbol. He says in his definition that 
the symbols produced by the imagination are not only "harmonious in
42 Compare Heidegger's discussion of the relation between word and thing in "The 
Nature of Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New Yorks Harper and Row, 1971), 85-90.
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themselves" but are "consubstantial with the truths, of which they are 
the conductors." Coleridge's love for precision of terminology needs to 
be appreciated here. The symbol is not a moment of transubstantiation 
but of consubstantiation. The doctrine of transubstantiation holds that 
the substance of the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper is changed - 
transmuted - into the physical substance of the body and blood of the 
Christ. The substance of the bread and wine is lost in the new sub­
stance of the body and blood. Coleridge, however, uses the word 
"consubstantial." The eucharistie doctrine of consubstantiation was 
developed by Martin Luther and proposes that the body and blood are a 
presence together with the bread and wine, that they are "with, in, and 
under" the elements. As symbols, the bread and wine are not destroyed 
but are acknowledged to remain together as one with the truths of which 
they are the conductors. Coleridge commented upon this view in a mar­
ginal note in his copy of Charles Butler's vindication of "The Book":
The Eucharistie Act as instituted by Christ is a Symbol, 
i.e. - a part, or particular instance selected as a repre­
sentative of the whole, of which whole however it is itself 
an actual, or real part. Now the Sacramentaries degrade the 
Symbol into a Metaphor, and that too, a Catachresis, while 
the Romish Superstition makes the Symbol représentant, the 
whole thing represented, and in consequence equally with the 
former, destroys the Symbol.
In other places, Coleridge expresses his agreement with the sacramental 
views of Bucer, upon whom the renaissance humanism of Erasmus as well as 
the reformational theology of Luther had a profound effect. Bucer modi­
fied both Luther and Zwingli's eucharistie positions by arguing for a 
"sacramental union" of the elements with the body and blood of Christ; 
the elements co-inhere with the body and blood. Bucer was also the 
primary influence upon the sacramental theology in the English Prayer
43 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Marginalia, CC 12, ed. by George Whalley, Vol. 1 (London! 
Routledge and Regan Paul, 1980), 862.
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Book, Coleridge's thinking here reflects, then, the influence of the
I
Anglican tradition with which he had a varied relationship. Coleridge i
followed Bucer and Anglicanism in the language used in a late notebook
entry in which he states that identity
44 yjie Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by Kathleen Coburn, Vol 4: 1819-1826 
(London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), 4544. Subsequent references to this volume 
will appear in the text under the abbreviation CN IV.
45 See Perkins 7-12.
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means One containing the power of two as their radical ante­
cedent, or as...a point producing itself into a bi-polar 
Line but contemplated as anterior to this production, and 
containing the two Poles or Opposites in unevolved i
coinherence....Be thing, however, called Identity or Prothe­
sis, this Coinherence of Act and Being is the I AM IN THAT I f
WILL TO BE, of Moses, the Absolute I AM, and its grammatical 
correspondent is the VERB SUBSTANTIVE. 44 ;
This sacramental notion of the "Coinherence of Act and Being" finds 
expression also in the Logos, which Coleridge understood to be the prim- SÏ
ary and essential symbol and the primary and essential language. It is 
in his thinking about the logos that we see his theory of the symbol i
coalesce with his understanding of language.
2.6 The Logos as Essential Language
5
The central role of the logos in Coleridge's philosophy is in ■'
3itself a lengthy subject which has received a variety of responses.
Mary Anne Perkins argues persuasively that "the Logos is the unifying 
factor of Coleridge's 'system'...and the key to understanding every area
of his thought after 1805" (3). It "connects his theories of language
and imagination, his philosophy of nature, his attempt to establish an 
epistemology based on the constitutive nature of ideas, and his moral 
philosophy and anthropology" (267). The development of this "unifying
Jfactor" must be seen as an essential part of the development of his 
thinking about the symbol and language. His logos doctrine must also be 
seen as an outgrowth of and a response to his eclectic r e a d i n g . 45 There
are clearly elements from Kant in his search for unity and from Schell­
ing in his notion of the mediating power of the logos; but there are 
also obvious influences of the mystical tradition and Neo-platonic phi­
losophy. Also, McNiece observes a direct correlation between Coler­
idge's notion of logic and "the ancient and Christian idea of the Logos" 
as expressed by "several different attempts to define the appropriate 
relation between mind and nature,"46 Warren pays particular attention to 
the Neo-platonic influence on Coleridge, citing especially Plotinus' 
doctrine of creation as an important source for Coleridge's own think­
ing- Warren quotes a lengthy passage from the Enneads (V,I,7; The 
Divine Mind) in which Plotinus describes the monistic vision of Ideas, 
"veritable Being," and "veritable Essence," out of which physical crea­
tion has emanated ("APPI" 344-45), In a later footnote, Warren suggests 
that "Coleridge's particular doctrine of symbolism...seems to be devel­
oped under the shadow of Plotinus" (403). Plotinus' description of the 
universe as "a stately whole, complete within itself, serving at once 
its own purpose and that of all its parts..." is not very far from 
Coleridge's conception of the logos as the primary and essential symbol 
and word, "a stately whole, complete within itself."
The logos doctrine seems to have taken precedence in Coleridge's 
thinking between 1803 and 1805. In a notebook entry from November 1803, 
Coleridge proposes his "last & great work" as "The work which I should 
wish to leave behind me, or to publish late in Life, that On Man, and 
the probable Destiny of the Human Race..." (CN 1.1649). He says that 
this work is to be "followed and illustrated by the Organum vere Organ- 
um, & philosophical Romance to explain the whole growth of Language, and 
for these to be always collecting materials." However, by 1805, Coler-
46 Gerald McNiece, The Knowledge that Endures: Coleridge, German Philosophy and the
Logic of Romantic Thought (London: MacMillan, 1992), 2,
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idge seems to be pondering more specifically the role of the Logos in 
human language. In a notebook entry from that year, Coleridge ponders 
the "trinity" of the "Platonic Fathers," which he identifies as "God, 
his Word, and his Wisdom." As to the second element of this trinity, he 
writes,
Reason, Proportion, communicable Intelligibility intelligent 
and communicant, the Word - which last expression strikes me 
as the profoundest and most comprehensive Energy of the 
human Mind, if indeed it be not in some distinct sense 
evspYVpoc Qsojcapaôoxov (CN 11.2445).
He says that "the moment we conceive the divine energy, that moment we 
co-conceive the Aoyog. .. " so that under the work of the "Spirit of holy 
Action," "the redeemed & sanctified become finally themselves Words of 
the Word - even as ieu- articulate sounds are made by the Reason to rep­
resent Forms, in the mind, and Forms are a language of the notions....As 
he is the Father, even so we in him!" Under the aegis of the logos, 
Coleridge brings together his thinking about language and the symbol.
His concept of the logos underwent a transformation from a neoplatonist 
tenet rooted in triunity to the Christian notion of the trinity.4? By
1817, then, Coleridge was able to write in the Biographia Literaria his 
proposed large and systematic work "which I have many years been prepar­
ing, on the Productive Logos human and divine? with and as an introduc­
tion to, a full commentary on the Gospel of St. John" (1.136). In other 
places Coleridge refers to his "magnum opus" under the term Logosophia. 
That he envisioned this to be his great and final work in his later 
years is apparent. However, this would mean that he had abandoned his 
earlier goal for his "last & great work" to be his study on "the prob­
able Destiny of the Human Race."
His thinking about the logos brought together and gave shape to
47 See Perkins 16-21,
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his other concerns which developed in his thinking about the imagina­
tion. Coleridge sees in the notion of the logos the possible ground for
See also Anima Poetae 136.
SO
"I 
it
a symbolic understanding of language. In April of 1805, he wrote,
In looking at the objects of Nature while I am thinking, as 
at yonder moon dim-glimmering thro' the dewy window-pane, I 
seem rather to be seeking as it were asking, a symbolical 
language for something within me that already and forever 
exists, than observing any thing new. Even when that latter 
is the case, yet still I have always and obseerecure feeling 
as if that new phenomenon were the dim Awaking of a forgot­
ten or hidden Truth of my inner nature/It is still interest­
ing as a Word, a Symbol ! It is Aoyoc, the Creator! (CN II.
254 6). 48
His first thoughts about the logos appear to have been in its creative 
and re-creative function, which perhaps correlates to his later descrip­
tion of the primary and secondary imagination. In the work of creation, H
Coleridge conceives of the Logos as the actualizing power of God. For 1
him, "unity is manifested by Opposites" and "all true Opposites tend to }
unity" (CN IV.4513). So, Coleridge describes the creation of the physi- /i
cal universe as the "Incorporation of the Logos" by which the 
"potentialized Actual" is polarized into light and darkness and then the 
created light is polarized into life and warmth. However, in the "New 
Creation," Coleridge identifies the "Incarnation of the Logos" by the 
"polarization into divine Life and Light with Faith as the Indifference 5
(John 1)" (CN IV.5162). Christ, then, as both incorporated and incar­
nated Logos, is "the Verhum Dei," "the fixed word, the verb in the form 
of the Substantive, he is Nomen Dei" (CN IV.4625),
The logos is the essential living word and primary symbol. His 
thinking about the logos drew upon his modification of Tooke's notion of 
"winged words" into his own conception of living words. In his Lectures 
1808-1819Î On Literature, Coleridge clearly goes beyond Kantian dualism
when he writes that "...words are the living products of the living mind 
& could not be a due medium between the thing and the mind unless they 
partook of both."49 Like symbols which are the "living products" of the 
imagination, words are "products of the living mind" and act as a medium 
only because they partake of both the thing and the mind. In Aids to 
Reflection, he goes on to say, "For if words are not THINGS, they are 
LIVING POWERS, by which the things of most importance to mankind are 
actuated, combined and humanized" (10). Words actuate, even as the 
Word, the Logos, actuated all the potentialized actual in the work of 
creation. But this actuation is by means of symbol, for a symbol "is a 
sign included in the Idea which it represents" {Aids to Reflection 
263n). Thus, language functions by the same means as the symbol? this 
is made clear in an early notebook entry, from the summer of 1803: 
"Language & all symbols give outness to Thoughts/& this the philosophi­
cal essence and purpose of Language" {CN 1 .1 3 8 7 ).so All language and 
symbols give outness to thoughts, though only the Logos, as the primary 
and essential word, does so without arbitrariness or limit. In 1808, 
Coleridge wrote, "All minds must think by some symbols - the strongest 
minds possess the most vivid Symbols in the Imagination - yet this 
ingenerates a want, no9ov, desiderium, for vividness of Symbol: which
something that is without, that has the property of Outness...can alone 
fully gratify/even that indeed not fully..." {CN III.3325), Coleridge 
borrowed this notion of outness from Berkeley and later described it as 
"but the feeling of otherness (alterity) rendered intuitive, or alterity 
visually represented."si
2.7 Truth and Poetry
49 Lectures 1808-1819: On Literature, CC 5, ed. by R. A. Foakes (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1987), 1.273.
50 See also Aids to Reflection, ed. by John Beer, CC 9 (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul? Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1993), 39In.
51 See Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine X (1821), 249.
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Warren begins section V of "A Poem of Pure Imagination" by stating 
that "the central and crucial fact" of his reading of The Ancient Mar­
iner is "the fusion of the primary and secondary themes" (380), This 
symbolic fusion reflects what Warren considered to be the way that 
Coleridge reconciled the aesthetic and the theological in his thought, 
"His solution was, of course, one of detail and not part of the great 
synthesis of which he dreamed. For the age presented complications 
which could not, apparently, be resolved into such a system" (381-82). 
According to Warren, "The precarious solution which Coleridge attained 
was, of course, one aspect of his doctrine of the creative unity of the 
mind," that doctrine which encompasses his thinking about the imagina­
tion and the symbol, the logos and language, in his effort to abolish 
"the opposition between thought and feeling," Coleridge saw in the act 
of poetic creation a moment of unified perception. Warren summarizes 
Coleridge's conclusion "that the truth is implicit in the poetic act as 
such, that the moral concern and the aesthetic concern are aspects of 
the same activity, the creative activity, and that this activity is 
expressive of the whole mind" (382, emphasis his). With regard to the 
imagination, Warren is expanding here upon Coleridge's definition of the 
secondary imagination. Warren notes that this distinction between prim­
ary and secondary imagination is a distinction between the unconscious 
and the conscious will. The secondary imagination is an exercise of the 
creative and conscious will, drawing upon both passion and joy. With 
regard to the symbol, Warren sees the moment of the poetic act as a sym­
bolic moment, which "always partakes of the Reality which it renders 
intelligible." The poetic moment is a living part of the whole which it 
enunciates, thus it "is expressive of the whole mind." Such a summary 
of Coleridge's solution to the problem of reconciling poetry and reli-
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gion addresses more than just the issue of The Ancient Mariner. In 
fact, Warren states that his "argument is that The Ancient Mariner is, 
first, written out of this general belief, and second, written about 
this general belief" (382). In this way, Warren reads the poem as a 
symbol which partakes of the whole reality which it seeks to render 
intelligible.
Warren describes the way in which the poem is written out of this 
general belief about poetic creation by identifying what he calls little 
fables of the creative process. In this way, he contends that the poem 
is "in general, about the unity of mind and the final unity of values 
and in particular about poetry itself" (383). The first fable of the 
creative process is the moment of the blessing of the water snakes, 
which Warren describes as "the very turning point of the poem." When 
the Mariner blesses the snakes "unaware," Warren observes an instance of 
poetic genius, quoting from "On Poesy" in which Coleridge's states that 
"There is in genius an unconscious activity...." According to Warren, 
then, this moment within the poem suggests "that the writing of a poem 
is simply a specialized example of a general process which leads to sal­
vation," as is instanced by the Mariner beginning the voyage home only 
after composing his poem of blessing (384). This accords with Warren's 
repeated use in his later poetry and criticism of the image of Jacob 
wrestling the angel and receiving both a blessing and a curse. Warren 
identifies in the instance of the Mariner's return home what he calls 
the "doubtful doubleness of the imagination" (386). The fable of the 
Mariner reveals that the power of the imagination rests in its holding 
in tension "its two inherent indestructible yet counteracting forces"
(BL 164), Warren summarizes in this way:
So we have here a peculiar and paradoxical situation: the
poem is a poem in which the poetic imagination appears in a
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regenerative and healing capacity, but in the end the hero, 
who has, presumably, been healed, appears in one of his 
guises as the poète maudit. So we learn that the imagina­
tion does not only bless, for even as it blesses it lays on 
a curse (386).
Warren observes, however, another fable of the creative process at the 
end of the poem, and this is "perhaps a fuller statement of Coleridge's 
conception of the poet, the man with the power which comes unbidden and 
which is an 'agony' until it finds words..." (387). This other fable at 
the end is the ongoing tale of the poet, the ongoing agony of the dou­
bleness of his position. The power which comes unbidden to the poet 
"wells up from the unconscious but is the result of a moral experience, 
and in its product, the poem, the 'tale' told by the Mariner, will 
'teach' - for that is the word the Mariner uses. It is a paradoxical 
process" (387).
In the final section of his essay, Warren meditates further on 
this paradoxical situation of the poet and the nature of the symbolic 
blessing and curse which he bears. Warren suggests that "the creation 
of a poem is as much a process of discovery as a process of making" 
(395). This does not necessitate that the poetic process is irrational. 
"What comes unbidden from the depths at the moments of creation may be 
the result of the most conscious and narrowly rational effort in the 
past" (396). Warren says that ultimately what "the poet is trying to 
discover... is what kind of poem he can make. And the only thing he, in 
the ordinary sense, may 'intend' is to make a poem" (396). And once the 
poem is made, it partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible. 
Thus the power of the imagination, rendered even in its doubleness, 
gives rise to a power within the poem itself. In The Ancient Mariner, 
"the vividness of the presentation and the symbolic coherence may do
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their work - as blessing sprang to the Mariner's lips - unawares. For 
the good poem may work something of its spell even upon the readers who 
are critically inarticulate" (398). Or, as Warren put it earlier in the 
essay,
...we may say that the reader does not interpret the poem 
but the poem interprets the reader. We may say that the 
poem is the light and not the thing seen by the light. The 
poem is the light by which the reader may view and review 
all the areas of experience with which he is acquainted 
(347).
As the light, poetry is able to reconcile "by its symbolic reading of 
experience..., the self-devisive [sic] internecine malices which arise 
at the superficial level on which we conduct most of our living" (399). 
It is in this way that Coleridge views poetry as a religious, salvific 
activity.
However, the paradoxical tension between blessing and curse 
remains for the poet. This paradox, which is an integral part of his 
search for a reconciling language, is at the core of Coleridge's under­
standing of the relationship between religion and poetry, as Warren 
points out. Jasper has also observed this coalescing of the religious 
and the linguistic in Coleridge:
His approach to words and language is profoundly significant 
of his sense of the religious experience, and thus it 
behoves the critic to attend to the literary and narrative 
techniques of The Ancient Mariner which contribute to its 
total effect and sense, and which link it with the whole 
corpus of Coleridge's writings on religion, even to the 
prose of his last years.52
Within the whole corpus of Coleridge's writings, not just on religion, 
we may see that this paradox is specifically what Coleridge's years of
52 David Jasper, "The Two Worlds of Coleridge's The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," in 
An Infinite Complexity: Essays in Romanticism, ed. by J.R. Watson (University of 
Durham/Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 135-136.
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pondering the question of language brought him to. This is not incon­
sistent with his long-standing argument with Locke or with his varied 
deference to Tooke. As Coleridge sought for a language in which the 
division between word and thing could be destroyed, in which words 
became not simply things but living things and living powers, he moved 
toward the inevitability of the doubleness of language itself. For 
Coleridge was well aware of the arbitrariness of human language and of 
the fractured nature of our utterances. But there remained for him a 
unified language - idealized in the logos - in which word and thing, or 
name and nature were one. According to Pulford, "Coleridge was embrac­
ing linguistic breakdown in order to dramatize the fact that the rules 
of ordinary language were conventional and fallible and to wrest from 
that dramatization a glimpse of a linguistic unity beyond such rules and 
such breakdowns."53 Thus, "Coleridge had made the extreme of linguistic 
arbitrariness into a mark of the passage of spiritual knowledge" (41).
A t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  h i s  t h e o l o g i c a l  u n d e r s t a n d in g  l a y  t h e  s y m b o l ic  t e n s i o n  
b e tw e e n  t h e  s a y a b le  a n d  t h e  u n s a y a b le .  T h e  s y m b o l i s  t h e  m om ent o f  p a r ­
a d o x  i n  w h ic h  u n i t y  a n d  f r a c t u r e  a r e  h e l d  t o g e t h e r ,  p a r a d o x i c a l l y  a n d  
s a c r a m e n t a l l y  c o n s u b s t a n t i a l  w i t h  o n e  a n o t h e r ,
Warren himself expressed this paradox of the poet with regard to 
language as the poet's effort to "say the unsayable." He was well aware 
of the agony of the poet, that agony which seeks words which are not 
always there to be found. It is this paradoxical situation of the poet 
and the doubleness of language itself which Warren explores in his late 
poetry. Even as early as Promises: Poems 1954-1956, Warren is probing
the nature of language in his poem "Dragon Country: To Jacob Boehme." 
Warren's dedication of this poem, which could not have been arbitrarily
53 Tim Fulford, "Coleridge, Bohme, and the Language of Nature," Modern Language Quar­terly 52/1 (1991), 41.
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chosen, brings to light the central issue in this poem: the search for
a language which transcends our finite and unstable words. In this 
mythical narrative, a small rural community is ravaged by an unseen 
dragon, whose absent presence is seen only in traces of its power. The 
dragon is for many a curse: it destroys a hog pen, it kills a teamster, 
it devours all of a man save a boot with part of the leg left inside.
And yet the dragon is also a paradoxical blessing: it is the "Necessity
of truth [which] had trodden the land..." and leaves "the fearful glim­
mer of joy, like a spoor." The dragon is never seen but only the traces 
of its presence. The dragon is a living power and a living thing which 
acts for both good and ill. It does not bring either good or ill; it 
brings about both in a powerful paradox which actuates being in the 
world. This doubleness is the doubleness of language. However, the 
absent presence of the dragon also draws out the incessant longing for a 
pure language:
We are human, and the human heart
Demands language for reality that has not the slightest
dependence
On d e s i r e ,  o r  n e e d  -  a n d  i n  c h u r c h  f o o l s  p r a y  o n l y  t h a t  t h e
B e a s t  d e p a r t .
Warren's demand here is the demand of the poet: the yearning for that
language which will finally speak "reality." However, he does not seem 
to realize here, as he does in his later poetry, that if the unsayable 
were finally spoken its consequences could be unspeakable. As it is, 
the gift of the "fearful glimmer of joy, like a spoor," granted within 
our Fallen language, is what the poet must learn to cherish.
However, it is in his 1969 poem, Audubon: A Vision, that Warren 
returns most obviously and most powerfully to the issues raised in his 
study of The Ancient Mariner, the issues of poetic creation, the place
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of the poet, and the nature of language itself. In this pivotal poem, 
Warren rewrites the myth of the Mariner, recasting the symbol into the 
terms of the hunter. In this way, Coleridge's aesthetic provides the 
ground upon which we may read Warren's later poetry.
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Chapter Three 
The Mariner and the Hunter; Audubon and 
the Pure Imagination
"The language of poetry, then, is a language of silences, is 
itself constituted by traces, by words that cannot fully 
embrace the dynamics of being."i
Audubon: A Vision (1969) is Robert Penn Warren's lengthiest and 
most forthright poetic meditation upon the nature and power of the imag­
ination in relation to language as it shapes and modifies our experience 
in the world. Although critics have emphasized the historical, bio­
graphical, and psychological aspects of this poem, Warren articulates a 
specifically poetic vision in the seven sections and nearly four hundred 
lines, one that is consistently Romantic in character and tone. As 
such, it entertains the possibility of a poetry which does not represent 
the world but shapes and illuminates it so that the poet and the reader 
alike might continue to walk in the world and even love it. It is in 
this illuminating capacity that the poem moves toward the postmodern 
perspective which conceives of language as a living and dis-closive pat­
tern of difference. Like The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Warren's poem 
is preoccupied with the precarious position of the poet and with the 
double-edged act of poetic creation. In "A Plea in Mitigation," Warren 
observes that The Ancient Mariner is a primary example of a Romantic 
poem which plagues the question of the role of the poet and the nature 
of poetry (9). The same may be said of Audubon in which Warren, taking 
his lead from his reading of the Mariner's fable, continues to plague 
this question.
Warren set out in "A Poem of Pure Imagination" to develop a cer-
1 Richard Jackson, "The Generous Time: Roberb Penn Warren and the Phenomenology of
the Moment," Boundary 2 9/2 (1981), 24.
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tain "type of critical analysis" (394) in which his primary goal was "a 
discursive reading of the symbol which is the poem" (398). He repeat­
edly states in this essay that his chief concern is not so much the 
presence of the two themes - the sacramental vision and the imagination 
- as it is the way these themes are fused. This is, he claims, the 
"central and crucial fact" of his reading. By emphasizing the "high 
degree of expressive integration" in The Ancient Mariner, Warren seeks 
to gain a vision of the creative unity of the mind in the act of poetic 
creation. In Audubon Warren returns to these themes and provides his 
own fusion of the sacramental vision and the imagination, as he contin­
ues to explore the nature of poetic creation. He does not rewrite 
Coleridge's poem by simply recasting the same narrative structure into a 
new context and into new terms. While there are similarities in the 
narrative plot, Audubon stands on its own structurally and stylistical­
ly. It is not immediately analogous to the Mariner myth; there is no 
strict one-to-one correspondence between the terms of the two poems. 
Rather, Audubon is a symbolic exploration of the thematic concerns 
relating to the imagination and to language. Here Warren deals with the 
play of tension within the symbolic understanding and with the agency of 
passion in what Coleridge called the "verbal imagination." In this med­
itation, the poet makes his way along the precarious and unstable way of 
language in order to approach an understanding of being in the world.
Warren began work on Audubon in the 1940s, just prior to and dur­
ing his year as Consultant in Poetry at the Library of C o n g r e s s . 2 He 
became enthralled with the life of this early nineteenth century natu­
ralist and artist while reading "a whole range of subliterary genres" 
(Talking 333), including journals and memoirs, in preparation for his 
novel World Enough and Time (1949). After reading Audubon's journals,
2 See Talking 119, 153, 243-44, 333, 339 and Blotner 212, 381-82.9 0
Warren began working on a poem during this period based on Audubon's 
life, but he could not finish it. Warren told Peter Stitt in 1977 that 
" it was a trap; I couldn't find the frame for it, the narrative line. 
I did write quite a bit, but it wouldn't come together, so I set it 
aside and forgot about it" {Talking 244). However, Warren also dealt 
with Audubon in his 1944 essay, "Love and Separateness in Eudora Welty," 
in which he examines Welty's short fiction.3 Audubon figures in Welty's 
story, "A Still Moment," as one of three central characters who "stand 
for a still moment and watch a white heron feeding" (161). Only Audu­
bon, however, "can innocently accept nature" by loving the bird "and so 
escape from [his] own curse as did...the Ancient Mariner" (162). The 
irony of such love, though, is that in order to know the bird he must 
shoot it. "But having killed the bird, he knows that the best he can 
make of it now in a painting would be a dead thing..." (162). Warren 
goes on to state.
He loves the bird, innocently, in its fullness of being.
But he must subject this love to knowledge; he must kill the 
bird if he is to commemorate its beauty, if he is to estab­
lish his communion with other men in terms of the bird's 
beauty. There is in the situation an irony of limit and 
contamination (162).
Warren's assessment of Audubon in Welty's story is subtly but impor­
tantly different, though, from his own rendering of the artist in Audu­
bon: A Vision. There is a clue to this differentiating factor, however, 
in his reference to the Ancient Mariner within this essay. According to 
Blotner, Warren set aside his earliest efforts on the Audubon poem in 
order to pursue his lecture on The Ancient Mariner which was scheduled
3 Robert Penn Warren, "Love and Separateness in Eudora Welty" in Selected Essays (New 
York: Random House, 1958), 156-69. For comparative analyses of Welty's and Warren'sdealings with Audubon, see Nancy Cluck, "Audubon: Images of the Artist in Eudora
Welty and Robert Penn Warren," Southern Literary Journal 17/2 (1985), 41-53, and Lesa 
Games Corrigan, "Snapshots of Audubon: Photographic Perspectives from Eudora Welty
cind Robert Penn Warren," MQ XLVIIl/1 (Winter 1994-95), 83-91.
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to be presented in April of 1945. It would appear that this work on 
Coleridge provided two crucial factors for Warren's later work on Audu­
bon: A Vision. First, it seems to have provided the frame and narrative 
line which was missing in his earlier efforts. While Warren makes a
brief thematic connection between the Ancient Mariner and the Audubon of
Welty's story, he does not explore in that essay the specific implica­
tions of killing the bird for the narrative line of Audubon's story. 
Second, Warren's analysis of Coleridge's notion of the imagination seems 
to have provided a way for the dead birds to become living things 
through the act of re-creation. Warren confronts in Audubon specifi­
cally the secondary imagination which struggles to idealize and unify in 
the work of dissolving, diffusing and dissipating. Warren's conception 
of the imagination in this poem is both vital and verbal.
Warren's return to Coleridge at this point also coincides with an
important period in the mid-1960s in which he appears to have been
assessing the role of the poet and the problem of language. Warren's 
concerns about language seem to have come to the forefront of his think­
ing during this period. In the poetry of these years, there is an 
increasingly apparent confrontation both with the powerful agency of 
language - as the living words which work together with the living power 
of the imagination - and with the "unsayable" which evokes both fear and 
joy in the poet. While we do find moments of questioning the power and 
stability of language in earlier poems, such as "The Mango and the Mango 
Tree" {Selected Poems 1923-1943), Brother to Dragons and "Dragon Coun­
try: To Jacob Boehme," these moments appear more frequently and promi­
nently in the poetry of this period and anticipate the forthright con­
siderations of Audubon. For example, in "Insomnia" {Selected Poems:
New and Old 1923-1966 34-39), the speaker confronts the simultaneous
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need for the ability to articulate the truth and the inability of truth 
finally to be spoken:
...Truth
Is all. But
I  m u s t l e a r n  t o  s p e a k  i t
Slowly, in a whisper.
Truth, in the end, can never be spoken aloud.
For the future is always unpredictable.
But so is the past...(39).
In Incarnations: Poems 1966-1968, the volume immediately preceding the 
appearance of Audubon, Warren raises certain issues which he addresses 
more obviously in the light of Coleridge's aesthetic in Audubon. In a 
thematically and linguistically related series in the first section 
("Island of Summer"), Warren questions the nature of the Fall and probes 
the extent of the sacramental union between the self, the community and 
nature. Warren concludes the fourth poem of this section, "Riddle in 
the Garden," by urging.
You think
I am speaking in riddles. But I am not, for
The world means only itself (7).
In the two concluding poems of this volume, Warren approaches the rela­
tionship between language and being. In "The Enclave," the poet 
explores the generative tension between what he calls the silence and 
the s a i d . 4 in the final poem, "Fog," the speaker approaches the religi­
ous dimensions of language and silence, or being and nothingness, and 
ends with a call which seems to invoke both the language and the themes 
of Audubon:
Oh, crow.
 ^This poem was also included in Or Else: Poem/Poems 1968-1974. For a more detailed
discussion of it in this latter volume, see Chapter Four below.
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Come back, I would hear your voice:
That much, at least, in this whiteness.
Each of these poems anticipates a specific moment and issue in Audubon, 
but in the latter poem the struggle for articulation, the meaning of the 
world, the tension between the "sayable" and the "unsayable," and the 
voice of the world are all presented specifically in the context of the 
poet's agony and joy in the act of poetic creation.
3.1 Some Critical Distinctions
While critics of Warren's poetry have accorded Audubon a signifi­
cant place in the larger body of his work, the significant relationship 
between Audubonf Warren's earlier work on Coleridge, and his later 
thinking about language has apparently been overlooked. Anthony Szcze- 
siul has aptly pointed out that critics "generally seem to agree that 
Audubon: A Vision is a watershed moment in Warren's career as a poet."5 
However, even though Audubon has drawn its share of critical attention 
since its publication, most of this criticism has neither recognized it 
as a further exploration of the themes which Warren identified in The 
Ancient Mariner nor considered it specifically as a central poem in War­
ren's ongoing struggle to understand language and the unsayable. Calvin 
Bedient does see Audubon as a pivotal poem for Warren: "His greatness
as a writer began with his determination to concentrate on poetry as the 
extreme resource of language-knowledge, language-being - began with 
Audubon: A Vision..., forty-six years after he started publishing poems 
as a student prodigy at Vanderbilt...."6 However, Bedient's survey of 
Warren's "grand last phase" falls short of any thorough analysis of a 
struggle with "language-being." Instead of following through the impli-
5 For the textual history of this poem, see Anthony Szczesiul, "Robert Penn Warren's 
Audubons Vision and Revision," MQ XLVII/1 (1994), 3-14.
6 In the Heart's Last Kingdom (Cambridge, MA, and London; Harvard University Press, 1984), 3.
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cations of his statement, Bedient's discussion of language only goes so 
far as to analyse the formal elements of the poetry, such as the syntac­
tical "characteristic configurations, [or] linear voiceprints." Most 
significantly, he abandons in his analysis of Audubon any real concern 
for the nature of l a n g u a g e . ?  instead, in a reading reminiscent of 
Strandberg's work, Bedient takes the psychological approach, focusing 
upon the development of Audubon's identity through the interplay of the 
conscious and unconscious, drawing out and focusing upon Oedipal images 
and analyzing the "split nightmare identity" of the woman in the long 
second section as both "Eaten Mother" and "Mother of Eating" (143).
W h i le  Jam es J u s t u s  p a y s  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  la n g u a g e  as  a  r e c u r ­
r i n g  c o n c e r n  f o r  W a r r e n ,  h e  d o e s  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  b r o a d  i n f l u e n c e  o f  W a r­
r e n ' s  s t u d y  o f  The Ancient Mariner. I n  The Achievement of Robert Penn 
Warren, J u s t u s  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  M a r i n e r ' s  t a l e  a s  o n e  o f  W a r r e n 's  r e c u r ­
r i n g  th e m e s  i n  b o t h  h i s  f i c t i o n  a n d  h is  p o e t r y . s  He f i n d s  e v id e n c e  o f  
t h i s  i n  W a r r e n 's  u s e  o f  t h e  l i t e r a r y  d e v ic e  o f  " t h e  i n t e r p o l a t e d  s t o r y ­
t e l l e r . "  A c c o r d in g  t o  J u s t u s ,
This technique for widening and deepening thematic implica­
tions through the use of alternative points of view is 
related to Warren's fascination with The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner. Among the several insights in "A Poem of Pure 
Imagination" is Warren's reminder of the affective structure 
and layered points of view of that great romantic work. The 
primary narrative situation in Coleridge's poem is the over­
lay and constant impingement of the two storytellers: the
Mariner and the omniscient poet whose emotional alliance is 
with the Wedding Guest (25),
J u s t u s  s e e s  a  p a r a l l e l  b e tw e e n  t h e  p o e t  a n d  t h e  M a r i n e r  f i g u r e ,  w h o s e  
v i s i o n  i s  " b o t h  t o  m ake m o r a l  s e n s e  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  t o  r e t a i n  t h e  
a e s t h e t i c  p o w e r  t o  g a l v a n i z e  q u i e s c e n t  a n d  c o m p la c e n t  s o u ls  t o  a t t e n -
7 See Bedient 134-149.
8 Baton Rouge and London: LSUP, 1981.
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tion" (25). "That double concern," Justus says, "is precisely Warren's" 
(25). He then discusses the way Warren uses this device of the interpo­
lated storyteller in his early novels, from Night Rider through Band of 
Angels. However, Justus says that after Band of Angels Warren loses his 
attraction "for that explicit narrative vehicle and the Mariner figure 
whose role parallels the common dilemma of the protagonists..." (33). 
Instead, Warren turns in his poetry to a preference for the personal 
voice of the author. When Justus later presents his reading of Audubon, 
he ignores any shaping influence The Ancient Mariner might have had on 
this poem. Rather, he is concerned with the structure of the poem and 
with the comparisons and contrasts between Warren's Audubon and the 
Audubon of history and biography. At various points in his reading, 
though, Justus appears to be assuming the influence of Coleridge upon 
Warren's work, but he never makes any explicit connection in his reading 
of Audubon.
In The Poetic Vision of Robert Penn Warren, Victor Strandberg sees 
movement in Audubon toward a more consciously developed mysticism, fol­
lowing Warren's ideas about the "osmosis of being" introduced in 
"Knowledge and the Image of Man." In Strandberg's analysis, this poem 
is "especially serviceable as [a] final study in Warren's mysticism 
because it fuses the osmosis of being theme and Warren's epiphanies into 
the 'Vision' declared in the poem's subtitle" {Poetic Vision 247). He 
acknowledges the influence of Coleridge on Warren and sees its 
appearance in the poem primarily through the sustained yearning which 
forms the basis of Audubon's - and Warren's - art. Strandberg situates 
the poem with Incarnations and Or Else and argues that together these 
poems reveal a "surprising mastery of the 'new' style" in Warren's 
poetry (275). But Strandberg also argues that Audubon is vindicated not
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so much by formal technique as by "a rising and subsiding emotional 
intensity." Meaning does not come from the language but from the "curve 
of experience," and it is this experience which provides the logic of 
the formal ordering. It would seem that Strandberg's criticism comes 
close to the kind of moralistic reading which warren himself sought to 
refute in "A Poem of Pure Imagination."
Other critics have pursued moralistic as well as historical kinds 
of criticism of Audubon. T.R. Hummer sets out to study "Warren's cen­
tral conviction, the moral center of his art," which he considers to be
"the deep engagement of the artist with human growth, in himself and in
other men."9 Hummer explores that moral center in Audubon by relying 
heavily upon the work of Joseph Campbell and C.G. Jung in order to 
explore the growth of Audubon. For example, he traces the way Warren 
simultaneously démythifiés and remythifies the figure of Audubon, creat­
ing what Campbell called the "monomyth." This monomyth provides the 
narrative outline for the poem,
for underneath the story of Audubon as man, as underneath 
the story of Warren as man and all of us as human, there 
reverberates the structure of the myth of self as hero.
What this myth signifies is the symbolic death and dismem­
berment of the self, its regeneration, and its resurrection
in a higher form, as Campbell demonstrates (806).
On the other hand, Daniel Duane reads Audubon in light of "Warren's 
life-long critique of American idealism."lo Duane describes the poem as 
"Warren's most dense and ironic meditation on nature and the frontier" 
(25) and focuses in his essay upon the way Warren characterizes Audubon 
by highlighting the "irony and limit" of the man Audubon as well as his 
praiseworthy aspects. One of the critics that Duane cites in support of
5 See "Robert Penn Warren: Audubon and the Moral Center," SoR 16 (1980), 799-815.
10 See "Of Herons, Hags and History: Rethinking Robert Penn Warren's Audubon; A 
Vision/' Southern Literary Journal 27/1 (Fall 1994), 25-35.
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11 New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988.
12 For example, see Strandberg, Poetic Vision 248; Burt 92; Justus 87-88. Warren him­
self suggested that this was an issue in his own thinking about the poem. See Talking 244.
13 Marshall Walker describes the poem as "an exercise in creative biography.
Robert Penn Warren: A Vision Earned (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1979), 174.Strandberg provides a helpful summary of criticism dealing with Audubon in Poetic 
Vision 16-17. See also Frank Graziano, "The Matter Itself: Warren's Audubon: A
Vision" in Homage to Robert Penn Warren: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by
Frank Graziano (Durango, Colorado; Logbridge-Rhodes, 1981), 17-32.9 8
his concern for idealism is John Burt, who devotes a chapter to this 
poem in his Robert Penn Warren and American Idealism. I n  that chapt­
er, Burt traces what he observes to be the "two closely related prob­
lems" of the poem, the first being "the problem of discovering a charac­
ter who is able to approach an experience of primary significance...but
g
who...is not consumed and destroyed by that experience" (92). If the
first problem is one of content, then the second is "a formal one," in 4.
which "Warren seeks to define in the snapshot method a poetic form that
can be at the same time strong and articulate, that can combine the
power of the ballad and the intelligibility of the commentary" (93).
These concerns are not unrelated to the issues Warren raised in his 
analysis of The Ancient Mariner and Burt even uses language akin to War­
ren's own aesthetic: "The formal problem and the problem of defining a
proper protagonist are, of course, versions of the same problem - the 
problem of reconciling power and form, or, in other terms, ecstasy and i
intelligibility, lyric and narrative, value and life" (93).
Most criticism of Audubon confronts, in one way or another, the K
issue of identity in the poem. 12 However, this issue is very often over- 4
shadowed by a more specific preoccupation with the relationship between v
the historical figure and the character of Warren's poem. 13 There is a S
curiosity about the way that Warren borrowed from the personal biography 
of the historical John James Audubon in the shaping of the character #
found in the poem. For example, Bedient asks.
Would the historical Audubon like what Warren has made of
him? This horrific, sublime substitution? Warren visits on 
him a violent love, a still more violent need. He stuffs
Audubon's eyes with sights, fills his mind with thoughts,
his sensibility with nuances and raptures, his psyche with 
nightmares, whose origin and stamp are unmistakably those of 
Robert Penn Warren, lost dauphin of the imagination's former 
grandeurs (134-135).
This emphasis upon Warren's use of the historical Audubon seems to suff­
er, though, from what Warren identified as the confusion of the fancy 
and the imagination in various interpretations of The Ancient Mariner. 
Coleridge distinguishes the fancy from the imagination by contending 
that the fancy is passive and can only mimic what is given to it, wher­
eas the imagination is active and shapes and diffuses experience. Fan­
cy, Coleridge says, deals in "fixities and definites" and "is indeed no 
other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and 
space..." (BL 1.305). It is clear that the figure we find in Warren's 
poem is more than "memory emancipated from...time and space." The com­
position of the poem is governed by more than choosing which events from 
Audubon's life should be drawn out so that the poem might be a mirror 
reflecting the facts of these events. Coleridge goes on to say that 
"equally with the ordinary memory [fancy] must receive all its materials 
ready made from the law of association" (BL 1.305). Rather than simply 
taking up the materials of Audubon's life which "the law of association" 
would provide, Warren has exercised the creative will in order to dis­
solve, diffuse, and dissipate the life of this man and to re-create by 
the verbal imagination a character with a symbolic role within a larger 
symbolic pattern. Because of this symbolic import, Warren's choice of 
Audubon was not arbitrary. As Warren said in "A Poem of Pure Imagina­
tion," the symbol "contains within itself the appeal which makes its 
serviceable as a symbol" (352). So, Warren saw The Ancient Mariner to
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be a central poem for its own age because it did not necessarily provide 
"a comment on an age, but a focus of the being and issues of that age." 
It is in this way that Warren understands the poem to be one of "pure 
imagination" (394). In an interview soon after completing Audubon, War­
ren says a similar thing: "It's about Audubon's life as a kind of focus
for a lot of things about humans. I hope it's the way life is. It's 
about his heroic solution of his problems and the problem of being a 
man" (Talking 119, emphasis mine). Audubon and his "fable" are symboli­
cally rendered so as to provide not simply a picture of a man but a 
focus for the issues of creation and being, or the poet and the act of 
poetic creation.
Taken together, these critics of Audubon leave unanswered some 
very important, even necessary, questions. First, if, as Bedient 
asserts, Audubon does reveal a concentration upon poetry as the extreme 
resource of language-being, then how does it do so? What are the impli­
cations of such a statement for our understanding of the poem itself? 
Furthermore, how does this poem achieve the reconciliation to which Burt 
alludes? Also, does Audubon only reveal the "surprising mastery of [a] 
'new' style," as if language were for Warren merely "a substantial medi­
um, an object to be shaped according to an established system of stylis­
tic forms and models"?i4 Or, do we find in this multi-poemed poem a more 
obvious struggle with the nature of language, a struggle shaped under 
the influence of Coleridge's own linguistically-oriented formulation of 
the imagination and the symbol? If language has indeed become "the mat­
ter itself" in Warren's poetry, then what kind of a reading does a poem 
such as Audubon: A Vision invite? What would happen if we were to fol­
low the lead of Jonathan Culler who suggests that the goal of a struc­
turalist criticism is "to read the text as an exploration of writing, of
14 Bruns, Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language 49,
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the problems of articulating a world"?is It is the poet's exploration of 
writing in the moment of poetic creation and of the struggle to articu­
late a world and even a definable self which forms the aesthetic sub­
stance of Audubon and anticipates the vital concerns of Warren's later 
poetry.
3.2 The Poet and the Agony of Words
Audubon presents from the beginning the image of the artist who 
struggles to articulate his place in the world through the power of his 
imagination. As an artist, Audubon continually seeks to discover his 
relation to the world. His desire is not simply to represent what is in 
the world but is rather to recreate and illuminate an understanding of 
being in the world. The question of his identity cannot be abstracted 
from his yearning for understanding and for articulation; as a result of 
this "passion" he experiences both the blessing and the curse of the 
imagination. Like the Mariner, he knows the agony of telling his tale. 
Warren establishes Audubon as the artist even in his first epigraph: 
"Thou tellest my wanderings: put thou my tears into thy bottle: are
they not in thy book?" (Psalm 56:8). This poem tells of the wanderings 
of the artist in the world and of the tears which come from both the joy 
and the agony of artistic creation. This poem also suggests, though, 
this notion of the "book" which is a silent and unsayable text behind 
and beyond all of the poet's utterances. The work of the poet is not 
simply to tell but to listen to the voice of that book which "tellest 
[his] wanderings."
These intertwined questions of identity, vocation, and being 
appear in the first section of the poem, "Was Not the Lost Dauphin," and 
introduce the themes and issues which recur throughout the poem. Warren
Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975), 260.
101
begins this section.
Was not the lost dauphin, though handsome was only
Base-born and not even able
T o  m ake a  d e c e n t  l i v i n g ,  w as o n l y
Himself, Jean Jacques, and his passion - what
Is man but his passion?
Warren immediately puts to rest the myth of Audubon's origin, which he 
summarizes in the head note to the poem: he was not the son of a sea
captain and his first wife but was the son of a slave-dealer and his 
mistress. The most fantastic legend regarding his origin was "that he 
was the lost Dauphin of France, the son of the feckless Louis XVI and 
Marie Antoinette" {NSP 212). These matters help to make apparent the 
tension which generates the character of the poem. However, Burt sug­
gests that these opening lines
have the air of clearing away the unessential, of listing 
the matters that will not be of concern. Whether or not 
Audubon was the lost dauphin...matters as little as whether 
he was a good shopkeeper; all that matters is that "his 
heart shook in the tension of the world" (93).
Burt's assessment, though, overlooks the way that Warren establishes 
Audubon as a poet. Rather than simply listing the unessential items, 
these lines suggest the precarious position of the poet and establish 
the specific and recurring motif of Audubon as the poète maudit, which 
Warren described in "A Poem of Pure Imagination" as a central image for 
the poetry of the Romantic age. Being base-born, Audubon is an outcast 
who dwells "beyond the circle of respectable society" ("APPI" 388). He 
does not belong either among the highest levels of society or simply 
among the decent, in "A Poem of Pure Imagination," Warren quotes from 
one of Shelley's letters which helps to define the position of the poet: 
"Imagine my despair of good, imagine how it is possible that one of weak 
and sensitive nature as mine can run further the gauntlet through this
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hellish society of men" (387). Audubon makes a similar comment in a 
section which expands the notion of his being poète maudit:
Below the salt, in rich houses, he sat, and knew insult.
In the lobbies and couloirs of greatness he dangled.
And was not unacquainted with contumely.
Wrote: "My Lovely Miss Pirrie of Oackley Passed by Me
this Morning, but did not remember how beautifull 
I had rendered her face once by Painting it 
at her Request with Pastelles."
Wrote: "...but thanks to My humble talents I can run
the gantlet throu this World without her help."
The poète maudit undergoes the ordeal of human society like one being 
unjustly punished. As a result, Audubon experiences a communion with 
the natural world in which he dwells rather than finding his communion 
among human society. He is a wanderer in the world. We read several 
times throughout the poem that he continued to walk in the world, and 
this walking forms a narrative thread through the various images of 
Audubon. 16
As an outsider and a wanderer, Audubon is only himself, "Jean Jac­
ques and his passion...." This combination of name and passion further 
confirms Audubon's function as a poet, as one who yearns to make his 
name and his passion coterminus in himself. His name alone cannot pro­
vide his identity, but it must be combined with his prevailing passion 
for understanding and articulation. Warren's use of the term "passion" 
would appear to be related to two influences. First, in his 1974 Jef­
ferson Lecture in the Humanities, published under the title Democracy 
and Poetry, Warren makes reference to the notion of passion in the 
thought of Soren Kierkegaard. i? In the second of his two essays in this
16 See Sections III, IV[E], and V[A].
17 Demoaracy and Poetry (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1975), 
48.
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volume, Warren explores the way that poetry might provide a place from 
which we may scrutinize "our own experience of our own world" (41). 
Warren goes on to describe the contemporary world, though, as one of 
scientific and technological predominance which denies the vital role of 
poetry in the formation of knowledge. He is skeptical, therefore, of 
the heritage of Cartesian thought which has led to abstract thinking and 
urges the essential place of poetry. In order to substantiate this 
claim, Warren points to Kierkegaard, who "affirmed that abstract thought 
cannot grasp the meaning of existence and that feeling - passion, as he 
termed it - provides the knowledge that is the key of existence and 
action" (48). Warren goes on to equate Kierkegaard's use of the term 
"passion" with the notion of the imagination held by the Romantic poets. 
By establishing passion as the hallmark of Audubon's identity, Warren 
seems to relate this to his imagination which "provides the knowledge 
that is the key of existence and action."
In the second place, Warren's emphasis upon passion in the artis­
tic activity of Audubon is also related to the influence of Coleridge, 
which provides a helpful complement to Kierkegaard's notion of passion 
as a means to that knowledge which actuates existence. While Coleridge 
sometimes used the word "passion" to refer to the base emotions of man­
kind, he employed it more often in the context of the imagination, 
describing it as that part of the creative will by which experience is
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united and modified.le Passion, rather than passivity, distinguishes
both true poetry and the genuine poet, as it discloses the character of
the imagination. When Coleridge describes the nature of poetry in
Chapter 14 of the Biographia, he does so with special reference to the
distinguishing mark of poetic genius.
What is poetry? is so nearly the same question with, what is 
a poet? that the answer to the one is involved in the solu­
tion of the other. For it is a distinction resulting from 
the poetic genius itself, which sustains and modifies the 
images, thoughts, emotions of the poet's own mind. The 
poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul 
of man into activity, with the subordination of its facul­
ties to each other, according to their relative worth and 
dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity that blends 
and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic 
and magical power to which we have exclusively appropriated 
the name of imagination (11.15-16, emphasis mine).
True poetry and poetic genius are marked by the power of the imagination 
which modifies images and diffuses unity so that there is a fusion of 
the creative will with all the other faculties of the soul. However, 
Coleridge goes on to suggest in Chapter 15 that passion is the real 
proof of this poetic genius, pointing to Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis 
as the penultimate example of such genius. In the course of his analy­
sis, Coleridge states.
It has been before observed that images, however beautiful, 
though faithfully copied from nature, and as accurately rep­
resented in words, do not of themselves characterize the
38 with regard to the former use of the term, Coleridge describes the way that dema­
gogues seek to arouse the base passions of their hearers. These "political empirics" 
use "arguments built on passing events and deriving an undue importance from the feel­
ings of the moment. The mere appeal, however, to the auditors...is an effective sub­
stitute for any argument at all." In response, mobs fall into a state in which 
"passions, like a fused metal, fill up the wide interstices of thought and supply the 
defective links: and thus incompatible assertions are harmonized by the sensation,
without the sense, of connection." See "A Lay Sermon Addressed to the Higher and Mid­
dle Classes on the Existing Distresses and Discontents" in Lay Sermons, ed. by R.J. 
White, CC 6 (London: Routledge and Regan Paul; Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1972), 153. This statement affirms, however, the power of the passions: while
it may be helpfully employed by the imagination of the poetic genius to approach the 
unsayable, it can also be exercised by ideology to unspeakable ends. There is both an 
inherent power and an inherent danger in passion, as in language.
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poet. They become proofs of original genius only as far as 
they are modified by a predominant passion; or by associated 
thoughts or images awakened by that passion; or when they 
have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succes­
sion to an instant; or lastly when a human and intellectual
life is transferred to them from the poet's own spirit...
(11.23, emphasis mine).
This statement illuminates Coleridge's distinction between copy and imi­
tation, or mimicry and mimesis. The work of the poet is not simply to
copy from nature by attempting to re-present in words what his mind per­
ceives. Rather, the poet imitates, and imitation for Coleridge means 
"the union of Disparate Things" {CN III.4397 f50v). The genius of the 
poet lies in his ability to modify these images according to a predomi­
nant passion. Coleridge held that passion works to fuse in a way com­
parable to the imagination, stating as early as 1804 that "all Passion 
unifies as it were by natural fusion" {CN 11.2012 /41v).i9 However, in 
1811, Coleridge also attributed this fusing power to the imagination, 
writing in his notebook of "the worth & dignity of poetic Imagination, 
of the fusing power, that fixing unfixes & while it melts & bedims the
Image, still leaves in the Soul its living meaning" {CN III.4066). By
describing the fusing power of the imagination as that which "fixing 
unfixes," Coleridge links this to his notion of the symbol which is sus­
tained by this kind of paradoxical tension. In Chapter 22 of the Bio-
graphia, Coleridge does not make a radical division between the fusing
39 It was this modifying and fusing effect of passion that led Coleridge to lin]c pas­
sion to meter and rhythm in verse. Coleridge distinguishes poetry from prose not 
simply by the arrangement of words or by the question of beauty but by the "essential 
difference" of metre. However, according to Emerson R. Marks, Coleridge disagreed 
with "Wordsworth's notion of verse as the mere superaddition of metre to an order of 
discourse essentially prosaic." See Coleridge on the Language of Verse (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 70, Metre for Coleridge would appear to
relate not simply to order or arrangements of words but to a specific mode of expres­
sion (Marks 73). This mode of expression is generated by passion. Coleridge says 
that he "would trace [the origin of metre] to the balance in the mind effected by that 
spontaneous effort which strives to hold in check the workings of passion" {BL 11.64). 
There must be in verse "an interpenetration of passion and of will, of spontaneous 
impulse and of voluntary purpose" (EL 11.65).
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powers of the imagination and the passion. He speaks of "the blending, 
fusing power of Imagination and Passion" (11.150), ascribing to both a 
power which reconciles and unites. In the fourth of his "Lectures on 
Shakespeare and Milton" presented in 1811-12, Coleridge renders more 
vividly the relationship between the imagination and passion in this 
work of fusion:
That gift of true Imagination, that capability of reducing a 
multitude into unity of effect, or by strong passion to mod­
ify a series of thoughts into one predominant thought or 
feeling - those were the faculties which might be cultivated 
and improved, but could not be acquired. Only such a man as 
possessed them deserved the title of poeta who nascitur non 
fit - he was that child of Nature, and not the creature of 
his own efforts {Shakespearean Criticism 11.63).
Passion provides a sort of agency for the imagination. It is by means 
of the passion that the imagination is able to reduce a multitude into a 
unity of effect. The agency of the passion connects it to Coleridge's 
thinking about the symbol and about language. The symbol making activ­
ity of the imagination is generated by the predominant passion of the 
poet. Furthermore, the poet's passion enlivens his understanding of 
language as living words by which the antithesis between word and thing 
is destroyed.
Coleridge's emphasis upon the role of passion in the work of the 
poet provides an important clarification of Warren's use of the term in 
the first section of Audubon. Above all, it establishes Audubon's role 
at the outset as a poet whose activity centers upon the imagination and 
language, Warren confirms this when he moves from the issue of Audu­
bon's passion into the world in which Audubon walked. This world is not 
a world of representation, but is the world shaped by Audubon's own 
imagination. The scene which Warren presents is not copied from nature. 
Rather, the images presented are modified by Audubon's predominant pas-
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sion so that the reader sees only as Audubon sees.
Saw,
Eastward and over the cypress swamp, the dawn.
Redder than meat, break;
And the large bird.
Long neck outthrust, wings crooked to scull air, moved 
In a slow calligraphy, crank, flat, and black against 
The color of God's blood spilt, as though 
Pulled by a string.
Saw,
It proceed across the inflamed distance,
Warren introduces in these lines the two primary themes of the poem, 
which would appear to be derived from his reading of The Ancient Marin­
er. First, he introduces the theme of the sacramental view of the uni­
verse through his reference to the color of the dawn sky as being the 
"color of God's blood spilt." This sacramental vision not only links 
individuals to one another but more importantly unites God and nature.
In "A Poem of Pure Imagination," Warren states that Coleridge's notion 
of the imagination is rooted in his understanding of the imago del, by 
which "the world of Nature is to be read by the mind as a symbol of 
Divinity" (345). This creaturely imagination "operates to read 
Nature...as a symbol of God. It might be said that reason shows us God, 
and imagination shows us how Nature participates in God" (346). Warren 
develops the second and related theme of Audubon in the image of the 
heron moving across the sky, suggesting that nature may be read by the 
imagination, that it forms a text and that it has a voice which declares 
itself. Warren does not use simile in these lines to describe the 
motion of the bird. Rather, like the Windhover of Gerard Manley Hop­
kins, the language actuates the experience in such a way that the
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experience cannot be divided from the language itself,20 The bird's 
motion is not like a slow calligraphy; rather, that motion is a callig­
raphy, and it is black, suggesting the ink of writing. Warren's lan­
guage here is strikingly similar to his symbol of the logos in "Myth on 
Mediterranean Beach: Aphrodite as Logos," The poem begins with a simi­
lar motion and image:
From left to right, she leads the eye
Across the blaze-brightness of sea and sky
That is the background of her transit.
Commanded thus, from left to right.
As by a line of print on that bright
Blankness, the eye will follow, but
There is no line, the eye follows only
That one word moving, it moves in lonely
And absolute arrogance across the blank
Page of the world, the word burns, she is
The word, all faces turn...(Tncarnations 12).
Warren's poetry, here as in Audubon, has moved beyond the use of figures 
of speech to a language which is consubstantial; it is what it says, 
without making any claims to some extra-verbal reality. Through the 
agency of language, there is a re-creation of experience, Audubon's eye 
is commanded by the heron as it moves across the sky, as "the eye" in 
this earlier poem is commanded by the image of Aphrodite, Whereas the 
image in "Myth on Mediterranean Beach" is clearly that of reading a line
20 There are striking similarities between Hopkins' poem and this image in Audubon. 
Hopkins is caught by the majestic motion of the Falcon as it rides the morning air.
His heart seaas to be stirred by a similar passion as Warren's: "My heeurt in hiding /
Stirred for a bird, - the achieve of, the master of the thing!" Each poem also has a 
distinct religious or theological aspect which shapes the living language of the 
verse. See The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. by W.H. Gardner and N.H. MacKen- 
zie, 4th edn, revised and enlarged (Oxford and New York; Oxford University Press, 1970), 69.
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of print superimposed upon the the blank page of the world, in Audubon 
the image is that of writing. Even as Aphrodite is the word in this
earlier poem, so the heron which Audubon watches is the word which
writes itself upon this other page of the dawn sky. His "eyes [are] 
fixed on the bird" as he sees "it proceed across the inflamed distance."
;
Warren makes it clear, though, that the concern of the poet is not rep-
A
resentation but the shaping and modifying power of the imagination.
Audubon's passion shapes what he sees so that by his imagination the 5
bird is the word.
By its modifying and fusing effect, Audubon's passion opens to him j
the knowledge of the world after which he yearns. But it is not simply 
a knowledge of identity; rather, the imagination perceives difference 
and seeks to bring that "multitude into unity of effect," as Coleridge 
said. This knowledge by difference is established by the notion of ten- S
sion which Warren explores in the second half of this section.
Moccasins set in hoar frost, eyes fixed on the bird.
Thought: "On that sky it is black."
Thought: "In my mind it is white."
Thinking: "Ardea occidentalis, heron, the great one."
Dawn; his heart shook in the tension of the world.
Dawn: and what is your passion?
Warren establishes here a formal pattern which he uses throughout the #
rest of the poem by setting up the recurring tension between black and 
white. He returns to this this pattern at several points in the poem, ?
often using a chiastic structure to make the tension concrete. This 
linguistic tension is at the center of the poet's imagination. Although 
Audubon perceives the heron to be black against the sky, yet in his mind 
it is white. The difference between this "black" and "white" is not 
simply the distinction between the knowing subject and the perceived
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object. Rather the difference here is between Audubon's report of his 
perception and the report of his imagination. The imagination does not 
simply reflect what the mind perceives. Rather, it modifies the image 
so that the bird not only becomes "white" but is named, "Ardea occiden- 
tails, heron, great one." It is the shaping power of the imagination.
and not the reflective power of the fancy, which distinguishes Audubon 
as an artist/poet. Jasper's comment on Coleridge's notion of the imagi­
nation clarifies the importance of this power for Audubon.
The artist, abandoning the minimal role of holding up a mir­
ror to nature, shapes the world as he experiences it, in 
metaphor and symbol his art a self-expression, illuminating 
and not merely reflecting. As it "dissolves, diffuses, dis­
sipates, in order to recreate," the imagination is a symbo­
lising activity, the symbol focusing and shaping through the 
very particularity of an event or object the eternal "ideas" 
which underlie it and of which it is a part.21
So Audubon shapes the world in which he moves as he experiences it.22 
His vision opens up a way of understanding the world, a way to see the 
tension of the world and to embrace that tension rather than attempting 
to move beyond or around it. It is a vision of the poet's struggle 
after knowledge - a yearning toward unity - but that knowledge is char­
acterized by the tension of the world. His constant need is to under­
stand the nature of that tension. This is the poet's passion. Warren 
repeatedly highlights that tension throughout the poem both thematically 
and formally. And as a poet, Audubon is seeking after authentic 
utterance, the kind of utterance which is rooted in the "woful agony"
{1. 57 9) which grasped the Mariner and was the impetus for the tale 
which he told. This agony, which returns again and again, is an agony 
which burns within the poet and provides the "strange power of speech"
21 Jasper, "The Two Worlds of Coleridge's The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" 127.
22 Note the development, through Coleridge, of Kantian notions in Warren's poetry and 
thought. Compare Handy 64-75.
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(11. 582-586).
The tension of the world is, for the poet, a linguistic tension 
which relates to the problem of articulation. The poet cannot avoid the 
inherent tension of language but must embrace it, recognizing within 
this tension the parallel doubleness of the the imagination and of lan­
guage. Warren describes the working of the imagination in "A Poem of 
Pure Imagination" in this way:
So we have here a peculiar and paradoxical situation: the
poem is a poem in which the poetic imagination appears in a
regenerative and healing capacity, but in the end the hero, 
who has, presumably, been healed, appears in one of his 
guises as the poète maudit. So we learn that the imagina­
tion does not only bless, for even as it blesses it lays on
a curse (386),
The paradox of the poem and of the poet is the simultaneous doubleness 
of the imagination and of language. The doubleness of the imagination 
inheres in the way that it both blesses by regenerating the understand­
ing and curses by failing to give complete knowledge. Warren observes, 
"Though the Mariner brings the word which is salvation, he cannot quite 
save himself and taste the full joy of the fellowship he advertises" 
(386). The imagination and language, both bearing the effects of the
Fall, can only function according to this tension. This tension is at
the very core of the notion of an agony seeking words. For Audubon, the 
heron is both black and white; one demands the other, and these two are 
held in tension, the heron of the dawn sky and the heron of his imagina­
tion. Furthermore, though the poet may search for adequate words to
articulate his vision, they will never completely suffice. His passion 
will never be satisfied, the agony never quenched. This is what Warren 
calls the "paradox of the situation of the poet," because the poet is 
"the man with the power which comes unbidden and which is an 'agony'
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until it finds words..." ("APPI" 387). As Audubon continues to walk in 
the world, he bears in himself the very blessing and curse which distin­
guishes the imagination and language. On the one hand, by pursuing his 
passion, he led a "blessed" life:
His life, at the end, seemed - even the anguish - simple.
Simple, at least, in that it had to be
Simply, what it was, as he was.
In the end, himself and not what
He had known he ought to be. The blessedness! (IV[A])
By virtue of his imagination and his passion, Audubon knew the blessed­
ness of being "Himself, Jean Jacques, and his passion" (I[A]), rather
than what he knew he ought to have been. Rather than keeping store, 
dandling babies and getting rich (IV[C]), Audubon knew the blessedness 
of seeing
...from the forest pond, already dark, the great trumpeter swan 
Rise, in clangor, and fight up the steep air where.
At the height of last light, it glimmered, like white flame 
(IV[C]).
By pursuing his passion, he "saw the Indian, and felt the splendor of 
God" (V[A]). On the other hand, the imagination cannot sustain such 
blessing. In section IV, Warren describes the blessedness of hearing 
the world declare itself in a voice that speaks of joy. But concomitant 
with this blessing is the realization that "truth is the only thing that 
cannot/Be spoken." It can only be enacted. Audubon also experienced 
the curse of the imagination and language through its failure or 
regress. He had seen and loved the great heron and the swan but "he 
did not know/What he was. Thought: 'I do not know my own name" (IV[E]). 
This inability to speak the name which provides identity is a character­
istic of linguistic tension which Warren will explore in many of his 
later poems . 23 At the end of his life, Audubon knew the effects of this
23 See Chapter Five below.
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curse:
And in the end, entered into his earned house.
And slept in a bed, and with Lucy.
But the fiddle 
Soon lay on the shelf untouched, the mouthpiece 
Of the flute was dry, and his brushes.
His mind
Was darkened, and his last joy
Was in the lullaby they sang him, in Spanish, at sunset.
He died, and was mourned, who had loved the world-
This one who had known the glory of the imagination, who had understood 
the glimmering power of a sustaining passion, was in the end abandoned 
by imagination, and his mind was darkened. Though Audubon brought "the 
word which is salvation" by placing the images of these birds into our 
own imaginations (VI), he could not "quite save himself and taste the 
full joy of the fellowship he" had advertised ("APPI" 386).
3.3 The Sacramental Vision
The theme of the imagination in Audubon is fused together with the 
theme of the sacramental vision, which further characterizes the poet's 
experience of the tension of the world and of language. In his reading 
of The Ancient Mariner, warren identified the sacramental vision as the 
"primary perspective or primary theme" (355) and linked this theme spe­
cifically to the crime of the Mariner - his shooting the albatross. The 
sacramental vision is "the issue of the fable" (355) because it brings 
to light the notions of the Fall, original sin, guilt and redemption.
In his analysis, Warren dealt primarily with the nature of the Mariner's 
crime as a re-enactment of the mystery of the Fall. As this theme is 
developed in Audubon, it also deals with the nature of the Fall and with 
the crime of Audubon as a Mariner figure. Warren develops this theme in
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his poem through two prominent images or narrative moments. In the 
first, the sacramental vision is intimated through Audubon's ironic act 
of shooting birds in order to know and to paint them. This hearkens
back to the issue of the doubleness of the imagination and discloses the
struggle with language in the act of poetic creation. In the second, 
Warren develops a parallel - and necessary - part of this theme in the 
long second section of the poem, which is the real turning point and the 
moment of blessing. Both of these involve the notion of crime as it 
relates to the Fall and to original sin: Audubon commits a crime upon
nature in the first image which paradoxically leads to redemption, and 
in the second he is the victim of crime, acted upon by another person.
3.3.1 Slayer of Birds, Slayer of Self
Audubon's crime of shooting birds so that he might know them and 
in turn illuminate our imagination makes an interesting reversal of the 
Mariner's crime in The Ancient Mariner. In the third section of "A Poem 
of Pure Imagination," Warren probes the nature of the Mariner's trans­
gression. He rejects any reading of the crime which views it simply 
from a moralistic perspective; instead, Warren insists that it be read
as a symbol which "re-enacts the mystery of the Fall" ("APPI" 360). He
supports this reading by tracing out Coleridge's understanding of the 
doctrine of original sin and of the Fall, concluding that Coleridge 
could not intellectualize these matters but could only accept them as an 
unavoidable mystery. Warren quotes Coleridge from the Table Talk:
A Fall of some sort or other - the creation, as it were, of 
the nonabsolute - is the fundamental postulate of the moral 
history of Man. Without this hypothesis, Man is unintelli­
gible; with it, every phenomenon is explicable. The mystery 
itself is too profound for human insight ("APPI" 359).
If Coleridge held that the Fall is necessary to our understanding of the
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nature of man, he also maintained that the Fall was necessary to our 
understanding the whole of creation. In Confessions of An Inquiring 
Spirit he states, "Not only Man, but, says St, Paul, the whole creation 
is included in the consequences of the F a l l . . . . "24 He also held that the
mind of man bore those consequences in an obvious way. In Aids to
Reflection he states that the myth of the Fall "speaks to the Catechumen 
& to the Adept. - To the Catechumen it states the simple Fact, viz. that 
Man fell and falls thro' the separation and the insubordination of the 
Fancy, the Appetance, & the discursive Intellect from the Faith or prac­
tical R e a s o n . ..."25 The effect of the Fall was the distortion of Reason 
and man continues to bear that effect - he continues to fall - by ele­
vating the fancy above the imagination. Part of the mystery of the Fall 
for Coleridge, however, is that it appears not only to have resulted in 
a curse but also to have prepared paradoxically for a b l e s s i n g . 26 Man
would be unintelligible without the Fall; however, man receives his 
imagination with the Fall. It is by means of the imagination that the 
fallen creature yearns toward a healing of the wound of the Fall.
Warren interprets the act of the Mariner as an act of sin which is
original in the will of the sinner himself and which is without prior
determination. He states,
The bolt whizzes from the crossbow and the bird falls and 
all comment that the Mariner has no proper dramatic motive 
or is the child of necessity or is innocent of everything 
except a little wantonness is completely irrelevant, for we 
are confronting the mystery of the corruption of the will, 
the mystery which is the beginning of the "moral history of 
Man" ("APPI" 359-360).
The corruption of the will, Warren says, is mysterious precisely because
24 Confessions of An Inquiring Spirit, ed. by H. St J. Hart (London: Adam and Charles
Black, 1956), Letter I.
25 Aids to Reflection 261 n. 40.
25 We are not proposing that Coleridge held to any doctrine of the felix culpa as did 
William Blake. For a brief discussion of this, see Chapter Four.
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of its lack of motivation and its perversity. This "is exactly the sig­
nificant thing about the Mariner's act" and the thing that "flies in the 
face of the Aristotelian doctrine of hamartia" (360). As a re-enactment 
of the Fall, this act involves a condition of the will which is "'out of 
time,' and...is the result of no single human motive" (360). The Marin­
er's crime resulted from the abstraction of the will, and, according to 
Coleridge, the will in abstraction "becomes Satanic pride and rebellious 
self-idolatry" and characterizes "the mighty hunters of mankind, from 
Nimrod to Bonaparte."27 Warren observes that this peculiar phrase blends 
"the hunting of beasts and the hunting of man" and "takes us straight to 
the crime of the Mariner" (360). This identification illuminates the 
sin of the Mariner who "did not kill a man but a bird", and the literal­
minded readers have echoed Mrs. Barbauld and Leslie Stephen: what a lot
of pother about a bird. But they forget that this bird is more than a
bird" ("APPI" 360-61). In Warren's reading, "the hunting of the bird 
becomes the hunting of man" and the crime becomes "symbolically a 
murder..." and a motiveless one at that. In this way, the poem main­
tains its symbolic reference to the Fall. Warren concludes:
The poet's problem, then, was to provide an act which, on 
the one hand, would not accent the issue of probability or 
shockingly distract from the symbolic significance, but 
which, on the other hand, would be adequately criminal to
justify the consequences. And the necessary criminality is
established, we have seen, in two ways: (1) by making the 
gravity of the act depend on the state of the will which 
prompts it, and (2) by symbolically defining the bird as a 
"Christian soul," as "pious," etc. ("APPI" 361).
But Warren is concerned for the deeper religious symbolism and impor­
tance of the Mariner's act, arguing that "the crime against Nature [isj 
a crime against God" (361). This is manifested when the cross is
27 See "APPI" 350. Warren is quoting from The Statesman's Manual 65-56.
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removed from the Mariner's neck and is replaced by the dead albatross.
In this exchange, there is a transference from the creature of God to 
God himself: "And the death of the creature of God, like the death of
the Son of God, will, in its own way, work for vision and salvation" 
("APPI" 362). But the Mariner's crime goes hand in hand with his regen­
eration, which is revealed in the moment of blessing the sea snakes.
"In the end," Warren says, "he accepts the sacramental view of the uni­
verse, and his will is released from its state of 'utmost abstraction' 
and gains the state of 'immanence' in wisdom and love" ("APPI" 365).
While there is a similar crime committed by Audubon when he kills 
the birds that he will paint, this act is diffused and re-created by 
Warren's secondary imagination in his own poem. Like the Mariner, Audu­
bon commits a crime against nature: he shoots birds. But Audubon's act 
does not appear to be motiveless under a will in a state of utmost 
abstraction. Audubon's crime is clearly motivated by his passion for 
true knowledge of the world and of the "Birds of North America" (V[A]). 
Warren suggests that this passion for knowledge is one name for love 
(VI). And yet, he "slew" the birds, "at surprising distances, with his 
gun" (VI). Warren commented on this paradoxical situation in 1977: 
"Audubon was the greatest slayer of birds that ever lived: he destroyed
beauty in order to create beauty and whet his understanding. Love is 
knowledge" {Talking 244). It is precisely this paradoxical situation of 
Audubon's crime which re-enacts in its own way the mystery of the Fall 
and reveals the doubleness of the imagination necessitated by the Fall. 
Audubon yearns for an immediate and real knowledge that would heal the 
wound of the Fall, yet this knowledge is not available to him. This 
knowledge is what Warren the poet strives for in the "unsayable." War­
ren writes in V[C],
For everything there is a season.
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But there is the dream
Of a season past all seasons.
In such a dream the wild-grape cluster.
High-hung, exposed in the gold light.
Unripening, ripens.
Audubon longs for that season past all seasons, but this can only be 
described by the language of tension and paradox: in that season the
wild grape cluster "unripening, ripens." His knowledge is always marked 
by the tension of the world. Like truth which is "the only thing that 
cannot / Be spoken" (IV[E]), this knowledge of what is beyond knowing 
may only be approached through the enactment of Audubon's art. His 
crime of shooting the birds sustains the sacramental vision, though, 
because the crime against nature is clearly seen to be a crime against 
God. Warren implies that the death of the birds and their re-creation 
through the artistic act has an equal effect to the sacrificial death of 
the Son of God: it "will, in its own way, work for vision and salva­
tion" ("APPI" 362).
Warren further qualifies Audubon's act by framing it as a crime 
against the self. The slaying of birds is more than a criminal act 
against nature, even as the Mariner's act is more than the killing of a 
bird. Whereas Warren observes that the hunting of the bird becomes the 
hunting of man in The Ancient Mariner, here in Audubon the hunting of 
the bird becomes the hunting of the self. In Section IV, Warren writes.
The blessedness 1 --
To wake in some dawn and see,
As though down a rifle barrel, lined up
Like sights, the self that was, the self that is, and there.
Far off but in range, completing that alignment, your fate.
Hold your breath, let the trigger-squeeze be slow and steady.
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The quarry lifts, in the halo of gold leaves, its noble head.
This is not a dimension of Time.
In this passage there is an alignment of the bird with the self. The 
self is the quarry which is hunted so that the hunter might discover his 
own identity and be able to speak his own name.28 in the "blessedness" 
of the imagination, the self may be re-made through this act of self- 
immolation. This moment may be seen, then, as a sacramental moment 
because the death of the self leads to vision. We learn in Section VI 
that Audubon's crime against nature is motivated by knowledge - he slays 
in order to know. The crime against the self is motivated by the same 
yearning for knowledge. He wants to know that self which can be finally 
known beyond the tension of the world. Warren told Peter Stitt that as 
he worked on the poem he "began to see [Audubon] as a certain kind of 
man, a man who has finally learned to accept his fate" {Talking 244). 
However, before he can accept his fate, Audubon must slay the self in an 
act of the will.29 Rather than being an instance of the will in utmost 
abstraction —  as Warren suggested the act of the Mariner was -- here we 
have an instance of the will in its immanence. It is redeemed from 
utmost abstraction by the desire for wisdom and love. so By his recogni­
tion of a sacramental union with nature, Audubon does not display that 
"fearful resolve to find in [himself] alone the one absolute motive of 
action, under which all other motives from within and from without must
28 Compare Audubon's thought in the final part of this same section (V[Ej), "I do not 
know my own name."
29 Compare the final five lines of "Pear and Trembling" {NSP 112);
Can the heart's meditation wake us from life's long sleep.
And instruct us how foolish and fond was our labor spent - 
Us who know that only at the death of ambition does the deep 
Energy crack crust, spurt forth, and leap
From grottoes, dark - and from the caverned enchainment?
30 See The Statesman's Manual 65.
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be either subordinated or c r u s h e d , "3i Rather, his heart shakes with the 
passion to understand his connection with the natural realm which alone 
can provide the overarching motive in the act of poetic creation.
3.3.2 Dream and Blessing
Audubon's crime against nature and the self is not the only way 
that the theme of the sacramental vision is developed. Warren further 
modifies this theme in the long second section of the poem, "The Dream 
He Never Knew the End Of," extending the implications of the sacramental 
vision to the artist's connection with humanity. Warren develops in 
this passage what he calls in "A Poem of Pure Imagination" the 
"socializing function of the imagination" which was a fundamental con­
cern of the Romantic poets. Warren refers to Shelley who argues in the 
Defense of Poetry that the poet puts "'himself in the place of another 
and of many others' so that 'the pains and pleasures of his species must 
become his own'" (384). In this most narrative section of the poem, 
Audubon is given shelter for a night in a woman's wilderness cabin and
is threatened during the night with his own murder by the woman and her
sons. In the image of this woman, Warren fuses his concern for nature 
and concern for humanity. The first section of the poem introduces the 
sacramental vision by declaring how thin the membrane is between Audubon 
and the natural world. In the second half of that section, Audubon 
watches a bear on an autumn afternoon as it prepares for its long win­
ter's nap:
October: and the bear.
Daft in the honey-light, yawns.
The bear's tongue, pink as a baby's, out-crisps to the curled tip. 
It bleeds the black blood of the blueberry.
The teeth are more importantly white
Than has ever been imagined.
31 The Statesman's Manual 65.
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The bear feels his own fat
Sweeten, like a drowse, deep to the bone.
Bemused, above the fume of ruined blueberries.
The last bee hums.
The wings, like mica, glint
In the sunlight.
He leans on his gun. Thinks
How thin is the membrane between himself and the world.
This meditation looks back to the blood-red sky of dawn across which the 
heron flew through its own sacramental image of the "black blood of the 
blueberry," even as it further illuminates the tension of the world in 
which Audubon's heart shook. However, these lines also look forward to 
the second section in which Audubon will learn how close the connection 
is between himself and humanity through his confrontation with the wom­
an. If in the first section he learned that this membrane signifies 
both a division and a union between himself and nature, Audubon learns 
in this encounter with the woman that there is no membrane to separate 
him from the tension of the human filth and human hope which he finds in 
this cabin in the woods. If the poet -- whether Audubon or Warren -—  
can frame a definition of joy, it must be a definition which confronts 
this tension and embraces it. The confrontation portrayed in this sec­
ond section is a necessary part of the poetic vision which seeks after a 
true knowledge of the world and yearns for that moment of articulation.
Whereas the first section of the poem emphasizes the glorious 
aspects of the tension of the world, here in the second it is revealed 
in all of its gritty and grimy aspects. "The Dream He Never Knew the 
End Of" begins at the "Shank-end of day," seemingly following on from 
the dawn mentioned in the first section. There is also the presence
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again of a bird, a crow which calls from the distance. The call of the 
crow acts to announce the clearing upon which Audubon apparently stum­
bles .
Shank-end of day, spit of snow, the call,
A crow, sweet in distance, then sudden
The clearing: among stumps, ruined cornstalks yet standing, the
spot
Like a wound rubbed raw in the vast pelt of the forest. There
Is the cabin, a huddle of logs with no calculation or craft;
The human filth, the human hope.
Warren develops the notion of nature as sacrament here by means of the 
clearing, which is like "a wound rubbed raw in the vast pelt of the 
forest." As a wound, the clearing reveals some criminal act which has 
been inflicted upon the forest. However, Warren uses here an animate 
image; it is a wound in a pelt, the hide of an animal. The crime 
against the forest appears to be without motive, but it betrays the 
effects of humanity's presence and labor: the cabin stands among the
tree stumps and the ruined cornstalks. As Audubon approaches the clear­
ing and the cabin, he stands and thinks about the scene before him, as 
he did in the first section. It is a fallen scene, devoid of glory or 
beauty. The smoke coming out of the "mud-and-stick chimney" drains down 
the roof "like sputum." In his imagination, he already knows "the 
stench of that lair beyond / The door-puncheons." These physical signs, 
however, only anticipate the confrontation with fallen humanity which 
Audubon will face inside the cabin.
The woman who inhabits the cabin is something of a foil to Audu­
bon. She and her voice, which is played against Audubon's thoughts 
throughout the section, are the manifestation of the tension between the 
"human filth, human hope." In her physical appearance and in her voice, 
there is at once a beauty - or power - and a repulsing crudity. These
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two are not resolved in this section but remain in tension, and Audubon 
must accept both the beauty and the horror: she "is what she is"
It is this sustained tension which not only lends to the woman 
a certain authenticity but also reveals the power of language whose 
energy resides in an unresolved tension between linguistic despair and 
linguistic hope. It is clear that this union of opposites, this multe­
ity in unity, is the basis of the woman's powerful beauty. Her power is 
also intimated by the way that her image is fused with the image of a 
bird. In II[A], the woman's voice is paralleled with the call of the 
crow. The first line ends with "the call" of the crow, and the last 
line ends with "the voice" of her response to Audubon's greeting. This 
fusion is heightened when Warren introduces the woman in II[C]; the 
physical description resembles a description which might have been given 
the crow which invokes this section. Her face hangs like a crow in mid­
air. It is "Large,/ Raw-hewn, strong-beaked" and her eyes, "dark, glint 
as from the unspecifiable/ Darkness of a cave." Only after this 
description is this creature defined as "woman." This combination of 
images confirms the symbolic role and significance of the woman in the 
larger vision of the poem. The blending of the woman's image with the 
imagery of birds affirms that Audubon's encounter in this section is not 
separate from his paradoxical activity of slaying birds in order to 
create beauty. The threat to his own life and the subsequent death of 
the woman and her sons correspond to the crime against the self and the 
crime against nature discussed above. By extending the sacramental 
vision through the crime against humanity, this narrative reiterates the 
notion of an atoning sacrificial death- Just as the death of the birds 
worked to bring about a sort of redemption, so the woman's death in the 
place of Audubon provides for the him the fullness of this sacramental
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vision so that he might bless "them unaware" {Ancient Mariner 1. 285). 
And if this moment of blessing is the turning point of Coleridge's poem 
(as Warren saw it to be), then this moment of blessing would appear to 
have similar significance in Audubon.
Audubon first recognizes the beauty of the woman in II[D], when he 
takes out his pocket watch and it glows in the firelight.
It is gold, it lives in his hand in the firelight, and the woman's
Hand reaches out. She wants it. She hangs it about her neck.
And near it the great hands hover delicately
As though it might fall, they quiver like moth-wings, her eyes
Are fixed downward, as though in shyness, on that gleam and her
face
Is sweet in an outrage of sweetness, so that
His gut twists cold. He cannot bear what he sees.
Her body sways like a willow in spring wind. Like a girl.
This moment of beauty follows a particular instance of the woman's crud­
ity in which she laughed at the Indian, who is also staying there for 
the night, for having wounded his eye with his own arrow. But the glit­
tering of the gold watch in the firelight transforms her not only from a 
woman into a girl but from a crow into a moth. The description of the 
motion of her hands and body is radically different from descriptions in 
the rest of this section. Her "hands hover delicately" and "quiver like 
moth-wings." Her eyes, which were described as dark and glinting "as
from the unspecifiable/ Darkness of a cave," now are shy and are a part
of the "outrage of sweetness" which has come over her face. "Her body 
sways like a willow in spring wind," but ten lines later she "hulks by
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the fire."32 Yet this irreconcilable beauty and horror nauseates Audubon 
so that he "cannot bear what he sees." He cannot find in this woman the 
beauty which he so readily sees in the heron or the crow or the jay, a 
beauty which captures his passion and his love. It is the power of this 
tension in the woman which proves to be a threat to Audubon as much as 
the threat of his own murder by the woman and her sons.
However, Audubon's reaction to the immanent threat of his murder 
(II[E-H]) reveals his sense of complicity. This narrative moment of 
threat is the dream to which the title of this section refers, the dream 
which Audubon has had before and knows well. But it is a dream that he
never knows the ending of. When faced with the threat, Audubon is fro­
zen in passivity by "a lassitude/ [which] Sweetens his limbs" {II[G]). 
Rather than fighting back he lies in wait for the end of the dream. His 
reaction recalls the bear in I[B] which "feels his own fat/ Sweeten, 
like a drowse, deep to the bone." Though Audubon "knows/ What he must 
do," he cannot do it. And he does not understand his inaction: "He
cannot think what guilt unmans him, or/ Why he should find the punish­
ment so precious." The guilt which unmans him is an awareness of his 
complicity which unites him to the tension of this situation and to this 
woman. This is the reason why the "cold corn pone grinds in his throat, 
like sand" (ll[l]), why there "are tears in his eyes," and why his 
"throat is parched" (II[L]). Audubon's inaction also seems to be moti­
vated by the desire to know the ending of that dream "Of a season past
all seasons" {V[C]). If he could know the ending of the dream, then he
would know what is beyond knowing and would be able to speak the name of
32 Compare the image of the woman's body swaying "like a willow in spring wind" to the 
similar image in "Myth of Mountain Sunrise" ( AE 85 ), in which the reader is asked to 
think "of a gir1-shape, birch-white sapling, rising now / From ankle-deep brook- 
stones. There is a similar mixture of innocence and power in this image as in 
Audubon, This comparison is heightened by Warren's reference at the end of this poem to "the old tale told" which seems to answer the imperative at the end of Audubon, 
"Tell me a story." See the discussion of this poem in Chapter Six.
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the world. This knowledge would only come with his death, and he would 
then not be able to act upon it. Though he may not speak truth while he 
is alive, it may nonetheless be enacted "in the dream become...action" 
(IV[Dj). Being in the world - participating in the tension and "the 
secret order of the world" (II[L]) - requires asking questions rather 
than speaking the answer:
He thinks; "What has been denied me?"
Thinks: "There is never an answer."
Thinks: "The question is the only answer."
He yearns to be able to frame a definition of joy (II[L]).
The ultimate answer or meaning which Audubon looks for is continually 
deferred, so he must continue to ask questions. Warren confirms this 
deferral of meaning in his "Afterthought" to Being Herei "Here, as in 
life, meaning is, I should say, often more fruitfully found in the ques­
tion asked than in any answer given" (107-108). The definition of joy 
which Audubon yearns for must be a definition made up of questions, of 
silences and traces which "cannot fully embrace the dynamics of b e i n g . "33 
In the tension of the world, the poet must continue to yearn.
When Audubon is saved by the three travelers who burst into the 
scene, his role in the narrative shifts from victim to witness.
Although he was denied knowledge of the ending of his own dream, he wit­
nesses the fulfillment of "the dream that, lifelong, [the woman] had 
dreamed toward" (II[K]). As with his own dream, the fulfillment of the 
woman's dream only comes with her execution together with her sons. The 
hanging scene enlarges the imagery introduced in the first section and 
consummates the theme of theme sacramental vision. In the first sec-
33 "The language of poetry, then, is a language of silences, is itself constituted by 
traces, by words that cannot fully embrace the dynamics of being." Jackson, "The Gen­erous Time" 24.
127
tion, in which the sacramental imagery of "God's blood spilt" colors the
dawn sky, Audubon saw "Eastward and over the cypress swamp, the
dawn/...And the large bird," In the second section, when dawn comes, it
is gray and "Eastward, low over the forest, the sun is nothing/ But a
circular blur of no irradiation..." (II[J]). Through the image of the
woman Warren formally portrays the tension between white and black which
in the first section revealed the imaginative passion of Audubon.
And in the gray light of morning, he sees her face. Under
The tumbled darkness of hair, the face
Is white. Out of that whiteness
The dark eyes stare at nothing, or at
The nothingness that the gray sky, like Time, is, for
There is no Time, and the face
Is, he suddenly sees, beautiful as stone, and
So becomes aware that he is in the manly state
(II[J], emphasis mine).
On a rhetorical level, Warren uses chiasmus to structure the tension 
which is imaginatively portrayed in the woman's face. On another level, 
though, he makes it clear that the language is the tension: "white" and
"dark" are not referential terms but are the tension within which Audu­
bon recognizes the beauty of the woman's face. The language creates the
experience. At the moment of recognition, Audubon "becomes aware that 
he is in the manly state." Rather than being a gratuitous sexual 
innuendo, Warren's reference to the "manly state" - presumably Audubon 
has an erection - counters Audubon's earlier failure to understand what 
guilt unmanned him while he awaited the inflicting of the fatal wound 
from the woman. And yet this recognition of beauty takes on the form of 
blessing. This is made clear in II[K], in which Warren describes the 
hanging:
The affair was not quick: both sons long jerking and farting, but
she,
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From the first, without motion, frozen
In a rage of will, an ecstasy of iron, as though
This was the dream that, lifelong, she had dreamed toward.
The face.
Eyes a-glare, jaws clenched, now glowing black with congestion 
Like a plum, had achieved.
It seemed to him, a new dimension of beauty.
The beauty which he perceives is the woman's will which becomes salvific 
in a will-to-be. Her face takes on the bloody color of the blueberries 
in I[B] and in this self-sacrament, he sees "a new dimension of beauty." 
In her death, the woman achieves a certain wisdom, by virtue of which 
Audubon himself gains a fuller understanding of this sacramental vision. 
This vision, which has fused the crime against nature with the crime 
against humanity, is sealed when the crow reappears in the final line of 
this section to come "to rest on a rigid shoulder."
3.4 Language and Nature
The sacramental vision of life has specific implications for the 
poet's understanding of language. According to this vision, nature 
ceases to be an inanimate object which is passively available to the 
poet's scrutiny. In Audubon nature becomes an active participant in the 
sacramental vision, even becoming the sacrament itself at times. The 
poet, then, ceases to be the only speaker and becomes a participant 
through listening. Heidegger makes the same claim. According to Stein­
er,
For Heidegger,...the human person and self-consciousness are 
not the centre, the assessors of existence. Man is only a 
privileged listener and respondent to existence....We are 
trying 'to listen to the voice of Being'. It is, or ought 
to be, a relation of extreme responsibility, custodianship, 
answerability to and for. Of this answerability, the 
thinker and the poet...are at once the carriers and the 
trustees. 34
34 Steiner, Heidegger 36.
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As the poet listens to the world, he is ultimately listening to being 
itself and the act of poetic creation becomes an act of answerability in 
which the poet offers his testimony. The sacramental vision lays bare, 
then, not only the tension of the world but also the tension between 
speaking and listening, declaration and silence, the sayable and the 
unsayable. Language is no longer simply a given, nor is it a lifeless 
substance to be shaped; rather it is a living power. So the moment of 
poetic creation - Warren's overt concern in his study of Coleridge and 
his underlying concern in Audubon - is a sacramental moment. Poetic 
creation is a process of discovery, and in the moment of creation the 
poem comes "unbidden from the depths" just as the Mariner's blessing 
comes "unaware." The sacramental nature of this moment qualifies the 
type of speaking which is involved in creating the poem: it is a sort
of prayer which is watchful and humble in its a p p r o a c h . 35
This concern for "saying the unsayable," as the poet works toward 
the given within the tension of the world, recurs throughout Audubon.
It does so primarily through the voice of the world, by which the world 
declares itself. This voice is heard through the call of the birds 
throughout the poem. The voice of the world declares itself first in 
Section I, when the heron is identified as moving across the dawn sky in 
a "slow calligraphy." What does it write upon the sky? It does not 
write its own name within the world - either "ardea occldentalls" or 
"heron, the great one." It writes its presence which opens within Audu­
bon's mind the possibility of a knowledge of both the bird's presence 
and its absence. The world repeatedly calls to Audubon and leads him
35 Compare 11, 288-291 of The Ancient Mariners 
The self-same moment I could pray;
And from my neck so free
The Albatross fell off, and sank
Like lead into the sea.
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toward moments of understanding as he continues to walk in the world.
For example, the second section of the poem is bracketed by the call of 
the crow which at first implicitly draws Audubon on toward his passion 
and in the end explicitly alerts Audubon to his new-found vision. While 
Audubon is in the cabin, he hears the world break its silence once again 
in the whisper of the stone (in [E]). In the darkness of the night, 
Audubon
hears
Like the whisper and whish of silk, that other 
Sound, like a sound of sleep, but does not 
Know what it is.
But this whisper alerts him and warns him of his doom. It bespeaks the 
tale which is "the dream he had in childhood but never/ Knew the end of, 
only/ The scream." As the woman prepares to murder Audubon, she sharp­
ens her knife on the stone, wetted by her own spit. "The spit is what 
softens like silk the passage of steel/ On the fine-grained stone. It 
whispers." At the end of this second section, Audubon stands alone in 
the clearing, staring at the face of the woman after she is hanged. He 
thinks, "I must go," but he cannot as long as he is captured by this 
face "beautiful as stone." Then: "Far off, in the forest and falling
snow,/ A crow was calling." When the voice of the world sounds, he 
"stirs, knowing now,! He will not be here when snow/ Drifts into the 
open door of the cabin..." (emphasis mine).
As the poet, Audubon listens to this voice of the world which 
speaks in a language which he may hear but may not fully understand.
This language is far more primordial than the approximating and unstable 
language of human intercourse. This voice of the world speaks the lan­
guage of being and the poet patiently waits and listens for the voice. 
This is what we find in IV[D]s
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Listen! Stand very still and.
Far off, where shadow 
IS undappled, you may hear
The tusked boar grumble in his ivy-slick.
Here the poet demands the reader to participate with him in listening to
the voice of the world. IV[D] continues: "Afterward, there is silence
until/ The jay, sudden as conscience, calls." It is this call of the 
world, in the midst of the silence, which the poet hears. And it is in 
the tension between the silence and the call that the poet stands. The 
possibility of the world presence-ing itself is drawn out by the concom­
itant possibility of the world absence-ing itself in silence. It is 
this tension which IV[E] goes on to describe:
The world declares itself. That voice
Is vaulted in - oh, arch on arch - redundancy of joy, its end
Is its beginning, necessity 
Blooms like a rose. Why,
Therefore, is truth the only thing that cannot 
Be spoken?
It can only be enacted, and that in a dream.
Or in the dream become, as though unconsciously, 
action,....
The poet waits upon the voice of the world and is inspired by its lan­
guage. However, he acknowledges the presence of the unsayable in those 
things which may not be spoken. Sometimes language can only approximate 
meaning. The poet dwells in this tension of the world declaring itself 
and yet there are things which may not be spoken by man.
Having listened to the voice of the world, though, the poet can 
only create through the exercise of the creative will by which it 
"dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate" (BL 1.304). The 
imagination is not passive but is vital, Coleridge says. In Warren's
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aesthetic, it is an act of violence which re-enacts the mystery of the 
Fall, but this violence leads to imagination, knowledge, and even love. 
So, Audubon's act of slaying these birds -- through whom the voice of 
the world is heard —  symbolizes the act of poetic creation. Just as he 
slays beauty in order to create beauty, the poet slays language by 
feigning mastery over it, dissolving, diffusing and dissipating it in 
the act of creation. However, this imaginative activity ultimately col­
lapses in on itself and the poet's mastery over language breaks down so 
that truth may not be spoken. It must be enacted in the on-going work 
of creativity and collapse.
3.5 Epigraph
Audubon ends both with this image of the poet as listener and with 
a benediction which forms the epigraph for all of Warren's subsequent 
poetry. Section VII, "Tell Me a Story" both tells a story and issues 
the call for a certain story to be told. In subsection A, Warren speaks 
of a time in boyhood when he heard the voice of the world as the "great 
geese hoot northward." This forms a sort of bookend to the first sec­
tion in which Audubon sees the great heron in the dawn sky; here, howev­
er, the speaker can only hear the goose in that "first dark" after sun­
set- What Audubon understood to be his great passion as he felt his 
heart shake in the tension of the world, the speaker here does not 
understand: "I did not know what was happening in my heart." The
speaker's reference to the season as being that "season before the 
elderberry blooms" recalls the tension in V[C] between "For everything 
there is a season" and "But there is the dream / Of a season past all 
seasons," In this tension there is a wisdom to be learned by the poet, 
a wisdom which the world seems to know and declares to the poet who is 
willing to listen:
It was the season before the elderberry blooms,
133
Therefore they were going north.
The sound was passing northward.
Part of the wisdom imparted is that dream of "a season past all
seasons," a season that never ends yet is always at is fullness. This
is a season which lies beyond the effect of the Fall, a season in which 
the wound of the Fall and the tension of the world have been reconciled. 
And it is a season not out of time (chronos) but the season of the full­
ness of Time {kaxros}.
In the second subsection, Warren calls for the telling of this 
story which is intimated in subsection A.
Tell me a story.
In this century, and moment, of mania.
Tell me a story.
Make it a story of great distances, and starlight.
The name of the story will be Time,
But you must not pronounce its name.
Tell me a story of deep delight.
The benign imperative, "Tell me a story," which contains both a tone of 
urgency and a sense of yearning, expresses the passion of the poet for 
the tension of the world. Part of this passion is the sense of urgent 
need for a word or story which will provide some understanding of being 
in the world. This urgency is evident in the second section of the poem 
in which the poet cries out, "Tell me the name of the world" (II[G]), 
and later states that Audubon "yearns to be able to frame a definition 
of joy" (II[L]). This same yearning finds utterance in IV[E], in the 
prayerful supplication, "Tell us, dear God - tell us the sign/ Whereby 
we may know the time has come." This yearning to know name of the world
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and to be able to frame a definition of joy both point toward the 
imperative in this final section of the poem which calls for that story 
whose name is Time. The poet senses the necessity of a story, both dia- 
chronically -- "In this century..." —  and synchronically —  "and 
moment, of mania...." And in between this diachrony and synchrony, bet­
ween "century" and "moment," the story blooms out of language. This 
tale is intimately related to the world; it is made up of the world: 
"Make it a story of great distances and starlight." And though the name 
of the story is known —  "The name of the story will be Time," — ■ this 
name may not be pronounced. Like truth, the name may not be spoken 
because it absences itself as soon as it is pronounced or spoken. While 
the story may be named, it cannot be encompassed by the pronouncing of 
that name. The name can only approximate the reality of lived experi­
ence within the world, but at the same time it calls this experience 
into being. The name of the story is not abstracted from the content of 
the story, which is the world. While Warren shares Augustine's "thirst 
to know the power and nature of T i m e ,  "36 there is for him no Augustinian 
notion of time in distinction from eternity, a tension which Augustine 
discusses in Chapter 11 of the Confessions. Rather, like Heidegger, 
Warren sees time as something we live. "We do not live 'in time' as if 
the latter were some independent, abstract flow external to our being.
We 'live t i m e . '"37 Time and being may not be abstracted from one anoth­
er, for it is only within time that man can find his identity. So, as 
long as the name of the story is not pronounced or spoken, it remains a 
vital presence and the story remains a "deep delight."
This last section of the poem is one of Warren's "threshold 
moments" which Richard Jackson describes in "The Generous Time: Robert
35 Second epigraph to Bff.
37 Steiner, Heidegger 11.
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Penn warren and the Phenomenology of the Moment." Jackson compares War­
ren's view of the moment to Heidegger's thinking about poetry and being: 
"Rather than a statically centered, purely referential moment, a moment 
of clear origins, there is instead the moment of traces, or rebeginnings 
in the shadows of the a b y s s .  "38 This moment at the end of Audubon is not 
at all "a statically centered" conclusion or resolution in which the 
poet states the "moral" or "meaning" of the poem. Rather, it is a 
moment of rebeginnings which calls forth a sense of what Heidegger 
called "anticipatory resoluteness" which is characterized by a "waiting 
towards" what is beyond the poem.as
As Derrida says of Edmond Jabes' poetry, "One emerges from the 
book only within the book. "4o Such a sentiment is not unfamiliar to this 
poem. When Warren quotes Psalm 56:8 as one of the epigraphs to Audubon, 
he seems to suggest that the wanderings of the poet are already written 
in the book, which in Warren's vision is the text of the world. It is 
fitting then to view this final section as Warren's epigraph to all the 
poetry which follows Audubon. This later poetry which contemplates lan­
guage and the unsayable in the poet's experience of the tension of the 
world is the telling of that story whose name is Time. But the poetry 
is careful to "not pronounce its name," It cannot circumnavigate time's 
expansiveness just as it can never fathom the depths of language. Rath­
er, this later poetry probes possibilities and asks its readers the 
question of being.4i
38 Jackson, "The Generous Time" 21.
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: 
SCM Press, 1962), 388.
40 gee Jacques Derrida, "Edmond Jabes and the Question of the Book" in Writing and 
Difference (London: Routledge, 1978),
41 See William V. Speinos, "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle:
Towards a Postmodern Theory of Interpretation as Dis-closure," in MHQL, ed. by William 
V. Spanos (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979), 139.
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Chapter Four 
The Unrolled Yet Glorious Fragment; 
Participation, Tension, and the Language of the World
In his poetry published after Audubon, Warren begins to tell that
story made up of "great distances and starlight" by entering into the
tension of the world which is declared in a "redundancy of joy." The
way that he begins to do this is by listening to that "story of deep
delight" in the voice of the world, within which the poet hears the
voice of language itself. By listening to the voice of language, the
poet bears a sense of urgency to tell his own story, as Warren indicates
in "How to Tell a Love Story":
There is a story that I must tell, but
The feeling in my chest is too tight, and innocence
Crawls through the tangles of fear, leaving.
Dry and translucent, only its old skin behind like 
A garter snake's annual discard in the ground juniper. If
only....1
Warren's later poetry sheds the old skin of deliberate statement and 
resolution which predominated so much of his early work in order to 
reveal the raw under-skin of questioning and listening by which this 
poetry becomes the beneficiary of language and being. This later work 
is also marked by a relentless engagement with the world. Warren is 
preoccupied by the possibility of the relation of the self to the world 
and by the character of this relation. However, he seems to be equally
preoccupied with the agency of language in this relation. As a poet,
Warren proposes that language is the only means of such engagement with 
the world. Rather than finding that language provides immediate access 
or final answers in this confrontation, Warren experiences in this later
1 Now and Then; Poems 1976-1978 (New York; Random House, 1978), 54.
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poetry the way that language in the voice of the world gives of itself 
on the one hand and withholds itself on the other.
Bedient claims that Warren's "greatness as a writer began with his 
determination to concentrate on poetry as the extreme resource 
of...language-being." (3). However, it would appear that the reverse 
is true in Audubon and in the collections which follow it: Warren's
strength in this poetry is rooted in his concentration upon language- 
being as the "extreme resource" of poetry. Poetry is crafted within the 
forge of language-being. Bedient's formulation is helpful, though, 
because it brings to light the inseparable relationship between language 
and being in Warren's aesthetic and sacramental vision. As Warren 
probes the limits of language, he is at the same time probing the limits 
of being itself. There is a very real sense in Warren's later poetry 
that "man finds the proper abode of his existence in language" (57) as 
Heidegger suggests in "The Nature of Language." The poet's confronta­
tion with the limits of language discloses the limits and character of 
our existence. However, the concrete character of existence, of being 
in the world, clarifies Warren's understanding of language as concrete 
utterance within the actualities of the world. As a result, then, lan­
guage is never rarefied into linguistics or into a clear philosophy of 
language in Warren's poetry. This is not what Warren understood to be 
the purpose of poetry. When Warren says at one point in Democracy and 
Poetry that "the end of poetry is to be poetry..." (42), he is not 
resorting to a notion of "pure poetry" or to some form of the "art for 
art's sake" argument. Rather, he is contending that it is the unique 
property of poetry to listen to the voice of being and to give utterance 
to this source in all its vitality.
Warren's later poetry listens to this voice of language-being as
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it listens to the voice of the world. Being is, for Warren, always sit­
uated concretely within the world. It is always being in the world, or 
"Being Here," as he titled his 1977-1980 collection of poetry. As such, 
it incorporates Warren's thought about the sacramental notion of partic­
ipation which he consistently explored from even his earliest poetry.
The kind of participation which he envisions is that of an engagement 
with being through an engagement with language and the world. This 
engagement does not seek to reconcile the irremediable elements of 
existence but seeks to hold in tension the simultaneous glory and terror 
of being in the world. Such a view of Warren's notion of participation 
runs counter to that proposed by Koppelman when he writes.
Participation in nature - not because nature is a shadow of
the divine, but because nature itself is imbued with divin­
ity - is the aim of Warren's late poetry and is, as we shall 
see, what distinguishes his aesthetic as sacramental, or
more broadly stated, spiritual (119).
Warren's later poetry does indeed aim for a participation in or with 
nature, but not because it is "imbued with divinity." Rather, 
"participation in nature" is necessary simply if one is to understand 
what it means to be in the world. In Warren's vision, both man and 
nature are bound together by and bear the marks of the Fall. Far from 
being divine, nature groans and aches under the curse of the Fall and, 
like the self, is limited and changeable. In this fallen condition, 
nature is fraught with irreconcilable and inescapable tensions. While 
nature does hold a certain power in Warren's vision, it cannot provide 
in itself the ultimate unity of experience and knowledge after which the 
poet strives. Though the heart may long for such unity, there is no way 
of circumnavigating the effects of the Fall in nature and no way of 
avoiding the consequent tension of the world. Warren never resorts to
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that notion of the felix culpa proposed by William Blake in which the 
curse of the Fall becomes its ultimate blessing. For Blake, Fall and 
redemption become one since the imagination, which was a result of the 
Fall, is the only means to s a l v a t i o n . 2 Rather, Warren seems to adopt to 
some degree Coleridge's position regarding the Fall in which the bless­
ing and the curse must go hand in hand. While Coleridge states in the 
Table Talk that he considers the Fall to be "the fundamental postulate 
of the moral history of man" without which "Man is unintelligible," he 
concedes that "The mystery itself is too profound for human insight." 
Warren holds these same two points in tension, yielding to the mystery 
of the Fall while he nonetheless finds in it a "fundamental postulate" 
regarding the being of man and of nature.
Warren explores the ramifications of the Fall in his 1966-1968 
collection. Incarnations, by probing the condition of corporeality 
shared by all creation, whether a man or a plum or a red mullet. Since 
all things have flesh, all things have an inwardness which, when exposed 
to the fallen world, brings about pain. This is what it means to be 
part of the world, as he says in "Riddle in the Garden":
- oh, do
be careful not to break that soft
Gray bulge of blister like fruit-skin, for 
exposing that inwardness will 
increase your pain, for you 
are part of the world.... 3
By aligning the flesh of nature with the flesh of man, Warren suggests 
that nature is another self which is equally fallen, alienated, and
2 Kevin Lewis writes that Blake "has no patience with this material world other than 
as a felix culpa, the only source of vehicular imagery for his ambitiously didactic, 
prophetic art." See his "The Impasse of Coleridge and the Way of Blake," in The 
Interpretation of Belief: Coleridge, Schlelermacher and Romanticism, ed. by DavidJasper (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 232.
3 Incarnations: Poems 1966-1968 (New York: Random House, 1968), 7.
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cursed. Rather than idealizing nature in such a way that creation is
divinized, Warren sees nature as bearing all the effects of the Fall and
as equally alienated from God as man is. Koppelman seems to read Warren
as he might read Wordsworth, toward whom the charge of pantheism may be
more readily leveled. For Wordsworth, paradise and salvation are
finally achievable through intercourse with the landscape. According to
Abrams, "Wordsworth's paradise...can be achieved simply by a union of
man's mind with nature, and so is a present paradise in this world...."4
Though Warren may yearn for this kind of union, it is never portrayed as
being "achieved simply" or as even being achievable apart from death.
The world into which Warren moves is never a paradise.
In an interview with Peter Stitt in 1977, Warren denied that he
had any spiritual essence, much less any divinity, to invest in nature.
Stitt compared Warren's love for the things of this world to that of
Richard Wilbur who "indicates that love by investing physical objects
with an implicit spiritual essence," Warren's response, in which he
denies any such spiritual investment, is significant:
I am a creature of this world, but I am also a yearner, I 
suppose. I would call this temperament rather than theology 
“ I haven't got any gospel. That is, I feel an immanence of 
meaning in things, but I have no meaning to put there that 
is interesting or beautiful. I think I put it as close as I 
could in a poem called "Masts at Dawn" - "We must try / To 
Love so well the world that we may believe, in the end, in 
God." I am a man of temperament in the modern world who 
hasn't got any religion. Dante almost got me at one stage, 
but then I suddenly realized, "My God, Dante's a good Prot­
estant - he was! Where have I gone?" My poem reverses the
whole thing, you see; I would rather start with the world
(Talking 243).
Rather than investing the things of the world in all of their immanence
4 M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernatural!sm: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Litera­ture (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), 95.
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with a spiritual, or transcendent, essence, Warren finds a meaning - or, 
meanings - implicit in the things themselves. By starting with the 
world, he enters into the inescapable sphere of the self's being where 
the poet must confront language. As "a creature of this world," he can­
not gain any position outside of the world from which he might put an
interesting or beautiful meaning into the things of the world. Rather, 
he thirsts to understand the meaning of the things as they present them­
selves to him.5 He seeks to understand the temporality of their being 
and wants to be able to speak in response to their manifestation. Since
the poet and the world are alike fallen, though, his understanding and
his ability to articulate are limited, partaking of the very contrari­
ness and tension which he observes in the world. If there is any imman­
ent meaning to be found in the world, it will only be within this ten­
sion which generates meaning in the midst of contrariness. Warren's 
understanding of the way that meaning is generated by tension is 
informed by Coleridge's formulation of the symbol. Symbols consist in 
contrariness and are sustained by the tension of "the eternal through 
and in the temporal." It is this sustained tension which provides the 
energy by which symbols "are the wheels which Ezekiel beheld" 
(Statesman's Manual 30).
4.1 Tension and Meaning
The poet encounters the immanent meaning of things in the world as 
he participates in the tension of the world. Warren acknowledges that 
there can be no participation in nature without experiencing this ten­
sion. In order to participate, the poet must engage in a relentless 
exploration of the tension out of which the immanent meaning is mani­
fested. This conviction forms the fabric of Warren's aesthetic. "For
 ^Compare the second epigraph to BH, "I thirst to know the power and nature of 
time..." (St. Augustine, Confessions XI.23 [trans. by Albert C. Cutler]).
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the basic fact about poetry," Warren writes in Democracy and Poetryf "is 
that it demands participation, from the secret physical echo in muscle 
and nerve that identifies us with the medium, to the imaginative enact­
ment that stirs the deepest recesses where life-will and values reside" 
(89). Warren explored the implications of this relationship between 
tension and meaning in his 1955 essay, "Knowledge and the Image of Man." 
Warren argues there that any concept of identity must be achieved within 
the knowledge of being in the world. The self is "in the world with 
continual and intimate interpenetration, an inevitable osmosis of being, 
which in the end does not deny, but affirms, his identity" (241).
Because this sense of identity is forged within the tension of the 
world, though, it is never a static presence; rather it "is a continu­
ally emerging, an unfolding, a self-affirming and...a self-corrective 
creation" (241). Like his understanding of the poem, warren's concept 
of the self is sacramental: he says that the knowledge after which man
seeks is a knowledge of "unity presupposing separateness" (242), Much 
like Coleridge's notion of symbols, Warren's thinking moves toward a 
sort of "multeity in unity" in which the self participates in but is 
never wholly united with the world of his being. Such an aesthetic is 
sacramental not simply because it seeks a complete union with nature in 
which the self is dissolved, as Koppelman suggests. Rather, it is sac­
ramental by virtue of its relentless exploration of the act of poetic 
creation as a way of simultaneously striving toward unity while con­
fronting the full reality of the tension of the world. The engagement 
of the poet is sacramental to the degree that what he creates, the poem, 
is consubstantial with the realities of which it speaks. Warren says 
that the poem offers a vision of form which "is not a thing detached 
from the world but a thing springing from the deep engagement of spirit
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with the world" (245).
Warren's notion of tension in his later poetry translates what was 
strictly a formal principle in the work of the New Critics into what we 
may call a more consciously ontological principle. As heirs of the 
Metaphysical poets, the New Critics valued wit, irony, and paradox as 
being the most subtle and most powerful formal elements of poetry and 
held that meaning in poetry is generated by poetic structure. For exam­
ple, Cleanth Brooks claimed that the language of paradox is the language 
of poetry.6 Paradox functions for Brooks by a heightening of tension 
between connotation and denotation. The language of paradox enables the 
poet to create a well-wrought urn which not only contains but provides 
truth. Such a view of language implies, however, that words are "like a 
grasp that fastens upon the things already in being and held to be in 
being, compresses and expresses them, and thus makes them beautiful" 
(Heidegger, "Nature" 68). By grasping upon things with words, the poet 
compresses them in order to express the good, the true and the beautiful 
in the well wrought urn. However, Warren seems to acknowledge in his 
later poetry that the poet must renounce his grasp on language in order 
to realize, as Heidegger said, that "only the word makes a thing appear 
as the thing it is....The word avows itself to the poet as that which 
holds and sustains a thing in its being" (Heidegger, "Nature" 65-66), 
What appears to be an implicit formalist assumption in Brooks' essay - 
that paradox is the nature of language - is made into a more consciously 
ontological presupposition in Warren's late poetry. Meaning is gener­
ated by the tension of the world, not simply by a specifically poetic 
use of language. The tension in the poem is not artificially created by 
the poet; rather, it arises from the tension of being itself which 
dwells within language.
6 See The Well Wrought Urn (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1975), 3-21.
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Warren's attention to the inescapable engagement with the tension 
of the world reveals an openness in his later poetry and thought which 
is absent from his earlier work. When Warren gave "Knowledge and the 
Image of Man" as an address to the American Philosophical Society in 
1955, he maintained a hope for a final reconciliation of this tension in 
which the "fear and disgust" which the world may provoke are conquered 
and sublimated by means of the form of the poem, so that "the world 
which once provoked the fear and disgust may now be totally loved in the 
fullness of contemplation" (245-46).7 By 1975, however, he seems to 
have lost any sense in which that final reconciliation is finally 
achievable. Instead the poem has become the image of a possibility 
which is always marked by struggle or tension. In Democracy and Poetry^ 
he writes, "The 'made thing' becomes, then, a vital emblem of the strug­
gle toward the achieving of the self, and that mark of struggle, the 
human signature, is what gives the aesthetic organization its numinous- 
ness" (69). This struggle also provides the ground of meaning, accord­
ing to Warren's vision. As a "made thing," though, the poem uncovers 
this ongoing struggle only by means of language. It is in language that 
this struggle reveals itself. The poet's only recourse is to language 
itself, in which this struggle is so vividly seen. As Heidegger 
declares.
The poet experiences his poetic calling as a call to the 
word as the source, the bourn of Being. The renunciation 
which the poet learns is of that special kind of fulfilled 
self-denial to which alone is promised what has long been 
concealed and is essentially vouchsafed already ("Nature"
66).
As the source of Being, language is, for the poet, that with which he is 
entrusted and made heir to. When language becomes the centre of his
 ^See our discussion in Chapter Six of postmodern poetics which no longer finds solace in the "good foxms" of poetry.
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concern, the self is necessarily decentred. The poet becomes then the 
listener to the voice of Being, as Heidegger put it elsewhere. In War­
ren's later poetry, then, to speak of the tension of the world is not 
simply a formal technique which constructs paradox out of a particularly 
poetic use of language. To speak of the tension of the world is to par­
take of the tension of the world. The poem - like the self - partici­
pates in this struggle within the tension which distinguishes being in 
the world. The well wrought urn begins to show cracks and fissures, 
gaps which are held together only by a "unity presupposing separateness" 
("Knowledge and the image of Man" 242). The poem itself is a moment of 
tense yearning which does not reflect this tension as a mirror or simply 
use figurative language to describe it. The language of the poetry is 
the tension of the world.
This notion of tension and meaning forms the necessary backdrop 
against which Warren's confrontation with language in his later poetry 
must be seen. In "The Enclave" (Or Else 61), Warren draws near to the 
way that meaning trickles out from the fissure of this tension.s
Out of the silence, the saying. Into 
The silence, the said. Thus 
Silence, in timelessness, gives forth 
Time, and receives it again, and I lie
In darkness and hear the wind off the sea heave.
Off the sea, it uncoils. Landward, it leans.
And at the first cock-crow, snatches that cry 
From the cock's throat, the cry.
In the dark, like gold blood flung, is scattered. How
May I know that true nature of Time, if 
Deep now in darkness that glittering enclave 
I dream, hangs? It shines. Another
 ^This poem, the second part of a two-poem sequence entitled "The True Nature of Time," was originally published in Incarnations: Poems 1966-1968, but this sequence
was republished in Or Else - Poem/Poems 1968-1974. Warren states in a prefatory note 
to Or Else that this sequence has a specific place within the thematic structure of 
that book which is conceived of as one one long poem. It would be interesting to 
study the way that the respective contexts affect the interpretation of the poem.
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wind blows there, the sea-cliffs.
Far in that blue wind, swing, wind
Lifts the brightening of hair.
In the first stanza, Warren encounters the manifested tension between 
silence and saying which generates the poem. From the blankness of the 
page, the poem begins, the black print rising from the white page. Out 
of the silence of the page the poem speaks. But the poem ends and 
returns to the silence of the white page. It is in this tension between 
the silence and the said that the poem itself exists. Its being gives 
voice to the being of language. But the silence out of which the poem 
speaks is not merely a problem for spatial composition. It is a matter 
of time itself, for silence "gives forth/ Time..." Even in the final 
poem of Or Else, entitled "A Problem in Spatial Composition" (101-102), 
Warren finds that spatial and temporal concerns are not removed from one 
another. As the speaker in this latter poem ponders the view of the 
forest visible from a "high window," his vision is interrupted by the 
upper lintel of the window, which "Confirms what the heart knows : beyond 
is forever...." Through the window, he observes the upward thrust of 
"the stub/ Of a great tree, gaunt-blasted and black...." Then a hawk 
enters the composition, "glides...," "Hangs...," and finally "Makes con­
tact" with the tree which "stabs...at the infinite saffron of sky." At 
the point where the spatial composition seems complete - "The hawk 
perches on the topmost, indicative tip of/ The bough's sharp black and 
skinny jag skyward." - the problem of time enters the picture. The poem 
concludes, in a single-line set off by itself, "The hawk, in an eye- 
blink, is gone." The problem in spatial composition is that it is never 
only spatial; it must also be temporal, for this is the basic tension of 
the world. So in "The Enclave," silence and timelessness are identified
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with one another, and the said is linked to time: "Silence, in time­
lessness, gives forth/ Time, and receives it again..." What is said 
forms not an object but a moment in time, spoken out of timelessness in 
time. Time and the saying are like the river to which Coleridge refers 
in a footnote in The Statesman's Manual, quoting from Plutarch:
"For it is impossible to step into the same river twice, 
according to Heraclitus, nor is it possible to grasp twice 
any mortal substance in a permanent state, but in the sud­
denness and swiftness of its change it scatters and comes 
together again, or, rather, not again or later but at the 
same moment it takes shape and dissolves, it comes and goes, 
so that that which is generated from it never achieves being 
because the process of generation never ceases or is over­
come" (20). 9
In the poetic moment, through the tension of language, there is a scat­
tering and a coming together, a simultaneous shaping and dissolving, a 
coming and a going between the silence and the saying. The moment never 
achieves the fullness of being in Itself, just as the poem can never be 
an isolated, sealed-off entity. Rather, it is only in the between, in 
the relationship of one moment to the next, between the elements of the 
poem itself and between one poem and the next, that meaning is generat­
ed.
In the second stanza of "The Enclave," there is a parallel rela­
tionship between the darkness and the cock-crow. In the darkness, the 
cry is raised, even as the word is spoken out of the silence. But the 
wind "snatches that cry" and "In the dark, like gold blood flung, is 
scattered." The cry is thrown back into the darkness which receives it 
again. This second stanza is not simply poetry as mimesis in which War­
ren copies from nature a scene as accurately as possible. Nor is it 
purely metaphorical in that Warren is simply making a comparison between
9 See the editors remarks regarding the text-critical background of this quote. The 
Statesman's Manual 20 n. 1.
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this moment and the first stanza. Rather, the moment here partakes of 
the reality of which it speaks. This is an instance of the tension of 
the world out of which meaning is found. The cock-crow and the word 
both fall back into the silent darkness, but in the moment of speaking, 
between silence and darkness, the utterance is made, coming and going in 
the simultaneous moment-
The third stanza highlights the crisis of the poet: "How// May I
know the true nature of Time, if...." If time never stands still, if it 
never may be reified into a static picture, then how can the poet know 
"the true nature of Time...?" Warren is asking two questions here; 
first, how can he know Time if this is the case? and second, may he know 
Time's true nature? is it possible? The emphasis seems to fall upon 
the second of the two questions, and the poem rhetorically symbolizes 
the answer to the question. The true nature of time is that it can 
never be known. Time is like truth which, as Warren submitted in Audu­
bon, may not be spoken but may only be enacted. Time and Truth, in 
their absoluteness, cannot be spoken or known, but must be lived in the 
tension of the ever-changing moment. In this third stanza, the dream of 
the enclave "hangs" motionless and is reified in the darkness, unlike 
the word in the silence. The enclave of the dream shines in the midst 
of the darkness, but its glittering beauty is snatched by the wind just 
as the cock-crow is scattered in the darkness. Even the dream is not 
insulated from the true nature of time. Coleridge comments in the same 
passage of The Statesman's Manual on the inability of the human mind to 
give permanence to things, just as Warren understands here that even the 
dream is not permanent. Coleridge writes,
the human understanding musing on many things, snatches at 
truth, but is frustrated and disheartened by the fluctuating 
nature of its objects? its conclusions therefore are timid 
and uncertain, and it hath no way of giving permanence to
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things by reducing them to abstractions...(20).
The meaning which is generated by the tension of the world, then, is 
timid and uncertain; this meaning cannot be a reductive abstraction by 
which the poet seeks to give permanence to things. It is a meaning tied 
to the concreteness of the world in which it dwells.
In "Interjection #2: Caveat" (Or Else 11-12), Warren casts the 
tension of the world and the meaning which it yields in terms of the 
play between continuity and discontinuity. The dialogue between the two 
provides the necessary understanding of our existence. The poem begins, 
"Necessarily, we must think of the/ world as continuous..,." The 
speaker suggests that every man has "bled for this knowledge" in a sac­
rifice in which the self replaces Jesus upon the cross. If this were 
not so - if we did not know that the world is necessarily continuous - 
then we could not know that we "are in the world, or even that the/ 
world exists at all...." But then the speaker announces the caveat of 
the poem's title:
but only, oh, on­
ly, in discontinuity, do we 
know that we exist, or that, in the deep­
est sense, the existence of anything
signifies more than the fact that it is
continuous with the world.
While the continuity of the world declares its existence to us, it is
only within the discontinuity of the world that we know that we exist,
that is, that we exist as distinct from, though bound to, the world. 
Existence is bound up by both continuity and discontinuity, and out of 
the tension between the two are we able to have a sense of meaning or 
being.
4.2 The Phenomena of Language in the World
Warren's concern for "the immanence of meaning in things" in the
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world and for the way that this meaning is generated within the tension 
of the world displays an important similarity to the phenomenological 
approach worked out by Heidegger in his early thought. Rooted broadly 
in the Platonic and Kantian traditions, Warren's aesthetic seems to fol­
low what Heidegger called in Being and Time the maxim of phenomenology: 
"To the things themselves !"lo Heidegger held that a true phenomenology 
must set out not so much to define the objects with which it deals but 
to seek a way of meeting things as they manifest themselves within the 
horizon of time. He stated in Being and Time that phenomenology "does 
not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as 
subject-matter, but rather the how of that research" {50, emphasis his). 
According to Richard Palmer, Heidegger proposed that "the mind does not 
project a meaning onto the phenomenon; rather, what appears is an onto­
logical manifesting of the thing itself."n In a similar way, Warren's 
concern for "an immanence of meaning in things" rejects the projection 
of meaning onto the things in the world and seeks to apprehend the way 
that the world declares itself in its ontological manifestation. Such a 
course follows a path parallel to the phenomenological method, which 
consists in "letting things become manifest as what they are, without 
forcing our own categories on them....it is not we who point to things; 
rather, things show themselves to us" (Palmer 128).
Even in his early poetry, Warren displays an awareness of the way 
that things in the world show themselves to us. In "Revelation" (Eleven 
Poems on the Same Theme), a young man experiences a sort of moral shock- 
wave after speaking a harsh word to his mother and senses the repercus-
10 Heidegger, Being and Time 50.
11 Palmer, Hermeneutias; Interpretation Theory in Schleiermaoher, Dilthey, Heidegger, 
and Gadamer, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philoso­phy (Evanston, 111: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 128.
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sions both in himself and throughout creation. 12 As a part of this 
shock-wave, nature manifests its awareness of the son's act and seems to 
voice its alarm. In the third and fourth stanzas, we find the world 
declaring itself;
By walls, by walks, chrysanthemum and aster.
All hairy, fat-petaled species, lean, confer.
And his ears, and heart, should burn at that insidious whisper
Which concerns him so, he knows; but he cannot make out the words.
The peacock screamed, and his feathered fury made
Legend shake, all day, while the sky ran pale as milk;
That night, all night, the buck rabbit stamped in the moonlit
glade.
And the owl's brain glowed like a coal in the grove's combustible
dark.
The whisper and scream of the world make a certain revelation to the son 
in the seventh stanza, that "In separateness only does love learn defi­
nition." This knowledge is mediated, though, not simply through nature 
manifesting its presence but by making known its manifest separateness. 
That separateness is revealed when "Nature's frame / Thrilled in volup­
tuous hemispheres far off from his home," but the character of its dif­
ference is confirmed by the inscrutable words of the flowers' whisper. 
Although he "cannot make out the words," this separateness revealed to 
him "something important about love, and about love's grace." The 
only definition of love available is that which is sustained by the ten­
sion of this separateness.
In Heidegger's' later essays and lectures, though, he expanded his 
conception of the phenomenological method to incorporate his thinking 
about language. In "Language" (1959) Heidegger made his claims about 
the power of language explicit.
Language speaks. Its speaking bids the dif-ference to
12 Eleven Poems on the Same Theme, The Poet of the Month Series (Norfolk, CT; New 
Directions, 1942). Please note that this volume is not paginated. "Revelation" is the seventh poem.
152
come which expropriates world and things into the simple 
onefold of their intimacy.
Language speaks.
Man speaks in that he responds to language. This 
responding is a hearing. It hears because it listens to the 
command of stillness.i3
The way that things show themselves to us is through the speaking of 
language. Language speaks so that we might understand the manifestation 
of the things in the world. If the poet is to understand the immanence 
of meaning in things, then he must begin to listen to language itself.
In response to its speaking, the poet may speak by the "verbal imagina­
tion" which shapes and modifies his experience of things which are mani­
fested in the tension of the world. It is not the poet who points to 
language, who calls language into being; rather it is language which 
declares itself to the poet and gives him his being. Any true experi­
ence with language must consist in language making itself manifest to 
the poet and the reader rather than in any attempt to coerce language 
into the poet's own service. In three lectures delivered in 1957 and 
1958 and published under the title "The Nature of Language," Heidegger 
set out to probe "a possibility of undergoing an experience with 
language," specifically an experience which "is not of our own making; 
to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it 
strikes us and submit to it." When we undergo an experience with lan­
guage, "language itself brings itself to language" ("Nature" 59). But, 
when does this happen?
Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for 
something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or 
encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind 
and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in 
which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched 
us with its essential being.
13 "Language," in Poetry, Language, Thought , trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), 210,
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But when the issue is to put into language something 
which has never yet been spoken, then everything depends on 
whether language gives or withholds the appropriate word.
Such is the case of the poet ("Nature" 59).
Heidegger's conception of moments in which we are "distantly and fleet­
ingly touched" by language illuminates our reading of Warren's later 
poetry, in which undergoing an experience with language brings the poet 
within the sphere of the sayable and the unsayable in the world. The 
poet confronts the essential being of language precisely when he cannot 
find the right word in himself or in the world, or when he cannot under­
stand the word which the world speaks to him. Frequently, the speaker 
in the late poems hears a voice but cannot understand the language being 
spoken by that voice. The question the poet asks is, "What Is the Voice 
That Speaks?" {BE 71). But the poet also confronts language when he 
seeks to say the unsayable - that is, to put into language that which 
has never been spoken and cannot be spoken - only to find himself caught 
between the giving and the withholding of language.
Warren's participation in nature, then, must by understood in 
light of his concern for the way the world declares itself to the poet 
within the tension of "being here." As Warren enters into the world in 
his poetry he does so by opening himself to the "possibility of undergo­
ing an experience with language." His concern for the world cannot be 
abstracted from his preoccupation with the power and limit of language. 
Both the world and language must be seen as the givens toward which War­
ren said the poet must work as he seeks for the moment of articulation. 
The poet is looking for that language necessary for articulation, a lan­
guage which will finally reconcile the irreconcilable. However, every 
attempt to idealize his own language brings the poet back to the reali­
zation that there can be no finally reconciled language either in him-
154
self or in nature. This remains unsayable. What Warren considered to 
be "meaning" —  that is, any conceptual understanding which enables the 
poet and reader to confront the complexities of the world without being 
consumed by that experiencei4 —  is found not in abstract, isolated 
images or statements, but in concrete instances of the voice of the 
world which speaks with the inherent tension of the Fall. Throughout 
his late poetry, Warren explores the way that language gives and with­
holds through the voice of the world. Even as he observed the blessing 
and cursing quality of the imagination in The Ancient Mariner, Warren 
experiences a similar doubleness in his confrontation with language and 
the unsayable. In a number of these poems, Warren encounters on the one 
hand the curse of language in the way that it withholds itself. Lan­
guage manifests its fragmentary nature as a casualty of the Fall and its 
inability to redeem itself. Even in the voice of the world, language 
withholds itself and the poet cannot find in that voice the appropriate 
word. In other late poems, however, Warren demonstrates the blessing of 
language when the voice of the world becomes the word which speaks our 
joy or our experience. The world forms not simply a text which may be 
read but a language which is not available to the poet in himself. It 
is in this between - the tension between the fallen inability of lan­
guage and its blessing power - that the language of nature betrays the 
fundamental tension of the world: it is a realm of great delight which
is fragmented and fractured. This is the sphere of being in which the 
poet listens to the voice of the world and hears the voice of being.
4.3 The Withholding of Language
In "Dragon Country: To Jacob Boehme," Warren states explicitly
what is implicit in his quest for the unsayable, that the heart yearns
14 Compare Burt's statement regarding Audubon : "Warren seeks in Audubon...a character
who can look upon the truth and not be silenced by it" (92),155
for a language that is absolute and will give permanence amidst the 
fluctuating nature of experience itself. The heart yearns for a lan­
guage that is unified, one in which the relation between word and world 
is immediate. Towards the end of the poem, he writes,
...We are human, and the human heart 
Demands language for reality that has not the slightest dependence 
On desire or need...
The heart demands a language which might cross the boundary of our lim­
ited understanding and experience. However, Warren acknowledges that if
such language could be spoken, then life would "dwindle again/ To the
ennui, the pleasure, and the night sweat" and would be devoid of "the 
fearful glimmer of joy" which shines in the darkness. The tension 
betrayed by that fearful glimmer of joy is necessary for understanding 
our experience in the world. This tension is demonstrated in Warren's 
poetry by the consistent confrontation with the limit and boundary of 
language - what he called in various poems the "language barrier," the 
"inevitable frontier," and the "mortal limit" - and by the experience at
that limit of the way language persistently recedes and withholds
itself.
Warren approaches this withholding quality of language in an early 
poem entitled, "The Mango on the Mango Tree," one of the four sections 
of "Mexico Is A Foreign Country; Four Studies in Naturalism" (SP 23-66 
269). The setting for this poem is a post-lapsarian world in which the 
self and the mango share a common guilt but are nonetheless divided from 
one another. As another self, the mango looks at the speaker just as he 
looks at it. The two spy on one another and each "pours his tale into 
the Great Schismatic's ear." In the naturalistic vision of the poem, 
the speaker declares that God has ordained this alienation between the 
self and nature:
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For God well works the Roman plan.
Divide and Rule, mango and man.
And on hate's axis the great globe grinds in its span.
I do not know the mango's crime 
In its far place and different time.
Nor does it know mine committed in a frostier clime.
But the speaker then suggests through an odd reversal of the atonement 
that mango and man offer up their own flesh as a vicarious sacrifice to 
cover for God's "primal guilt." Even still, the speaker has a yearning 
for redemption, a hope for a sacrament in which word and action might 
meet:
For, ah, I do not know what word 
The mango might hear, or if I've heard
A breath like pardon, pardon, when its stiff lips stirred-
If there were a word that it could give.
Or if I could only say forgive,
Then we might lift the Babel curse by which we live.
And I could leap and laugh and sing
And it could leap, and everything
Take hands with us and pace the music in a ring.
And sway like the multitudinous wheat 
In a blessedness so long in forfeit - 
Blest in that blasphemy of love we cannot now repeat.
Both the poet and the mango have need of a word that will enact a final 
pardon of such cosmic guilt. The poet yearns for the sufficient word, 
the redemptive word, which will "lift the Babel curse" so that all of 
nature might participate together in a blessedness. Under this curse, 
he does not know that word or the word does not exist. The nature of 
this curse, though, is not simply a limitation of our diction; rather it 
is the limitation of our power to enact the words that we might speak.
In his fallen condition the poet simply cannot say the word. The Babel
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curse remains and the redemption which he envisions remains only a hope. 
Were such a blessedness attained, it would only be in an all-consuming 
blasphemy, saying the word which only God can say and may live to 
repeat.
Warren expands the notion of the "Babel curse" in a poem from
Being Here entitled "Language Barrier" (73). Whereas Warren appears to
be more concerned in the earlier poem with the psychological condition
of complicity shared by the individual and nature, he is more openly
preoccupied in this later poem with the withholding of language within
the voice of the world. Though the world and the self remain equally
fallen, the voice of the world manifests what is withheld to the poet in
his own language.
Snow-glitter, snow-gleam, all snow-peaks 
Scream joy to the sun. Green
Far below lies, shelved where a great cirque is blue, bluest 
Of waters, face upward to sky-flaming blue. Then 
The shelf falters, fails, and downward becomes
Torment and tangle of stone, like Hell frozen, where snow 
Lingers only in shadow. Alone, alone.
What grandeur here speaks? The world 
Is the language we cannot utter.
Is it a language we can even hear?
Years pass, and at night you may dream-wake
To that old altitude, breath thinning again to glory.
While the heart, like a trout.
Leaps. What,
Long ago, did the world try to say?
It is long till dawn.
The stars have changed position, a far train whistles 
For crossing. Before the first twitter of birds 
You may again drowse. Listen - we hear now 
The creatures of gardens and lowlands.
It may be that God loves them, too.
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The poem begins with an archetypical moment in Warren's later work; the 
reader and poet are alike brought to a verge from which we overhear 
nature declaring itself, and both are silent before it. The snow-peaks 
"scream joy to the sun" above the green of the forest, the blue of the 
"bluest waters," and the "torment and tangle of stone." This is a 
jagged world in which mountains, sun, sky, and snow all converge in a 
clash of joy. This encounter carries within itself both blessing and 
cursing. It is a violent meeting in which all the snow-peaks "scream." 
However, it is a moment of immense joy, which is what they utter to the 
sun. Amidst this world of tension, there is a distinct communication 
between the various elements of the scene, it is a scene of distinct 
grandeur and beauty, but that grandeur is found not only in the beauty 
of the scene frozen in time but specifically in the voice of the world 
that speaks forth this grandeur. The poet's knowledge of this voice is 
only available to him through difference, that is, through a knowledge 
of separateness which brings to light his sense of alienation within 
this world. He is confronted by the voice which "Is the language we 
cannot utter." However he cannot understand what the voice says; "Is 
it a language we can even hear?"
What "Language Barrier" makes clear is that the poet's experience 
in the world finds language withholding itself in two ways. On the one 
hand, the poet hears and sometimes even understands a voice which speaks 
a language that is not available to him. It is a language which he many 
not utter. On the other hand, the poet is confronted by a voice which 
speaks a word which he cannot understand. All he can know is that he 
cannot finally know what the world is speaking. The relationship bet­
ween these two is similar to the relationship between langue and parole
159
in Saussure's linguistics.i5 The world forms its own langue or language 
system which is both a text and a speaking voice. But the language 
which the world possesses is a language that the self cannot possess- 
The self must listen intently to this language - or, read this text - 
but it may not speak its words. But on another level, the world makes 
concrete utterance, or parole, and the poet queries whether he can even 
comprehend the speech of the world. These two manifestations of lan­
guage withholding itself are not divided or opposed in any way to one 
another; the one is realized in the other. According to Hawkes, "The 
nature of the langue lies beyond, and determines, the nature of each 
manifestation of parole, yet it has no concrete existence of its own, 
except in the piecemeal manifestations that speech affords" (21). The 
remainder of "Language Barrier" intimates that while the langue of the 
world remains beyond the grasp of the poet, he can nonetheless hear the 
parole of the world within the horizon of time and within the tension of 
the world. Having pondered whether we can even hear the language of the 
world, the poet offers that we may hear its manifestations as "we hear 
now/ The creatures of gardens and lowlands." However, he may not under­
stand what the world and its creatures are trying to say: "What,/ Long 
ago, did the world try to say?" Warren returns to this paradoxical 
moment throughout his late poetry, as in "Three Darknesses: I" {NSP 3); 
"Since my idiot childhood the world has been/ Trying to tell me 
something." Here, the poet concedes that the world has been trying to 
tell him that there "is something/ hidden in the dark" but it does not 
say what that something is. In the fullness of Warren's vision, that 
knowledge is reserved for the wisdom that only comes with death.
W a rr e n  e x p a n d s  h i s  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e  la n g u a g e  w h ic h  we m ay n o t  u t t e r
15 See Jonathan Culler, Saussure, Fontana Modern Masters Series ([n.p.]; Fontana, 
1976), 29-34.
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- the langue of the world - in a number of poems concerned with the 
nature of truth. The way that language withholds itself in the speaking 
voice of the world is necessarily related in Warren's vision to the way 
that truth also withholds itself so that, while it may be approached, it 
may never be named. Warren explores the relationship between the voice 
of the world and truth in "What Is the Voice That Speaks?" The title is 
repeated as the opening words of the first line, in response to which 
Warren catalogs a variety of sources for the voice: the "tongue/ Of
laurel leaf," the "split tongue of coluber constrictor ~ / Black racer 
to you," the "blind man," the "great owl," the "wolf-howl," "my mother," 
the voice of the lover, and finally "I." Each one of these voices is a 
manifestation of the voice of the world, or the voice of being, that 
speaks. Also, all of them are collectively the voice that speaks. Yet 
each and all are limited to what may be spoken, whether it be the laurel 
leaf
trying
To tell how long since you lived on a mountain
In Tennessee, free wind inspiring your wisdom?
or the voice of the "I" which responds to the question, "I thought that 
you loved me" with "I do. But tomorrow's a snowflake in Hell." In 
response to the variety of voices which speak, the poet asks, "What 
tongue knows the name of Truth? Or Truth to come?/ All we can do is 
strive to learn the cost of experience." in the same way which Warren 
proposes in "Language Barrier" that the world is a language that we can­
not utter, so he discerns here that the human heart is unable to name 
Truth. Instead of speaking the Truth, we are bound over to experience 
within the tension of the world in which we learn "the cost of experi­
ence." Rather than finding a unified language that will answer the 
Truth-question, we must seek to enact truth, to live truth in the ten-
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sion of experience.
Warren pursues this concern for the relationship between Truth and
a language which withholds itself and cannot be uttered, in "Truth" {BH
63). In the first two sections, as in the last two lines of "What Is
the Voice That Speaks?", he links utterance to concrete experience
w i t h i n  t h e  w o r ld :
T r u t h  i s  w h a t  y o u  c a n n o t  t e l l .
T r u t h  i s  f o r  t h e  g r a v e .
T r u t h  i s  o n l y  t h e  f l o w i n g  s h a d o w  c a s t  
By t h e  w in d - t o s s e d  e lm
When sun is bright and grass well groomed.
T r u t h  i s  t h e  d ow n y f e a t h e r
You blow from your lips to shine in sunlight.
Warren approaches here the absolute nature of Truth which is manifested
in the sentiment that it absolutely may not be spoken. Instead, Truth
is revealed in fleeting moments of non-absolute time. Truth is the
shadow and the downy feather which flow and float in the midst of the
bright sunlight. These lines are reminiscent of Coleridge's statement
in The Statesman's Manual that the mind only "snatches at truth, but is
frustrated...by the fluctuating nature of it objects..." (20). As a
result, "its conclusions...are timid and uncertain, and it hath no way
of giving permanence to things by reducing them to abstractions..."
(20). Warren refuses to reduce Truth to an abstraction which might be
told or uttered. An absolute knowledge of Truth comes only with death.
Instead, Truth comes in snatches within the experience of the world.
T r u t h  i s  t h e  t r i c k  t h a t  H i s t o r y ,
Over and over again, plays on us.
Its shape is unclear in shadow or brightness.
And its utterance the whisper we strive to catch 
Or the scream of a locomotive desperately 
Blowing for the tragic crossing. Truth 
Is the curse laid upon us in the Garden.
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Truth is the Serpent's joke,...
Rather than giving permanence to truth here, Warren says that, like a 
mirage, "its shape is unclear in shadow or brightness." We might expect 
Warren to propose that the shape of truth - even a truth lived in 
experience - is more clear in the brightness of the sun, but here truth 
is unclear in both shadow and brightness. Its utterance is both a 
whisper we strain to hear and a scream from which we flee. Warren's 
allusion to "the curse laid upon us in the Garden" - presumably the Gar­
den of Eden at the point of the Fall - suggests that it is the absolute 
or "unsayable" quality of truth which was the curse laid upon us. What 
was known in fullness before the Fall may now only be enacted within the 
tension of the world. Warren does not deny that there is truth, but in 
a fallen world, it may not be named. By "the Serpent's joke," Warren 
suggests the temptation to grasp Truth in its absoluteness, and so to 
become God. In the final stanza, Warren returns to the notion that 
"Truth is for the grave:"
Truth is the long soliloquy
Of the dead all their long night.
Truth is what would be told by the dead
If they could hold conversation
With the living and thus fulfill obligation to us.
Their accumulated wisdom must be immense.
Here, as in other poems, death is seen as the fullness of experience, as 
the moment in which there is an absolute knowledge and a simultaneous 
apocalypse of the self.ie In that moment, the self is dissolved, dif­
fused, and dissipated, though reshaped into something other than what it 
once was. Warren avoids the vocabulary of Christian theology which 
might speak of some glorification or transformation at the point of
16 3 0 0  for example "Better Than Counting Sheep" EH 58.
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death; there is this deep sense of a radical change, though, in which 
the dead and the living are divided by this immense wisdom. For this 
reason, though the dead might tell truth, they may not "hold conversa­
tion" with the living. Death is the neighborhood of Truth; they dwell 
in what Heidegger would call nearness to one another, facing one another 
and completing one another.i?
In "A Way to Love God" {NSP 165), Warren develops the relationship 
between the nature of truth and the withholding of language. The poem 
begins by observing "the shadow of truth."
Here is the shadow of truth, for only the shadow is true.
And the line where the incoming swell from the sunset Pacific 
First leans and staggers to break will tell all you need to know 
About submarine geography, and your father's death rattle 
Provides all biographical data required for the Who's Who of the
dead.
I cannot recall what I started to tell you....
As in "Truth," Warren suggests that truth is never available as the
"thing-in-itself," but that we may only catch a glimpse of the shadow of 
truth. In our experience, only the shadow, unclear as a whisper, is 
truth. But, if only the shadow of truth is true, then where may the 
shadow be seen? Here, Warren says, in the world and in the poem itself, 
in both of which the shadow of truth is seen. Warren subverts here both 
the notion that poetry contains truth and the conviction that the poet 
is the speaker of truth. In the poem the poet observes the shadow of
truth. Warren also turns to the world which provides all that you need
to know or will be required to know about this shadow of truth. Each of 
the subsequent sections of the poem marks experience in the world, but 
each moment of experience is an aporetic moment. Each section inter­
rupts the other: "I cannot recall...," "I do not recall...," "But I had
17 See Being and Time 301-11 and Steiner, Heidegger 103-7,
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forgotten...." The shadow of truth slips away and recedes like the uni­
fied word which may never be uttered. But within the discontinuity of 
this experience, there is a continuity: "Everything seems an echo of
something else." These experiences which seem discontinuous actually 
reveal a continuity? each is a shadow of truth, whether it be the mid­
night moan of the mountains who "remember...that there is something they 
cannot remember," or the "hairiness of stars" in the midst of the 
silence, or the sheep, huddling together in a midnight mist, who "Stared 
into nothingness." And in Warren's vision, truth must be seen within 
each moment in itself, so that "You would think that nothing would ever 
again happen." In this recognition, snatching at the shadow of truth, 
he suggests, "That may be a way to love God." Warren returns here to 
his admitted "theological" reversal first intimated in his interview 
with Peter Stitt, where he referred to "Masts at Dawn :" "My poem 
reverses the whole thing, you see: I would rather start with the world"
{Talking 243). Warren also seems to be developing the admission he made 
in Audubom "What is love? II One name for it is knowledge" (VI). it 
may be that a way to love God is to know and understand the basic con­
trariness of the the world - its continuity in discontinuity - and to 
perceive that this is the shadow of truth. And though Truth, like the 
language of the world, may not be uttered, it must be pursued in the 
continuous walk within the tension of the world.
In Warren's experience of the withholding of language in the voice 
of the world, he encounters not only this unutterable langue but also 
that word or parole which cannot be understood. In several poems, War­
ren traces out this language which we cannot hear as being a code which 
cannot be broken, as in "Breaking the Code."is
The world around us speaks in code.
This poem was published in The Southern Review 19/2 (1983) and was not included in 
Warren's final selected volume. New and Selected Poemsi 1923-1985.
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Or maybe something like the old Indian sign
Language of the Great Plains - all with a load
Of joy and/or despair. And in all of which you must resign
Yourself to ambiguity, or error. The road
Markers are often missing, or defaced. Is
The message the veery tries at dusk to communicate benign?
Does the first flake of snow from a sky yet blue 
Mean that or this?
Is the Owl's question - "Who? - fiiho? - 
Addressed to your conscience, and you?
In dawn light does the scroll-raark of wind-swirl in night snow.
Or later the bleeding icicle tip from the eaves,
Tell you a truth you yearn to know -
Or is it merely an index of the planet's tilt?
And what of the beech's last high leaves 
Of hammered gold, or glint of sunlit gilt?
What is unambiguous in these opening lines of the poem is that the world 
speaks in a structured way which is continuous with our existence within 
the world. Only by virtue of this conviction can the poet even utter, 
"The world around us speaks...." However, the poet's understanding of 
what is spoken is indeterminate: it is a "code" or something like the
old sign language of the Indians. As the world speaks in code, the 
things declare themselves and bring themselves to light, but, though 
this bringing to light is unmistakable, the self cannot hear, or compre­
hend, what is said. It is the self which struggles under a certain 
ambiguity or error as it seeks to understand the meaning of the sign 
language or the code of the world. Does the world speak with a load of 
joy and despair, or does it speak with a load of joy or despair? The 
self can only respond by saying that it hears both, and in this tension 
there is a necessary ambiguity. What complicates understanding though 
is that "The road/ Markers are often missing, or defaced." The language 
of the world is not in and of itself complete, so you never know whether 
"the message the veery tries at dusk to/ communicate [is] benign" or
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19 Note the way that Warren links the elements within the world with words, as the snowflake to this or that, and that all nature functions as or is structured as a lan­
guage system.
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not. Although "the world means only itself" ("Riddle in the Garden"),
:=
the world does not necessarily declare its own meaning, and the poet 
does not have a meaning to put there; he can only ask, "Does the first 
flake of snow from a sky yet blue/ Mean that or this?"is But our own 
experience in the world complicates this situation so that "It is hard 
to break the code in our little time and space." Within the tension of 
the world - that is, between time and space, between time and timeless­
ness, between presence and absence, between the silence and the saying - 
we will never crack the code so that we might understand the final mes­
sage which the world speaks. However, Warren entertains the possibility J
that the message being told is that there is nothing in the end but the 
"index of the planet's tilt."
The coded message sometimes appears as a persistent whisper within -
nature. In "Summer Rain in Mountains" (RV 47-48), a "dark curtain of 
rain sweeps slowly over the sunlit mountain" through the course of the 
stanzas. There is a "whisper...moving through the wide air" of the 
afternoon which reminds the poet that he cannot remember something. ■
That something could be "a nameless apprehension" which is like the 
dog's tail which wakes you with its thumping the floor at the foot of 
your bed as you try to sleep. Then,
The wild
T h o u g h t  s e i z e s  y o u  t h a t  t h i s  m ay b e  a  c o d e .  I t  m ay b e  a  s e c r e t
warning.
A friend is addressing you now. You miss the words. You
A p o lo g iz e ,  s m i l e .  T h e  r a i n  ham m ers t h e  r o o f . . . .
The whisper of the world reminds the speaker of a nameless apprehension ■;
which persists like a code, which may be a secret warning, but he may
never break that code in order to know. The rain storm passes, the 
"sun/ Emerges like God's calm blessedness..." and "You pull yourself 
back together. A drink helps." The code remains, but there is no mean­
ing to put there. This tension becomes more explicit in "Code Book 
Lost" {Now and Then 43-44), in which the poet demands that there must be 
some meaning in the world's declaration.
What does the veery say, at dusk in shad-thicket?
There must be some meaning, or why should your heart stop.
As though, in the dark depth of water. Time held its breath.
While the message spins on like a spool of silk thread fallen?
What meaning, when at the unexpected street corner.
You meet some hope long forgotten, and your old heart.
Like neon in shore-fog, or distance, glows dimly again? 
will you waver, or clench stoic teeth and move on?
Have you thought as you walk, late, late, the streets of a town 
Of all dreams being dreamed in dark houses? What do they signify?
Yes, message on message, like wind or water, in light or in dark. 
The whole world pours at us. But the code book, somehow, is lost.
The poet feels the weight of import in the world's persistent declara­
tion, The message "spins on like a spool of silk thread fallen." But 
the poet has no way of deciphering the messages which he is able to 
hear. There is no key which can crack the code, ultimately, the poet 
must relinquish himself to the unavoidable tension: "Yes, message on
message, like wind or water, in light or in dark,/ The whole world pours 
at us. But the code book, somehow, is lost." Though he yearns for lan­
guage to speak as language so that he might be able to finally under­
stand his being in the world, language withholds itself.
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4.4 The Giving of Language
In Warren's quest for a "language for reality that has not the 
slightest dependence/ On desire or need," he finds that language not 
only withholds itself in such a way that it may not be heard or under­
stood but also readily gives of itself in fleeting moments for the one 
who will listen. When the poet reaches the limit of what may be spoken, 
he finds that language speaks in the midst of the tension of the world. 
However, he also finds that it is language which speaks in his own 
speaking. When the poet sets forth the poem in language, he brings the 
poem into the light of language. In "The Origin of the Work of Art," 
Heidegger claims that "the poet...uses the word - not, however, like 
ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in 
such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a w o r d . "20 
It is by virtue of this giving quality of language that the poet is able 
to question being. In "The Whole Question" {NSP 54), the speaker sug­
gests that "You'll have to rethink the whole question. // ...Yes, you 
must try to rethink what is r e a l . "21 The question which demands recon­
sideration is that of life and identity: being itself. What does it 
mean to be? The answer to the question though is just over the horizon, 
like the tortoise of Zeno's paradox to which Warren referred in 
"Paradox:"
Yes, far away and long ago.
In another land, on another shore.
That race you won - even as it was lost.
For if I caught you, one moment more,
You had fled my grasp, up and to go
With glowing pace and the smile that mocks 
Pursuit down whatever shore reflects 
Our flickering passage through the years.
20 In Poetry, Language, Thought, ed. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row,
1971), 48.
21 See the discussion of "The Whole Question" in Chapter Six.169
As we enact our more complex 
Version of Zeno's paradox.22
The trap of the paradox in "The Whole Question" is "a matter of 
language...." Being constantly recedes, yet it speaks from the silence. 
So, the poem concludes with a hopeful burst of desire that the words 
might yet give of themselves :
...You
May yet find a new one in which experience overlaps 
Words. Or find some words that make the Truth come true.
The language in which experience and words overlap is the language of 
nature, and the words which enact Truth are those spoken by the voice of 
the world. What this language gives is not a totalized utterance or an 
absolute statement, but is the word which we may not speak for our­
selves . This is a word which we understand and perceive in the speaking 
voice of the world. Only by virtue of this giving character of language 
can the poet and reader alike truly speak.23 The poet finds that what 
language speaks is that which the human heart cannot express in itself; 
it is a vicarious speaking. That which speaks is the unsayable. By 
virtue of the way that language gives, the poet is able to speak within 
the contraries of the world.
Within the voice of the world, the poet is able to hear the very 
word to which he is unable to give utterance. In a number of poems, 
Warren presents speakers or participants who are unable to give 
utterance to the experience in which they find themselves; in this sit­
uation, though, the world speaks the "unwordable word" which they are 
not able to find or to sustain. This appears prominently in a late 
poem, "Last Walk of Season" (AE 44), where the speaker and a partner 
climb a mountain in the late afternoon, late in the season of summer.
22 Selected Poems 1923-1975 (New York: Random House, 1976), 8.
23 See Heidegger, "The Nature of Language" 107.
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and late in life. As they walk, the gurgling of the stream of rain 
water in the ruts of the old logging road "Is the only voice we hear." 
But, bearing burdens of their own, "We do not ask / What burden that 
music bears." The speaker admits that their only wish "is to think of 
nothing but happiness" and "The world's great emptiness." And their 
great desire is to participate in that world, to participate "as part of 
that one / Existence." Within this recognition of being bound with the 
world, the speaker asks, "Can it be that the world is but the great word 
/ That speaks the meaning of our joy?" This is the ultimate union to 
which this poem points, rather than the union of the speaker with his 
partner, or of the "last light /...with the soft-shadowed land." It is 
this union between world and word which is symbolized in the convergence 
of summer and autumn and which is the source of the heart's "own 
delight," Language speaks the word that the speaker cannot say. In 
this way, it is only by means of this giving quality of language that 
the poet is able to say the "unsayable."
Warren pursues this theme of participation in the word of the 
world in "Star-Fall" {NT 23). In terms of the narrative of the poem, 
Warren returns to the vivid scenes of Promises in the old mediterranean 
fortress overlooking the sea. Though he acknowledges this to hearken 
back to "that far land, and time," the poem is a present experience in a 
moment of fullness: "There we, now at midnight, lay." But the poem
itself is not a far away time, but is now, and it is not simply there, 
but it becomes here. As in "Last Walk of the Season," the sound of 
water provides the only audible voice; "the slap and hiss far below" of 
the sea is "the only sound to our ears." And, as in the former poem, 
the speaker and a partner lie next to one another, each engrossed in the 
moment of the world's speaking. Warren probes in this latter poem the
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nature of our participation not simply with nature but with one another.
The third stanza begins, "We did not lie close, and for hours / The only
contact was fingers, and motionless they." But the union envisaged is
not simply between man and woman or sea and land, but it is that between
our communication and the voice of the world. However, Warren draws
together more explicitly his concern for language and being, apparently
suggesting something similar to Heidegger's statement that the being of
language is the language of being. So, here, Warren ponders.
For what communication
Is needed if each alone
Is sunk and absorbed into
The mass and matrix of Being that defines
Nature of all?
That communication which is mediated by human language is shown to be 
fragmented and failing before the voice of the world. What privilege 
can human language demand when Being itself is a language and communi­
cates what the human voice may not articulate? Warren is not denying 
the necessity for communication but is redefining - or, reshaping - our 
understanding of the nature of communication itself, moving it beyond a 
strict system of signs and signification. In the final sections of the 
poem, Warren turns to this defining "matrix of Being:"
We lay in the moonless night.
Felt earth beneath us swing.
Watched the falling stars of the season. They fell 
Like sparks in a shadowy, huge smithy, with 
The clang of the hammer unheard.
Far off in the sea's matching midnight.
Lights of fishing boats marked their unfabled constellations.
We found nothing to say, for what can a voice say when 
The world is a voice, no ear needing?
We lay watching the stars as they fell.
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As Warren turns to the being of the world, he finds that it is marked by 
a certain coincidence between the various elements. It is significant 
that he does not use the language of reflection in these final sections; 
the stars are not reflected in the sea, but rather find an echo in the 
lights of the fishing boats which are hung in the midst of their own 
midnight. The stars in the moonless night fall "Like sparks in a shad­
owy, huge smithy," just as the lights of the fishing boats mark their 
own "unfabled constellations." In light of this communication, or com­
munion, within the matrix of being, what can the human heart find to 
say? "We found nothing to say...." This "nothing," though, is a vital 
presence within the poem. "Nothing" does not denote an emptiness which 
is a dead-end but suggests that place from which the poet might listen 
to the voice and the world and that place from which he might begin to 
speak. This contact between the poet's voice and the voice of the world 
is the contact to which the poet moves. Human language appears so inad­
equate before the voice of the world which speaks what the human voice 
may not say. This communication, or communion, moves beyond the under­
standing of words as strictly linguistic signs to be read or heard. The 
voice of the world is a voice "no ear needing." The final line of the 
poem utters the communication which the language of the world gives:
"We lay watching stars as they fell."
In "August Moon" (jBH 31), we find an echo of these other poems in 
its preoccupation with stars and in its concern for the nature of commu­
nication. However, Warren turns here to consider the nature of growth 
and age in light of the infinity of being. The moon of the title 
announces to the speaker his being bounded by time within the world.
Gold like a half-slice of orange
Fished from a stiff Old-Fashioned, the moon
Lolls on the sky that goes deeper blue
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By the tick of the watch. Or
Lolls like a real brass button half-buttoned
On the blue flannel sleeve
Of an expensive seagoing blue blazer.
He then turns to the stars which "Slowly..., in a gradual/ Eczema of
glory, gain definition," The world does not count the years as the
speaker is tempted to do; the world moves on in its slow way of defining
itself. So, the poet asks, "what kind of world is this we walk in?" to
which he replies, "It makes no sense to us...," With an urgent desire
to make sense of the world, we must continue to walk on in the tension
of this apparent disparity.
Anyway, while night
Hardens into its infinite being.
We walk down the woods-lane, dreaming 
There's an inward means of 
Communication with
That world whose darkling sussuration 
Might - if only we were lucky - be 
Deciphered.
Here the poet dreams that there might be within himself some means of 
communication with the world and a way of deciphering the language of 
the world in its own inexorable rhythm. But a dream is not simply some 
illusion in Warren's aesthetics, as he learned in his study of The Anci­
ent Mariner and as he expressed in Audubon. The dream is a specific way 
of enacting the truth. So his dreaming here is a means of envisaging 
what is in reality true, though he can only see the shadow of truth. 
Occasionally, the "darkling sussuration" of the world can be deciphered 
in glimpses of the world's being and there is a means of communication 
which moves beyond human words or speech. As the poet ponders what it 
means to count years, the world moves on and "the great owl in distance" 
utters his call and rescues the poet from "what they say" (the reasons
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given for counting the years} by urging him to walk on. The owl call is 
an instance of this inward communication, but it is the voice of the 
world which gives and calls. The poem concludes.
The moon is lost in tree-darkness.
Stars show now only
In the pale path between treetops.
The track of white gravel leads forward in darkness.
I advise you to hold hands as you walk.
And speak not a word.
The forward movement of the "track of white gravel" into the darkness is 
the very means of communication which the poet sought. It is not a 
static perspective from which one may count the years, but it is the 
dynamic motion of living the years, within which there is a means of 
communication beyond that of human words. This is the deciphering of 
the world's darkling sussuration, before which the human heart must 
"speak not a word," for "what can a voice say when/ The world is a 
voice, no ear needing" ("Star-Fall," NSP 151)?
In a number of poems, Warren not only contemplates the way in 
which the world is a voice which speaks a word which says what we cannot 
say, but also considers the way in which the world itself is that word 
spoken. It is not simply that the world speaks a language which is 
"unsayable" to the poet. The world is the wordless language which gives 
of itself so that we might find meaning in "the secret order of the 
world" {Audubon, NSP 220). It is this language, as it gives of itself, 
that defines human language, rather than human language establishing the 
system of reference among the various elements of the world. Warren 
breaks down notions of referentiality through an understanding of lan­
guage which becomes purely referential. This sense is intimated in 
"Last Walk of the Season" when the speaker asks, "Can it be that the
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world is but the great word / That speaks the meaning of our joy?" The 
world and our joy converge in the speaking of language. There is no 
distinction between the language of the world and the world itself. In 
"Fear and Trembling" (RV 97), Warren is concerned to find a language 
that is not simply adequate but one that is meaningful so that he might 
"meditate on what the season has meant." But the words which comprise 
human language cannot define such meditation, for "What word has glit­
tered on whitecap? Or lured blossom out?" Rather, nature itself 
provides the language and the text for such meditation. But he asks.
Can one, in fact, meditate in the heart, rapt and wordless?
Or find his own voice in the towering gust now from northward?
When boughs toss - is it in joy or pain and madness?
The gold leaf - is it whirled in anguish or ecstasy skyward?
While the human heart yearns for a language to be able to meditate, its 
words fall short, for if the boughs toss in joy or in pain, the meaning 
is much more than this. Human language is bound over to difference 
within the tension of the world. But the world provides a very real 
narrative for meditation;
Can the heart's meditation wake us from life's long sleep
And instruct us how foolish and fond was our labor spent -
Us who know that only at death of ambition does the deep
Energy crack crust, spurt forth, and leap
From grottoes dark - and from the caverned enchainment?
Only a meditation by means of the meaningful language that the world is 
may wake us from "life's long sleep" and only then may meaning be found; 
only at the death of the ambition of human language to circumscribe the 
meaning of the world will meaning "spurt forth, and leap// From grottoes 
dark...." This final vision is apocalyptic in characters only at the 
breaking up of human language is meaning revealed through the speaking 
of the unsayable.
17 6
In "Aspen Leaf in windless World" {BH 87), Warren continues to
meditate upon the world which is an "unworded revelation":
Watch how the aspen leaf, pale and windless, waggles.
While one white cloud loiters, motionless, over Wyoming.
And think how delicately the heart may flutter 
In the windless joy of unworded revelation.
In his attention to the language of the world, Warren approaches again a
language which is purely referential. The image presented in this first
stanza does not enact a mimetic narrative but a poetic one in which the
call to watch and think is a call to read and listen. By listening to
the voice of nature, the poet is able to discern that the world is a
revelation, even though he does not always know what it reveals:
Look how sea-foam, thin and white, makes its Arabic scrawl 
On the unruffled sand of the beach's faint-tilted plane.
Is there a message there for you to decipher?
Or only the joy of its sunlit, intricate rhythm?
Is there a sign Truth gives that we recognize?
Can we fix our eyes on the flight of birds for answer?
Can the bloody-armed augurs declare expediency?
What does dew on stretched wool-fleece, the grass dry, mean?
Have you stood on the night-lawn, oaks black, and heard,
From bough-crotch to bough-crotch, the moon-eyed tree-toad utter,
Again and again, that quavery croak, and asked
If it means there'll be rain? Toward dawn? Or early tomorrow?
Though the revelation made by the world is "unworded," it is nonetheless 
revealed within the worded. The poet perceives it in the "Arabic 
scrawl" of the sea foam, in the sign made by Truth, and in the utterance 
of the tree toad. The poet and the world are bounded by language within 
which the unsayable speaks. There is no doubt in the poet that the 
world is itself a revelation, but the question is, what does it mean? 
Warren's allusion to Gideon's fleece in Judges 6 confirms this question;
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Gideon used the fleece to test the meaning of the Lord's revelation to 
him. In the same way, the poet listens to the voice of the world and 
asks if the quavery croak of the tree toad means that there will be 
rain. This revelation of the world speaks joy, just as in "Language 
Barrier" the snow peaks scream joy to the sun. It is this joy which is 
the "beauty-making power" ("Dejection: An Ode"). But, does the world 
speak of more than simply the joy of its own rhythm? For the poet, the 
world does utter a message, a sign, a meaning, but these are not always 
completely discernible. The world is, as he says in the sixth stanza, a 
"shadowy world/ Of miracles, whispers, high jinks, and metaphor." It is 
significant that Warren does not focus on any single metaphor in this 
poem but lists in catalog fashion the myriad ways that the world speaks 
this unworded revelation. There is no longer any room in Warren's poem 
for metaphors or symbols because the whole poem is a metaphor - or rath­
er, the poet's understanding of the whole world is symbolic. The world 
declares itself and provides the language by which we might begin to 
understand it and might begin to speak. But at the end of the poem, 
Warren asks if the world tells us of anything more than itself:
What image - behind blind eyes when the nurse steps back - 
Will loom at the end of your own life's long sorites?
Would a sun then rise red on an eastern horizon of waters?
Would you see a face? What face? Would it smile? Can you say?
Or would it be some great, sky-thrusting gray menhir?
Or what, in your long-lost childhood, one morning you saw - 
Tinfoil wrappers of chocolate, popcorn, nut shells, and poorly 
Cleared up, the last elephant turd on the lot where the circus had
been?
What will the world reveal at death? The power of this unworded revela­
tion is limited to itself; that is, it reveals nothing that is supernat­
ural . When Warren comes to the very edge of the worded utterance of the
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poem, he does not leap into any "transcendental Idea of infinity . "24 He 
does not propose that, having heard the unworded revelation of the voice
of the world, he might now say the unsayable. Even the language used to
probe the possibility of the death-image is bounded by the natural 
within which the unsayable speaks. And, though the language of the 
world gives of itself, there is no means of grasping any final image by 
means of human language. In Warren's vision, human language before the 
absolute nature of death is only "the last elephant turd on the lot 
where the circus had been."
4.5 Grasping the Paradox
Warren's confrontation with the unsayable within the voice of the 
world finally involves a vision which is decidedly paradoxical because 
being in the world is sustained in the radical tension of paradox. 
Although the poet may not say the unsayable, the unsayable nonetheless 
speaks within the voice of language which is given utterance in the 
moment of the poem. That which may not be spoken is grasped within par­
adox. In the first section of a poem entitled "Synonyms" {BH 93), War­
ren questions the power of paradox:
Where eons back, earth slipped and cracked
To leave a great stratum, snag-edged, thrust
As margin to that blind inwardness, water 
Now plunges in cosmic racket, sempiternal roar.
White-splintered on masses of stone, deep-domed or spired.
Chaos of white in dark paradox. What is the roar
But a paradox in that 
Tumultuous silence -
W h ic h  p a r a d o x  m u s t b e  a  v o i c e  o f  u l t i m a t e  u t t e r a n c e ?
In tones and images which recall Coleridge's Kubla Khan, Warren comes to
24 CN III.4047
17 9
a place and moment of paradox at the margin of "blind inwardness" which 
marks off the darkness of earth from the "white-splintered" waterfall.
At this margin, the water plunges with an unending roar over rocks and 
forms the paradox of "white in d a r k . "25 But this paradox is not simply 
visual; it also encompasses the juxtaposition of the roar of the water's 
chaos with the silence of earth. In this moment and space, Warren 
declares that there is a voice making an "ultimate utterance," what is 
it that speaks, though? It is neither the roar nor the silence which 
speak in isolation, but it is the paradox which speaks. The voice is 
heard within the radical and sustained tension of the world.
Warren's notion of the voice of language which speaks within this 
tension approaches a point close to Coleridge's understanding of the 
language of nature. In Lecture XII of his Philosophical Lectures, 
Coleridge suggests that the Book of Nature will "become transparent to 
us, when we regard the forms of matter as words, as symbols, valuable 
only as being the expression, an unrolled but yet glorious fragment, of 
the wisdom of the Supreme B e i n g . "26 Nature functioned for Coleridge as a 
book alongside the Bible which is a revelation of God's power and being. 
Warren, however, never suggests that world is divine nor does he claim 
that the world is God. Instead, he consistently makes recourse to the 
fallenness of the world as it bears the inescapable contrariness which 
is the result of the Fall. While nature is not a transparent medium 
through which we see God's wisdom, Warren shares Coleridge's emphasis 
upon the world being a language which is symbolic - it partakes of the 
reality of which it speaks - and bears the full contrariness of being - 
it is an unrolled and a glorious fragment. Warren's poetry claims that
25 This juxtaposition is reminiscent of Warren's repeated contrast between light and 
dark in Audubon. See Chapter Three.
26 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Philosophical Lectures, ed. by Kathleen Coburn (London: 
Pilot Press, 1949), 367.
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that which is more than concrete is manifested in the concrete elements 
of the world. So, the poet does not encounter the unsayable in some 
undefinable "out there" but in the "here" of the moment and the poem.
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Chapter Five 
Naming the Unnameable:
Tell Me the Name of the World"
Warren's quest after "language-being" in the voice of the world 
throughout his later poetry did not exhaust his pursuit of the 
"unsayable." His persistent desire as a poet was to find that place of 
articulation from which he might gain access to the "unsayable" and 
might be able to humbly speak a unified utterance which would destroy 
"the old antithesis of words and things."i Yet, as he walked in the 
world, he found no such place of privileged access but only the ongoing 
act of speaking in the limited, fragmented and unstable language avail­
able to him. His only recourse to the "unsayable" lay in saying itself 
-- in the act of poetic creation —  by which the beyond is presented as 
within through the exercise of the pure imagination. By pressing lan­
guage to its very limits, the poet found that the power of that place of 
articulation after which he yearned lay in its existence as an ever 
present, though never fully realized, possibility. As Warren confessed 
to Peter Stitt, his deep sense of the immanence of meaning in things 
could never provide that sense of final meaning to comprehend the world. 
In Warren's "bottom-up" sort of thinking, he "would rather start with 
the world" and love it as a means toward speaking and enacting that 
moment of possibility in which he could "believe, in the end, in God" 
("Masts at Dawn").
To love the world, though, Warren must be able not simply to speak
1 Coleridge, CL 1.625-26.
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about the world but must be able to name the w o r l d . 2 The nearness of
naming, knowledge and love to one another in Warren's later poetry finds 
its precursor in the relationship between these in the Bible. It 
hearkens to Adam's act of naming the animals in the garden, in which 
name and knowledge were unified. It recalls God's naming of Abraham and 
of his people as an act of covenant love by which he knew them and made 
himself known to them. It also encompasses the renaming of Jacob 
through his struggle with the angel during the desert night, an image 
which Warren invokes in a number of places in his later w o r k . 3 Naming 
within the biblical literature is an act of great power and one that 
creates and recreates notions of identity and difference. Warren's 
sense of urgency to name the world brings to light his grappling with 
notions of identity and difference. It also brings into focus his great 
concern to undergo an experience with language itself. Like Jacob, the 
poet suffers this experience in which he seeks not simply to name but to 
be named. His preoccupation with the voice of the world, which speaks a 
language which is not available to the poet, is one way that warren 
sought to love so well the world. But, in Audubon, we find another 
instance of that impulse in the poet's cry, "Tell me the name of the 
world." Audubon not only set Warren on the course of walking within the 
tension of the world - what he called "the secret order of the world" - 
but it also heightened his yearning to be able to name the world. The 
name of the world is the Name which, as the Living Word, encompasses the 
fullness of knowledge that the poet desires and actuates being within
2 For disoussions about naming as a theological and linguistic issue, see Jacques Der­
rida, On the Name, ed. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1995); Peter S. Hawkins and Anne Howland Schotter, eds., Ineffability: Naming the
Unnameable From Dante to Beckett, AMS Ars Poetica, No. 2 (New York: AMS Press, 1984);
John Leonard, Naming in Paradise: Milton and the Language of Adam and Eve (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1990); and David Tracy, On Naming the Present: Reflections on God,
Hermeneutics and Church (London: SCM; Maryhill, NY: Orbis Books, 1994).
3 For example, see "Dream" {NT 29), "Youthful Truth-Seeker, Half-Naked, at Night, Run­
ning Down Beach South of San Francisco" {BH 25-26), BD 79 62 and "The Use of the Past" 
47. For a fuller discussion of this image in Warren's vision see Chapter Six.
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the world. However, like the name of God, that name may not be spoken 
apart from a moment of consummation in which all is simultaneously 
revealed and destroyed.
In the long second section of Audubon, as Audubon comes under the 
threat of murder by the woman and her two sons and yet feels himself 
lulled into lassitude, the poet himself cries out, "Tell me the name of 
the world." This cry is answered within the same section when Audubon 
thinks, "The question is the only answer," and the poet comments, "He 
yearns to be able to frame a definition for joy." For Audubon, who 
"slew [birds], at surprising distances, with his gun," the definition of 
joy is found in the naming of the birds which he reverenced. For the 
poet, that joy is found in the name of the world itself, a name which 
constantly runs ahead of or recedes from his reach. The act of naming 
has to do with the creative act of the poet in which he experiences joy. 
In "Dejection: An Ode," Coleridge links the creative power of the poet
to the presence of joy which is the "beauty-making power" (1. 63).4 joy 
is what sustains the "shaping spirit of imagination" (1. 86) in the 
moment of dissolving and re-creating its perception of "Reality's dark 
dream" (1. 95). In the exercise of the imagination in the act of nam­
ing, Warren seems to enact a definition for joy just as joy sustains him 
in the act of naming. In Warren's vision, the name which he pursues is 
a name which the world itself knows and speaks in its own language, but 
the poet may never articulate the name. Rather, the cry to know the 
name of the world is the answer to the poet's question within the con­
trariness of the world itself. The possibility is held out but the 
realization of it is never reached.
The poet faces a similar crisis when he turns and asks, "Tell me
4 In English Romantic Writers, ed. by David Perkins (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovano-vich, 1967), 432-34.
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the name of the self." Just as the name of the world is never given but 
is seemingly and enigmatically present, so the name of the self is not 
given. The poet searches relentlessly after that place where he will be 
able to speak the name. But even as he yearns to know the name of the 
world and the name of the self - to be able to say the "unsayable" ~ he 
has a heightened awareness of his struggle within language. The ques­
tion of naming heightens the poet's sense not so much of linguistic 
arbitrariness as of linguistic instability. To be able to name the 
world is to be able to grasp the world in its fullness, in its complex­
ity and completeness. The quest for the name is the quest after the 
unified utterance in which word and thing finally share identity. And 
yet, in the poet's experience, there is no such stable word or name.
Even an individual's name does not lead to stability; the identity of 
the individual is never fully fixed but is always being made and remade, 
according to Warren. Names often appear as both arbitrary and unstable. 
Who is it that gives the name and what makes the name "stick"? And what 
about entities that share a name? These, too, are crucial linguistic 
issues for the poet. Thus, naming also raises the problem of the poet's 
own linguistic inability. Even as Warren confronts the voice of the 
world throughout his later poetry, he is also faced with his own inabil­
ity to give the Name to the world.
Tim Fulford observes a similar experience in Coleridge's aesthet­
ic, which he supports by observations of Coleridge's reading of the Ger­
man theosophical metaphysician Jacob Bohme. Coleridge was fascinated 
with Bohme's notion of a "language of nature," by which he referred to 
the unfallen Adamic, unified language of the garden.s Fulford examines 
the way that Coleridge understood Bohme's language of nature to be a 
divine or angelic language in the midst of our fallen world. It was "a
5 Regarding the thought and influence of Bohme, see Fulford 38-42,
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mystical state of spiritual knowledge"(40) which existed somehow "above 
language" but toward which "language was constantly aspiring and of 
which certain linguistic events, such as forgetting a name, were indica­
tions" (41). The forgetting of a name is, in Coleridge's understanding, 
an instance of linguistic instability. According to Fulford,
...to forget a name was, in Coleridge's view, to break the 
conventional linguistic code and to search, in the struggle 
to recollect it, for a unique word, a name meaning only 
itself, irreplaceable by another word, ungoverned now by 
relations to other words....Coleridge was embracing linguis­
tic breakdown in order to dramatize the fact that the rules 
of ordinary language were conventional and fallible and to 
wrest from that dramatization a glimpse of a linguistic 
unity beyond such rules and such breakdowns (41).
Fulford suggests that such evidence of "linguistic breakdown" became a 
matter of deep spiritual knowledge for Coleridge. As language fractured 
and fragmented, it revealed that there was something beyond it that 
could only be intimated by the necessary tension of its condition. War­
ren's aesthetic is pierced through with this awareness of the breakdown 
of the conventional linguistic code, and his search for the name of the 
world and of the self is a search after the unique word. However, it is 
only in its very brokenness that language can begin to suggest that 
there is a meaning not so much beyond it but within it. It is not as if 
language were a container for the meaning but that meaning is shown in 
the very nature of its brokenness and fractured condition. This was for 
Warren, though, a concrete problem. In his search for the name of the 
world, he works from the concrete toward that which is more than con­
crete or more than real - toward the unsayable. But that which is more 
than concrete is not exterior but is an interior matter. The unsayable 
is approached in the act of saying itself. However, this approach must 
be negotiated through the experience of an inability to speak the name
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of the world, an experience which reveals the linguistic instability 
which confronts the poet.
5.1 Naming as Act
Warren's concern for naming is closely related to his consistent 
emphasis upon the specific creative act which is a moment of experience 
and instancy. Warren consistently attempted to avoid what he considered 
the abyss of abstraction by dealing not in platitudes but with vital 
experience in the moment. Speaking of Truth or Happiness or Despair is 
pointless apart from the concrete act of the moment in which Truth is 
not spoken but enacted. The act gives definition not simply to an idea 
but to life itself in Warren's vision. During his first dialogue in 
Brother to Dragons (1979), with Laetitia Lewis, wife of Lilburn Lewis, 
R.P.W. states that
...every act is but a door 
Between two rooms, on equal hinges hung 
To open either way, on either room.
And every act to become an act must resolve 
The essential polarity of possibility.
Yet in the act polarity will lurk.
Like the apple blossom ghostly in the full-grown fruit.
Yet all we yearn for is the dear redemption of 
Simplicity (3 9 ).s
Though the act and the possibility are distinct from one another, they 
can never be separated. The act always dwells within the contrariness 
of possibility. However, though action is inescapable if one is to live 
at all, the act itself is not a given; it is not simply necessitated by 
a chain of cause and effect relations. The act is generated by the 
exercise of the conscious will within which the polarity of possibility 
lurks. The act does not destroy that tug of possibility. The polarity
6 Brother To Dragons: A Tale in Verse and Voices, A New Version (New York: Random
House, 1979). For a discussion of the two editions of this poem (1953 and 1979), see 
James A. Grimshaw, ed., Robert Penn Warren's Brother to Dragons: A Discussion
(Baton Rouge and London: LSÜP, 1983). R.P.W., listed as one of the speakers in the
dramatis personae, is identified as "The writer of this poem."
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of possibility is not resolved so that it is dispelled but is resolved 
by incorporating that polarity within the one moment of the act. The 
act incorporates the possibility just as the "full-grown fruit" incorpo­
rates the apple blossom. The polarity of possibility is not found only 
in binary oppositions, but in a plethora of possibilities available to 
the individual. in order for the act to become an act it must enter 
into one of the rooms available to it. But the act cannot evade an 
inherent doubleness similar to the doubleness the poet experiences in 
language. The act is never stable.
In the 1953 edition of Brother to Dragons, R.P.W. expounds the 
relationship between act and possibility. He continues in this passage.
No, that's not the thought I had meant to follow.
I had meant to say that if the act resolves 
The essential polarity of possibility,
It yet will carry that polarity.
As d e e p  i n  t h e  i n n e r  f l e s h  o f  a u tu m n  f r u i t
We trace the frail configuration of spring's flower.
But that image, with its sense of beauty and delight.
Is scarcely appropriate for my notion, and my own line 
Has a sort of conventional euphony and sweetness (55-56).
Like the concrete utterance of the poet, the act always bears the ten­
sion of the world in itself, always bears the doubleness of the 
"essential polarity of possibility." What is perhaps most significant 
here is the poet's suspicion about his own ability to articulate the 
unified experience which he appears to be describing. Though he speaks 
of the polarity of possibility, his impulse is to move toward resolution 
and yet he must struggle against that. R.P.W, complains, "No, that's 
not the thought I had meant to follow." Tension is not superseded but 
inevitably remains. But even when he seeks to translate this into meta­
phor, both his own impulse and his own language fail him: the image is 
inadequate to convey the fullness of the experience of which he speaks
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and his "own line/ Has a sort of conventional euphony and sweetness" 
which tames and destroys the tension. R.P.W. continues in the 1953 edi­
tion:
All wrong: For the origin of no human action,
No m a t t e r  how  s w e e t  t h e  a c t i o n  a n d  d e a r ,  i s  e v e r
Pure like the flower. For if sweetness is there, then bitterness
t o o ,
In that hell-broth of paradox and internecine 
Complex of motive and murderous intensity 
We call the soul, and from that 
Anguish of complication any act.
Any act at all, the bad, the good, affords.
Or seems to afford, the dear redemption of simplicity:
The dear redemption in the mere fact of achieved definition,
Be what that may (56).
There is no pure act, just as there is no pure language and no pure 
poem, as Warren argued in "Pure and Impure Poetry."? Though an act may 
wank to be pure, it partakes of the the tension of the world: it is a
mixture of sweetness and bitterness, a "hell-broth of paradox and inter­
necine/ Complex of motive...." The poet's understanding of this ten­
sion, though, is achieved through the exercise of the pure imagination 
Xu the poem.8 The act bears this tension because such is the ontologi­
cal condikion of Lhe human soul. The soul —  if Lhe poeL can speak of 
such an abstract idea — - is itself a paradox and a complex of motive, 
brimming with murderous intensity. Warren's mention of motive here 
calls Lo mind "A Poem of Pure ImaginaLion" in which he dealt with the 
role of motive in the Mariner's act of killing Lhe albatross. There, 
the severity of the crime which made it a reenactment of the mystery of 
the Fall was due to its apparent lack of motive. This concern for 
motive and act reappeared in Audubon where Warren redefined, in the 
light of The Anal&nt Pfarlner, Lhe acL of poetic creaLion as a willful
7 NSE 3-28.
 ^Compare Warren remarks in "APPI" 394.
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act which involved blessing and cursing and was in its own way a neces­
sary reenactment of the mystery of the Fall. Warren's lines here in 
Brother to Dragons seem to coincide with these other instances of his 
concern for the act and motive. They even seem to be be illuminated by 
Coleridge's comment from the Table Talk which Warren used as a sort of 
guiding statement for his analysis of the Mariner's act. For Coleridge, 
the Fall created the nonabsolute out of the absolute by which "every 
phenomenon is explicable" ("APPI" 359). As a result of the Fall, no 
human action is ever absolute, but involves a mixture of nonabsolute 
motives and values. No single human action can ever stand apart from 
other actions without any effect upon them. Though a given action may 
be without apparent motive, it is never an absolute and pure action.
The human soul bears an "anguish of complication" in any act and this 
characterizes what Coleridge calls "the moral history of Man." But 
because each act achieves a moment of definition out of the haze of pos­
sibility, each affords a sort of redemption, a buying back of each 
moment, though there is no clear promise attached to this redemption- 
In the 1979 edition of Brother to Dragons, Warren qualifies his earlier 
statements about the act affording "the dear redemption of simplicity" 
by stressing that that such a redemption is "All we yearn for...." In 
Warren's later poetry, such a moment of redemption is looked forward to 
as that moment of consummation when the unified word will be spoken and 
knowledge will give way to death.
Warren's desire to speak the name of the world is not simply a 
desire to define the extra-linguistic referent of his poetic enterprise. 
The act of speaking the name is not a mimetic act but is a poetic one. 
Through his quest after the name, Warren continues his search for the 
"unsayable" and absolute language. It reveals his commitment to con­
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tinue to act within the world as a poet through an imaginative engage­
ment which reshapes and modifies his knowledge of the world in which he 
dwells. Naming is a performative act rather than a denotative or pre­
scriptive one.9 Howeverf in Warren's aesthetic, naming is never an 
absolute and pure act. To name something involves embracing the tension 
of the world. But a name is language, a specific way that language 
reveals itself. This concern for naming as an act helps to clarify War­
ren's understanding that language is not simply a medium which is neu­
tral and pliable. Rather, language is experience itself, and vital 
experience at that. And poetry, to the extent that it is language, is, 
above all else, experience. in his conversation with Cleanth Brooks, 
published in The Possibilities of Order, Warren urges that literature be 
understood as "knowledge by enactment, imaginative enactment."lo One 
means of enactment is naming. As an act, naming bears the doubleness of 
language which we have observed in Warren's poetry; as such, naming both 
betrays and reveals, it both scatters and brings together in the same 
moment. Naming defines a relation of difference, a way of distinguish­
ing one person or entity from another. But the person or entity is 
never isolated; neither is the name ungoverned by relations to other 
names or words. And naming is a specific moment of utterance. It is 
not simply a matter of designation, as if a name were simply a sign 
which designates a thing. Rather it is a word which enacts. Heidegger 
suggests in "The Nature of Language" that a name is more than a mere 
designation.
What does "to name" signify? We might answer: to name means 
to furnish something with a name. And what is a name? A 
designation that provides some-thing with a vocal and writ­
ten sign, a cipher. And what is a sign? Is it a signal?
5 See Lyotard's discussion of language games in The Postmodern Condition 9-11.
10 "A Conversation with Cleanth Brooks," in The Possibilities of Order: Cleanth
Brooks and His Work, ed. by Lewis P. Simpson (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UniversityPress, 1976), 48.
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Or a token? A marker? Or a hint? Or all of these and 
something else besides? We have become very slovenly and 
mechanical in our understanding and use of signs (61).
Heidegger goes on to affirm in his reading of Stefan George's poem, "The
Word," that the name, as a word, does not designate but opens up the
realm of being. The hope of naming is that the name brings into the
realm of being that which it names. As Heidegger probes the possibility
of undergoing an experience with language, he asks,
What is it that the poet reaches? Not mere knowledge. He 
obtains entrance into the relation of word to thing. This 
relation is not, however, a connection between the thing 
that is on one side and the word that is on the other. The 
word itself is the relation which in each instance retains 
the thing within itself in such a manner that it "is" a 
thing (66).
As a word, the name does not designate a separate thing but it is the 
relation which brings the thing into being, into that realm of language 
where we can experience it. The name is simply one instance in which 
language speaks.
In Warren's poetry, he explores the act of naming and the status 
of a name in the relation that it reveals, in two primary ways. First, 
he pursues the cry uttered in Audubon: "Tell me the name of the world."
Even in Brother to Dragons we find intimations of what he turns to in
his later poetry: the elusiveness of the Name of the world according to
which he will be able to resolve the tensions and the paradoxes of the 
world. In the second place, Warren pursues the name of the self. Does 
the name equal identity? If not, where is identity found and what rela­
tion does the name bear to it? Warren's quest to name the self opens up
his thinking about the construction of identity and reveals the way the
poem and the self are analogous in his aesthetic. His desire to know 
the name is another way in which he pursued the unsayable and sought to
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here the voice of language speak.
5.2 The Name of the World
Warren's quest to know the name of the world is a quest after the 
world's primordial power or authority. To know the name of the world is 
to know the name which brings it into being and in which it exists as it 
does, full of tension and paradox. The poet does not simply want to 
know the name by which he can describe the world or refer to it. The 
name after which he seeks is in fact the unsayable. This quest, though, 
is ever a paradoxical one - the object of his search constantly runs 
ahead and when he has reached the point where it was, it has moved on.ii 
And yet this is the poet's passion, to name the world in which he lives 
and moves and has his being. In the dramatic dialogue of Brother to 
Dragons (1979), R.P.W. narrates how he first came to the ruined place of 
the Lewis home on a hill overlooking the Ohio River valley. After 
climbing the hill, R.P.W. encounters a snake which slithers out from 
under one of the rocks. The "manifestation" of the snake "was only nat­
ural," he claims. It was not a supernatural revelation but a natural
phenomena. R.P.W. then muses.
No, none of these, no spirit, symbol, god.
Or Freudian principle, but just a snake.
Black Snake, Black Pilot Snake, the Mountain Blacksnake,
Hog-snout or Chicken Snake, but in the books 
Elaphe obsoleta obsolete,
And not to be confused with the Black Racer,
Coluber constrictor - oh, I remember
That much from the old times when, like a boy,
I thought to name the world and hug it tight.
And snake and hawk and fox and ant and day and night
All moved in a stately pavane of great joy
And naked danced before the untouchable Ark of Covenant,
Like Israel's king, and never one fell down.
But when you're not a boy you learn one thing:
You settle for what you get. You find that out.
11 See "Paradox," fiP 8,
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But if that's all you settle for, you're good as dead (25).
Warren establishes here a tension between innocence and experience remi­
niscent of Blake's Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience. This 
tension is found between the boyish urge to "name the world" on the one 
hand and the somewhat bitter voice of experience, "You settle for what 
you can get," on the other. To name the world supposedly means that you
are able to "hug it tight," to grasp the world for what it is. The pro­
liferation of names here is significant: as a boy, the speaker thought
that to have the command of these names and distinctions was to be able 
to name the world. But the names, either in English or in Latin, 12 all 
seem to refer to the one snake, the one that is not to be confused with 
the Black Racer. The names do not bring him any closer to experiencing 
the snake as he had confronted him in this narrative, what is innocent 
about the desire to name the world is the expectation that he might 
actually be able to speak the word. In that vision of innocence, speak­
ing the name enacts all the elements of nature "in a stately pavane of
great joy" as they dance "before the untouchable Ark of Covenant..." 
without falling down. However, like the presence of Michal in the bib­
lical narrative, the voice of experience impinges and R.P.W- realizes 
that he may not speak the final Name of the world which will set nature 
to dancing. 13 Rather, he claims that you learn to accept what little 
bit you can apprehend about the world, and apparently the world teaches 
you that fairly quickly. But, the speaker's final note unveils the 
relentless tension of the world and the passion of the poet: "But if
that's all you settle for, you're good as dead." This is not simply 
irony; rather this is the paradoxical situation of the poet who yearns
12 Warren makes this distinction between English and Latin in other places in Brother 
to Dragons. For example, see BD 79 22 and 115.
12 See 2 Samuel 6.
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to name the unnameable. within this paradox, the poet finds that hope
which sustains him in his quest after the name of the world.i4
In another place in Brother to Dragons we find Warren returning to
the necessity of this yearning to name the things in the world, or to
name the condition of life in the world. During her account of her
relationship with Lilburn, Laetitia Lewis describes the way that he
raped her and how she subsequently fled to her brother. She states that
something had changed in her relationship with Lilburn, but she could
not name what that thing was. She says,
Just how it started I don't know. It wasn't
A thing to lay a name to, and I reckon
There's just no name to lay to the worst thing (45).is
Laetitia acknowledges her inability to name the thing that changed and 
led to the dissolving of her marriage. However, she draws together here 
the necessary relationship between naming and knowledge, implying that 
one may only name that which may ultimately be known. And when language 
withdraws and conceals the name searched for, then there is no real 
knowledge of the thing. The worst thing, like the best thing, is that 
which cannot be fully known and for which there is no name. And yet we 
are bound to experience them, though we do not know the name. Laetitia 
had experienced a severe violence from her husband; he had forced him-
14 Compare Heidegger's statement, "Thus, in order to name what is deployed in Being, 
language will have to find a single word, the unique word." Quoted in Jacques Derri­
da, "Différance," in The Continental Philosophy Reader, ed. by Richard Kearney and 
Mara Rainwater (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 464. For a lengthier discus­
sion of this passage, see Chapter Six below.
15 This passage is pared down from a lengthier passage in the 1953 version which makes 
"the worst thing" plural and then continues:
There's just no name to lay to the worst things.And that's what makes them worse than anything.
For if they had a name, then you could name it.
At least to name it would be something then.
If you could bear to name it. And I think - 
I mean I've come to think - that I could bear now 
To name most anything if I could know.
Just only know, the name to name it with.
Even the worst (67).
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self upon her sexually. But the "worst" thing to which she refers is
not the brutal act she suffered, but her husband's demand that she
describe the act to him. When he commands her, "Laetitia - now tell me
exactly what happened," she says, "But my words wouldn't come, and my
poor chest was a bigness / That hurt like something swelled there..."
(50). The presence of her absent voice was the pain that she endured.
It was her inability to speak that she felt so viscerally. This is made
clear when she concedes to speak what she could not name. As she is
confronted by her husband, she says.
And the bigness that in my chest had hurt me so
And was not words, was words now, and they came.
And some were words I never named before.
They were so awful, nor heard tell...(51).
Even though she speaks by recounting the act, she cannot name the act 
itself. In her state of emotional and linguistic debility, she lacks 
the name for this worst thing and so lacks the fullness of knowledge of 
the experience. The act or the experience is only brought to fullness 
of being when the name is spoken. Only then may it be fully known.
At another point in Brother to Dragons, R.P.W. tells Isham Lewis
that knowing is not simply "to know a thing,/ Like anything you know,"
as Isham had claimed. Rather, he says.
Wo, knowing can be.
Maybe, a kind of being, and if you know,
Can really know, a thing in all its fullness.
Then you are different, and maybe everything 
Is different, somehow, too (80-81).
To be able to name the world, one must know the world. And to have that 
kind of knowledge of the world in all of its fullness, there is a neces­
sary shift in being which changes the self and changes the self's per­
ception of the world. Heidegger suggests that to be able to name means
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6^ Randolph Runyan's thesis is relevant here: he contends that there are verbal
threads which tie Warren's poems together within specific collections. This fits with our own contention that Warren moved more toward the open-ended poem which can only be 
interpreted in light of other poems. See Runyan, The Braided Dream: Robert Penn War­
ren's Late Poetry 1-18.
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not simply that we designate the world and its contents but that we 
bring the world and the self into this new understanding of being. In 
"The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger claims that poetry provides 
the moment in which language "brings what is, as something that is, into 
the Open for the first time" (73). He goes on to state, "Language, by 
naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to 
appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their being from out 
of their being" (73, emphasis his). Such naming in poetry is what Hei­
degger calls "projective saying," a notion comparable to Warren's under­
standing of poetry as an enactment in which the unsayable speaks. 
According to Heidegger, "Projective saying is saying which, in preparing 
the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world" 
(74, emphasis mine). This notion of poetry and naming foregrounds the 
illuminating quality of language which shapes our "being in the world." 
As Warren sought to name the world in his later poetry, he encountered 
the unsayable within the ongoing task of saying within which the under­
standing of being is announced.
Warren's pursuit of the name of the world is particularly evident 
in his 1977-1980 collection. Being Here, in which we have already 
observed his attention to the voice of the world through which the 
unsayable speaks.le in these poems, Warren constantly turns to the 
instancy of experience and the necessity of that experience in light of 
the poet's own inability to speak the name the world. In this collec­
tion, Warren continues to explore the inescapable tension of "being 
here," or "being in the world." Within the radical tension of the 
poet's experience, there is a persistent hope for that place from which
he may raise his own voice and name the world. This hope, however, is
wed with an extreme sense of his own inability. The poet's experience
in the world both encourages him that he might hear the unsayable speak
and cautions him that that he in himself may never make that ultimate
utterance. In the "Afterthought" to this volume, Warren says.
Rather early, as the book began to take shape in my mind and 
in some poems, I began to feel that I needed a preliminary
poem and another as a sort of coda, both very simple in
method and feeling, to serve as a base for the book, or bet­
ter, as a bracket to enclose the dimly envisaged tangles and 
complications of the main body (107).i7
These two poems which begin and end the collection reveal the poet's 
concern for the tension of "being here." In the preliminary poem, 
"October Picnic Long Ago," Warren introduces both the narrative voice 
which is heard in so many poems in this collection and the trope of mem­
ory which provides the means by which that voice speaks. This poem is 
the vision of a Sunday afternoon family picnic, long ago, "That being 
before the auto had come, or many." But even in this vision of 
innocence, the poet, writing from the standpoint of experience, recog­
nizes the tension between the voice of the mother, who exclaims, "Could 
a place so beautiful bel", and the voice of the father who longs for 
more than the moment: "My ship will come in yet,/ And you'll see all
the beautiful world there is to see." In the final stanza, the mother
sings as the family "clop-clopped homeward while the shadows, sly,/ 
Leashed the Future up, like a hound with a slavering fang." But the 
poet confesses that, in his youth and innocence (or lack of experience), 
he "didn't know what a Future was...." He did not know the name of the 
future, nor did he know the name of the world, or even know that he 
lacked such knowledge. The voices of the mother and the father express
17 This is the only volume which contained such an explanatory note at the end.
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the tension between the moment and the possibility, each of which name 
the world in its own way,
Warren then picks up this issue of the name in two early poems, 
"Boyhood in Tobacco Country" which is followed by "Filling Night with 
The Name: Funeral As Local Color." In the first of these two poems, 
Warren remembers "an autumn sunset" envisaged in a dream in which a 
tree-lined horizon is "blackened / To timelessness." "Far off" in the 
dream the blue smoke "from the curing barns of tobacco / ...clings" to 
the world's horizon. In the second stanza, the poet hears a voice in 
his dream:
Far past slashed stubs, homeward or homeless, a black 
Voice, deeper and bluer than sea-heart, sweeter 
Than sadness or sorghum, utters the namelessness 
Of life to the birth of a first star.
And again, I am walking a dust-silent, dusky lane, and try
To forget my own name and be part of the world (11).
In the midst of the world, the voice "utters the namelessness/ Of life" 
at the moment that a first star appears in the evening sky. The name­
lessness of life is not defined by the specific experience of the one 
who utters, who is either moving homeward or is homeless. Regardless of 
situation, the speaker cannot utter the name of life even as he watches
"the birth of a first star." In fact, his utterance here is not only
nameless but is wordless, like a the melodious "bird-note" of the moth­
er's song in "October Picnic Long Ago." In this line ("...utters the 
namelessness/ Of life...") the tension of the world is revealed: the
speaker may give utterance to, but he may not make any final predication 
about, life except that it avoids such predication. The name which 
might be spoken is a name that he cannot speak. And yet, the final two 
lines of the stanza intimate that this is what it means to be a part of 
the world. The poet, once again walking along a country lane in his
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dream, suggests that he must forget his own name before he can be a part 
of the world. Rather than asserting his own name, he embraces the name­
lessness of the world. In the first lines of the third stanza, though, 
the poet encounters another voice as he moves in the timelessness of the 
world in his dream:
...From the deep and premature midnight 
Of woodland, I hear the first whip-o-will's 
Precious grief, and my young heart.
As darkling I stand, yearns for a grief
To be worthy of that sound. Ah, fooll Meanwhile,
Arrogant, eastward, lifts the slow dawn of the harvest moon (11).
In the previous stanza, the black voice was "deeper and bluer than sea- 
heart, sweeter/ Than sadness or sorghum..." and seemed to possess a cer­
tain joyfulness in its ignorance of the world's name. The whip-o-will, 
however, utters its "Precious grief" and the sound of his voice defines 
the grief he bears; it is a grief that the poet in his youth "yearns.../ 
To be worthy of...." There is a sense of need for both the grief and 
the joy which will inevitably be encountered in his pursuit of the name 
of the world. In the final stanza, as the poet awakens from his dream 
and memory to stand once again under an autumn moon, he wonders why his
perception that the moon presides over "what the year has wrought" does
not give to him the knowledge that he desires.
Enormous, smoky, smoldering, it stirs.
First visibly, then paling in retardation, it begins
The long climb zenithward to preside
There whitely on what the year has wrought.
What have the years wrought? I walk the house.
Oh, griefi Oh, joy! Tonight
The same season's moon holds sky-height.
The dark roof hides the sky.
In the poet's persisting tension between grief and joy, he encounters
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the limit of his knowledge in the recognition that the "dark roof hides 
the sky."18 Within the dark confines of that limit, though, he must con­
tinue to pursue the name of the world while the voice of the world 
speaks all around him.
What can neither be spoken nor understood in "Boyhood in Tobacco 
Country" is finally given utterance in the following poem, "Filling 
Wight with The Name: Funeral as Local Color" (Bff 12), in which the whip- 
o-will reappears in order to speak the word which is unavailable to man. 
In this poem, we see that Warren's notion of the name of the world is 
closely linked to his understanding that the language of the world 
speaks the word which the poet cannot articulate. Nature itself consti­
tutes that word. When Warren questions the name of the world, he sur­
mises that the name must be spoken by the world itself before he will be 
able to know it. Warren brings together here his longing for a unified 
word and his understanding of the name that the world itself gives.
T h is  poem  i s  m a rk e d  b y  t h e  sam e n a r r a t i v e  v o i c e  w h ic h  W a r r e n  in t r o d u c e d  
i n  " O c t o b e r  P i c n i c  L o n g  A g o "  a n d  w h ic h  r e c o u n t s  t h e  b o y h o o d  m em ory o f  
t h e  p r e v io u s  p o e m . T h e  v o i c e  t e l l s  t h e  t a l e  o f  a n  e l d e r l y  h u s b a n d 's  
l e a r n i n g  t o  c o p e  w i t h  h i s  w i f e ' s  d e a t h  d u r in g  t h e  n i g h t  a f t e r  h e r  f u n e r ­
a l .  B u t  t h e r e  i s  a  c l e a r  t e n s i o n  i n  t h e  poem  n o t  s im p ly  b e tw e e n  t h e  
s i l e n c e  a n d  t h e  s a y in g  b u t  b e tw e e n  t h e  s a y a b le  a n d  t h e  u n s a y a b le  -  t h a t  
i s ,  b e tw e e n  t h e  s p o k e n  w o rd  a n d  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  th o u g h  u n u t t e r a b l e  w o r d .  
T h e  t e n s i o n  i s  s u s t a i n e d  b e tw e e n  t h e  w o rd s  t h a t  seem  s o  t h o u g h t f u l  a n d
a r e  y e t  s p o k e n  so  e a s i l y ,  a n d  t h e  w o rd  w h ic h  i s  n e c e s s a r y  b u t  m ay n o t  b e
s p o k e n .
It was all predictable, and just as well.
For old Mrs. Clinch at last lay gut-rigid there
In the coffin, withered cheeks subtly rouged, hair 
Frizzled and tinted, with other marks of skill
Compare the similar problem encountered in "A Problem in Spatial Composition" ( OE 101).
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Of the undertaker to ready his client to meet
Her God and her grave-worm - well, Mrs. Clinch had heard
The same virtues extolled for the likes of her, word for word,
with no word, true or false, that she couldn't exactly repeat.
The speaker confronts the emptiness of the "predictable" and the virtu­
ous before the face of death. The words of the minister in his overused 
eulogy reveal that the predictable words could not suffice to speak the 
necessary word. By their endless repetition, the words had become trite 
and were all predictable. Yet such words, whether true or false, fall 
flat before the exigency of death. Even the husband's words in the sec­
ond stanza, spoken in response to "a friendly old couple," cannot stave 
off the reality of death: "'When a thing's gonna be,' he replied, 'git
used to it fast.'" When in the third stanza he sits "down to write to 
his boy,/ Far away," there is no word to speak what must be spoken:
"But no word would come, and sorrow and joy/ All seemed one...." Caught 
between the joy of the living son and the sorrow of his dead wife, what 
can he write? But Warren suggests that the word which he cannot find in 
himself is given by the name which the world speaks :
...just the single, simple word whip-o-will.
For the bird was filling the night with the name: whip-o-will,
Whip-o-will.
Here the name and the call converge in the one word which simultaneously 
speaks the husband's sorrow and joy. What cannot be spoken as a single 
word in human speech without privileging one word over another is given 
utterance in the voice of the whip-o-will. In the previous poem, the 
whip-o-will utters his precious grief, and here that grief is brought 
into the realm of being by the one unified, competent word which is both 
the call and the name. It is significant that this is the word with
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which the poem ends; the poet has receded and given way to the voice of 
being itself. The name has become a call which opens up instead of clos­
ing off, and so this final word/name is not an ending but an invocation 
similar to that at the end of Audubon: "Tell me a story of deep
delight."
In "Youthful Truth-Seeker, Half Waked, At Wight, Running Down 
Beach South of San Francisco" (BH 25-26), Warren frames a more urgent 
expression of the heart's yearning not simply to name the world but to 
"embrace" it "in its fullness and threat...." The connection that this 
bears to the description of the truth-seeker as being youthful is con­
firmed by the boyish desire which R.P.W. remembers in Brother to Drag­
ons, when he "thought to name the world and hug it tight" {BD 79 25).i9 
The desire to embrace the world incorporates the hope to engage the ten­
sion within which the poet may speak. The act of embracing the world by 
speaking its name calls forth that moment in which being is shaped and 
changed. In the thirteen stanzas of the poem, the speaker narrates his 
own experience many years before of running alone down the beach in the 
darkness. In his youthfulness, he runs away from "the glow of the city 
of men" into the darkness, the encroaching fog, and the sound of the 
surf. In the midst of his memory, he muses.
What was the world I had lived in? Poetry, orgasm, jokes 
And the joke the biggest on me, the laughing despair 
Of a truth the heart might speak, but never spoke - 
Like the twilit whisper of wings with no shadow on air.
You dream that somewhere, somehow, you may embrace
The world in its fullness and threat, and feel, like Jacob, at
last
The merciless grasp of unwordable grace 
Which has no truth to tell of future or past -
But only life's instancy... (25).
19 Compare also "Youth Stares at Minoan Sunset" in NSP 152.
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The dream which Warren envisions here is that of being gripped by the 
name of the world, that "unwordable grace" through which one is able to 
embrace the world in the moment of instancy. This unwordable grace is 
related to the truth of the previous stanza which "the heart might 
speak" but never is spoken. There is more than a hint of his own 
inability in his admission that his heart may not speak this truth. 
Rather, the truth is spoken by the world itself in "the twilit whisper 
of wings with no shadow on air," which is a moment of life's instancy, a 
truth for the moment which is unwordable and yet gracious. This is the 
quality of the name of the world after which the poet yearns : unword­
able and gracious. The poet continues this emphasis in the eighth stan­
za;
So lungs aflame now, sand raw between toes,
And the city grows dim, dimmer still.
And the grind of breath and of sand is all one knows
Of the Truth a man flees to, or from, in his angry need to fulfill
What?...(26).
The moment of instancy, in which the youth feels "the grind of breath
and of sand," is the only truth that he can name, and it is a truth that
a man both flees to and from. It draws him on, but it also repels by
its power. But there is still the question of fulfillment which goes
unanswered; there is the lack of stability for the self. As Warren
asserts in Audubon, the only answer can be found in the asking of the
question. The youth is a truth-seeker walking in the world and asking
the world to speak its truth. He stares at the stars and listens with
ear to the wet sand for this word or name. So, in the eleventh and
twelfth stanzas, he listens:
Below all silken soil-slip, all crinkled earth-crust.
Far deeper than ocean, past rock that against rock grieves
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There at the globe's deepest dark and visceral lust.
Can I hear the groan-swish of magma that churns and heaves?
No word? No sign? Or is there a time and place - 
Ice-peak or heat-simmered distance - where heart, like eye.
May open? But sleep at last - it has sealed up my face.
And last foam, retreating, creeps from my hand...(26).
The world does not tell us the word or the sign which would speak the 
truth after which the youth seeks. Though there is a way of relating to 
the groaning of the world, there is no way to know what defines that 
relation. This yearning longs for the moment of articulation, a moment 
within time and space, where the heart may finally listen and speak.
For the poet, listening and articulation are part of the same act. The 
heart opens both to listen and to speak. This is ultimately a moment of 
knowledge, as part of being itself, and is therefore necessarily related 
to "being here." Knowledge is tied to the concreteness of the world - 
whether the ice-peak or the heat-simmered distance. So, one way to say 
the unsayable - the name of the world - is to continue to live in the 
concrete realities of the world.
"Sila" {BH 37-40) is the next poem in which Warren confronts the 
need to name the world within the concreteness of the world, a portion 
of which is found in the concrete narrative itself which drives this 
poem forward.20 The poem sketches out the relationship between Sila 
("the tawny great husky, broad-chested...") and the boy or young man of 
the narrative. The poem highlights the sense of connection between the 
dog and the boy through their repeated eye contact, much like in other 
poems where Warren displays contact between eyes and hands and bodies. 
But this connection is still bounded by a degree of helplessness which
20 sila is an Eskimo word which Warren defines from Larousse World Mythology, which 
states that it "is the air, not the sky; movement, not wind; the very breath of life, 
but not physical life; he is clear-sighted energy, activating intelligence; the power­
ful fluid circulating 'all around' and also within each individual..." (37).205
each bears before the inescapability of death- The narrative shows the 
boy and dog in the winter wilderness coming upon the ruins of a cabin 
and the boy ponders the exigency of death: he thinks, "Two hundred years 
back - and it might/ Have been me" (italics his). He wonders "what name 
the man/ Might have had" who built and inhabited the cabin, then he 
imagines coming back in the summer to find gravestones and even imagines 
a skull rotting deep in the ground beneath those stones. The boy is 
confronting the sheer terror and delight of the world throughout the 
narrative, which is made more explicit in the remainder of the poem.
The husky is released from harness, frightens a doe from its thicket- 
cover, and ultimately pounces on and fatally wounds the deer. There is 
an intense section in the middle of the poem in which the boy's eyes are 
in contact with the dog's and then alternately with the deer's. This 
sense of connection betrays the sacramental quality of the tension of 
the world: there is no escaping the connection between the self and the
world, a connection bound up in violence, blood and death. After the 
dog has wounded the deer, the boy decides that he cannot leave it to die 
slowly in the winter sunset:
So the boy's knees bend.
Break the snow-crust like prayer.
And he cuddles the doe's head, and widening brown eyes 
Seem ready, almost, to forgive.
Throat fur is cream color, eyes flecked with gold glintings.
He longs for connection, to give explanation. Sudden,
The head, now helpless, drops back on his shoulder. Twin eyes 
Hold his own entrapped in their depth,
But his free hand, as though unaware.
Slides slow back
To grope for the knife-sheath.
There is a clear redemptive element at work here, but it is not simply 
the boy's redemption envisioned but the necessary redemption of life in
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the world. Together, the deer is "helpless" and the boy seems
"unaware." They both participate in the act of redemption. After the
boy has cut the deer's throat and watched the blood flow "Red petal by
petal" onto the white snow, the poem makes the sacramental notion of
participation all the more explicit:
He lifted his head, knife yet in hand, and westward 
Fixed eyes beyond beech-bench to the snow-hatched 
Stone thrust of the mountain, above which sky, too.
More majestically bloomed, but petals paler as higher - 
The rose of the blood of day. Still as stone.
So he stood. Then slowly - so slowly -
He raised the blade of the knife he loved honing, and
wiped
The sweet warmness and wetness across his mouth.
And set tongue to the edge of the silk-whetted steel.
He knew he knew something at last 
That he'd never before known.
No name for it - no!
Just as the boy had set his eyes on the dog's and the deer's eyes for a 
sense of connection, here he fixes his eyes on the "Stone thrust of 
mountain," and when he stands he seems to have been transformed by this 
connection, for he stands "Still as stone...."
This notion of sacramental participation is sharpened, though, 
into explicit eucharistie imagery. The blood which flowed out onto the 
snow like the fallen petals of a rose has now flowed into the day itself 
as the sun sets; above the mountain "The rose of the blood of the day" 
blooms.21 When the boy sets the blade to his mouth and partakes of the 
"sweet warmness and wetness," it is not simply the blood of the deer 
that he drinks but the blood of the day, and even mingles it with his 
own as he sets "tongue to the edge of the silk-whetted steel." The 
eucharistie union is comprehensive with life in the world, and it
21 Note the contrasting play on "rose" and the setting of the sun.
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becomes a sort of revelation, an entry into a new knowledge. However,
even though he has such new knowledge, he cannot name what it is he
knows. Though the violent act is unavoidable, it holds within itself 
the possibility of the blessing of that knowledge which opens up being 
and changes the self and the understanding of the world. But the change 
in being which the boy experiences might be said to be paradoxical: he
knows that a change has occurred but he does not have a name for it. It 
is unclear why he cannot name this, though; it may be because of an
implicit sense of holiness of this knowledge received through this act,
or it may be simply because of the inability not only to grasp the 
moment but also to articulate this experience. And yet, it appears that 
the boy finally does speak the word to name the knowledge that he has 
received.
He snow-cleaned the knife. Sheathed it. Called: "Come!"
The dog, now docile, obeyed. With bare hands full of snow,
The boy washed him of the blood and, comblike.
With fingers ennobled the ruff.
Then suddenly clasping the creature, he.
Over raw fur, past beeches, the mountain's snow-snag.
And the sky's slow paling of petals.
Cried out into vastness 
Of silence: "Oh, world!"
He felt like a fool when tears came.
Even here Warren emphasizes that this new knowledge, limited as it is, 
is a sort of redemption through a washing of blood. In the former stan­
za, the boy washes the dog "of blood," a prepositional phrase whose 
antecedent is ambiguous. The dog is being cleaned from the stain of the 
blood on his fur, but there is also the hint that the boy and the dog 
and the day have all been washed in blood. In the second of the two 
stanzas, the sky still bears the stain of this blood in its "slow paling
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petals." But such a redemption in the world is momentary and its power
is found in the instancy of the experience. In this moment, the boy
utters his cry in which we hear him name the only name he can utter
before the silence and the vastness of the world, and that is, "world."
The name of the world is, in the end, "world." For the poet, even with
such a sacramental vision, this is the only name that may be named for
the world and for life in the world. The knowledge that the boy
received was of the character of life in the world as he confronts
death. So the poem ends with his confrontation with his own deaths
Some sixty years later, propped on death's pillow.
Again will he see that same scene, and try.
Heart straining, to utter that cry? - But 
Cannot, breath short.
At the horizon of his own being, will he still "utter that cry" to the 
world? In the tension of the world, he will find that the name that he 
learned is what he will not be able to pronounce, because he, like the
pioneer and the deer, has succumbed to life itself. His last cry of the
name of the world will be the sound of his final expiration. This will 
be the speaking of life's name, as R.P.W. suggests in Brother to Drag­
ons: "For all life lifts and longs toward its own name,/ And toward
fulfillment in the singleness of definition" (BD 79 11).
In the final two poems of Being Here, Warren returns to the 
relentless yearning to name the world and so to achieve a redemption of 
life within the world. "Night Walking" (103), a first-person narrative, 
is the final poem of the section which Warren describes in his 
"Afterthought" as being "concerned with the reviewing of life from the 
standpoint of age" (107). To the degree that this poem deals with the 
perspective of age, it heightens the endless character of the quest to 
name the unnameable, which he terms here as a sort of wisdom. This poem
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also ties together the various thematic elements of this collection by a 
kind of transference of this quest from the aging speaker to the youth­
ful son and by its concrete rootedness in the world, the "here" of the 
title in which being is to be achieved, if it is going to be achieved at 
all. The narrative constitutes the event of the father hearing the son
wake in the night and following him into the mountain forest. The nar­
rative is not rendered in the past tense, as if it were recounting a 
memory. Rather, the poem is the event; the poem brings the event into 
the open in which it may occur. So, the poem begins by opening up the 
poet's own thought:
Bear, my first thought at waking. I hear
What I think is the first bear this year
Come down off the mountain to rip 
Apples from trees near my window - but no.
It's the creak of the door of the shop my son stays in.
Upon seeing the son, "Now booted and breeched but bare/ From waist,"
standing in the late light of a full moon, the father dresses and waits,
although he does not know what he is waiting for. He creeps quietly
behind the son as he makes his way into the wilderness:
I crouch as he slowly walks up the track
Where from blackness of spruces great birches 
Stand monitory, stand white - 
Moving upward, and on, face upward as though
By stars in an old sea he steered.
In silence and shadow and in 
The undefinable impulse to steal 
What knowledge I, in love, can.
With laggard cunning I trail to the first ridge-crest.
He stops- His gaze 
Turns slow, and slower.
From quarter to quarter, over 
The light-laved land, over all 
Thence visible, river and mowings.
Ruined orchards, ledges and rock-slides.
And the clambering forest that would claim all.
210
The world into which the father and son walk is a world full of tensions 
from the "blackness of spruces" the "great birches/ ...stand white...," 
and in the midst of "silence and shadow" there remains the "undefinable 
impulse to steal/ What knowledge I, in love, can...." And yet this ten­
sion is the place in which knowledge is gained. The son gazes upon the 
scene as if to accept it for what it is, knowing that the "clambering 
forest" would claim even him if given the chance. Bathed in the moon­
light, though, this scene experiences a sort of redemption similar to 
that perceived in "Sila" in which the landscape and the boy were bathed 
in blood. But the son moves on to "the next range to westward" where he 
pauses and "lifts up his light-bleached arms." In the light he stands 
frozen, and the poem itself pauses in that moment before "Arms down,
[he] goes o n . "22 The son lifts his arms to the moonlight without shame, 
embracing the world in its tension. After this moment of embracing the 
world, the son is able to move on into the world, but the father turns 
back at this point:
I do not guess
How far he will go, but in my
Mixture of shame, guilt, and joy do know
All else is his - and alone.
In shadow, I huddle
Till I can start back to bed and the proper darkness of 
night.
In this parting of ways, there is a passing on of the quest to walk in 
the world and to love it. Having walked in the tension of "shame, 
guilt, and joy" the father does know what his son's experience in the 
world will be marked by. And he knows from his own experience that the
22 This moment is reminiscent of a scene in a slightly earlier poem, "Youth Stares at 
Minoan Sunset" {NT 25). The boy in that poem "spreads his arms to the sky as though he loves i t "
211
son can only go on alone. In his own shadowed solitude, the father too
must move on by turning back to "the proper darkness of night," that
interior darkness into which the light of the moon cannot reach.
I start, but alone then in moonlight, I stop
As one paralyzed at a sudden black brink opening up.
For a recollection, as sudden, has come from long back -
Moon-walking on sea-cliffs, once I
Had dreamed to a wisdom I almost could name.
But could not. I waited.
But heard no voice in the heart.
Just the hum of the wires.
But that is my luck. Not yours.
The recollection takes the father to the brink of his experience which 
is opened up by the voice of the world. It speaks in that dream of "a 
wisdom I almost could name." That wisdom is what he "dreamed to." Like 
truth, this wisdom cannot be named but may only be enacted in a dream. 
This enacting of the dream invokes the presence of wisdom, but this 
presence holds within itself the absence of its name. The poet waits, 
as he has throughout the poem, upon the speaking of that name, but he 
hears "no voice in the heart." There is only the "the hum of the 
wires." The poet then admits that this absence of voice is his "luck," 
a word which recalls the early poem, "The Ballad of Billie Potts" {NSP 
287-300). In that poem, Warren links the identity and name of Little 
Billie to his birthmark which is "Shaped lak a clover under his left 
tit, / with a shape fer luck..." (299), After the boy's father and 
mother have brutally murdered him, thinking him to be some rich traveler 
unknown in their region, they open his shirt to find the birthmark 
"shaped for luck" and realize that they have sacrificed their own son.
In the final section of the poem, the poet transfers this mark of iden­
tity to "you, wanderer," to the poet himself. Having heard "the wind's
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word," he kneels "in the sacramental silence of evening" with the little 
black mark - his name - under his heart, that mark "Which is shaped for 
luck, // Which is your luck" (300). The luck that the poet admits to in 
"Night Walking" intimates the position of the poet, the wanderer in the 
moonlight, who bears the joy and grief of listening to the voice of lan­
guage in the world. The wisdom of which he can dream but may not name
is the agony which he as poet must bear.
In the final stanza, the poet avoids resolving such tension by 
issuing a call to his son and to the reader.
At any rate, you must swear never.
Not even in secret, the utmost, to be ashamed
To have lifted bare arms to that icy
Blaze and redeeming white light of the world.
In this call, the father seems to recognize the only name which is
available for the wisdom of which he dreamed. The wisdom which he could
almost name appears here as the "icy/ Blaze and redeeming white light"
which he has encountered under the name of "world." This is the only 
name which he can give to such wisdom because this is the name which is 
brought into the open by the world itself. It reveals itself in the 
blaze and light which the father confronted in the darkness of night.
But this is not something that the father alone has experienced. There 
is a shift in this final section to the second person personal pronoun 
and to a past perfect verb tense, a shift which draws in the reader and
places the name of the world on the reader's own lips. Here, it is not
the father that has lifted his arms but it is the reader who stands
before the blaze and light of the world as he reads the poem.
The name of the world which shines out at the end of "Night Walk­
ing" is also illuminated in the final poem of Being Here, "Passers-by On 
Snowy Night," the poem which Warren envisioned as forming a sort of book
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end together with "October Picnic Long Ago" at the beginning of the col­
lection. With a tone and voice characteristic of his later poetry, War­
ren engages the radical tension of the world as the language brings it 
into the open.
Black the coniferous darkness.
White the snow track between.
And the moon, skull-white in its starkness,
Watches upper ledges lean.
And regards with the same distant stare.
And equal indifference,
How your breath goes white in steel air 
As you trudge to whither from whence.
For from somewhere you rose to go.
Maybe long before daylight withdrew.
With the dream of a windowpane's glow 
And a path trodden to invite you.
And, indeed, there may be such place,
Perhaps at next corner or swerve.
Where someone presses a face
To the frost-starred glass, though the curve
Shows yet only mocking moonlight.
But soon, but soon! - Alone,
I wish you well in your night 
As I pass you in my own.
We each hear the distant friction.
Then crack of bough burdened with snow,
And each takes the owl's benediction.
And each goes the way he will go.22
Though this poem makes apparent allusions to Robert Frost's "Stopping by 
Woods on a Snowy Evening" in its setting and in some of its thematic 
concerns, Warren's poem is not so concerned with the way that the beauty 
of the woods on a snowy night cannot meet the existential needs of the 
on-looker. Rather, we find here a poem which fulfills in part Warren's
23 Please note that the text of this poem appears in italics, as printed here, in BH,
2 1 4
call at the end of Audubon, "Tell me a s t o r y . M a k e  it a story of 
great distances and starlight" (NSP 230). It is a poem which partakes 
of the tension of which it speaks, yet that tension is not devoid of 
hope. It is also marked by a certain degree of solipsism, but its 
solipsistic perspective recognizes the necessary presence of others 
within this same tension. Both "you" and "I" are alone in our own 
"night," although in each night there is the black and coniferous dark­
ness sliced through by the white snow track, and in each the same moon 
watches and regards "you" and "I." But within this vision, Warren 
betrays his hope for that place of contact and place of articulation.
It is the place that each dreams of going and the place that seems to 
wait for each. But it is a place that is ever receding as the path con­
tinues to invite the tread of the poet's foot.24 The poet walks on with 
the hope that "indeed, there may be such a place,/ Perhaps at next 
corner or swerve...." And yet, all he knows of that hope is the 
refrain, "But soon, but soon!" These passers-by are each moving toward 
that place within earshot of "the distant friction" and the "crack of 
bough burdened with snow...." Their walk is bounded by the concrete 
world. But it is a world which pronounces its own benediction to these 
passers-by. The name of the place that each seeks recedes with the path 
into to distance and starlight, but in the quest the world gives its 
blessing as "each goes the way that he will go." The world offers the 
well-spoken word which is not available to each in the midst of their 
journey. It is significant, though, that Warren characterizes the jour­
ney as a linguistic journey, a journey defined by difference: "you
trudge to whither from whence." That journey has been enacted within 
this volume, as "October Picnic Long Ago" suggests the whence from which
24 Warren's poem bears important similarities to Georg Trakl's poem, "A Winter 
Evening," which Heidegger responds to in his essay "Language," in Poetry, Language, 
Thought , trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row 1971), 189-210.
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the poet has walked, a place of linguistic innocence. But, through his 
experience here in the world, the poet continues to walk and to speak. 
The final poem does not name the place at which his journey ends; rather 
it can only name the journey in which he must continue. And that name 
is the world.
5.3 The Name of the Self
Warren's concern for the name of the world is complemented by his 
search for the name of the self, a quest whose object appears to be 
clearly defined so that the poet can grasp it with relative linguistic 
ease. However, as he learns in his confrontation with the world, the 
name of the self neither readily gives itself nor does it purely desig­
nate and define. The self is not a given from which he may work but 
that given toward which he must work. Just as his concern for the name 
of the world functions according to the desire to come into the being of 
the world and to participate in its unfolding through language, so his 
desire to find the name of the self involves the task of creating the 
self, of bringing it into being. This is one way that Warren antici­
pates the critiques of modernism made by postmodern thinkers as varied 
as Levinas and Foucault.25 Although warren never denies the existence
of the self, he maintains that the self must be created and worked 
toward, not as a teleological goal but as an ever present possibility. 
Warren never contends that all reality is a linguistic construct and 
that language is all we may know. Rather he proposes that all reality 
is linguistically perceived and that the self is not free from such a 
condition. There must be such linguistic perception if the poet ever 
hopes to find the place from which he can speak. Warren clearly is 
exploring this urgent need in "Sunset," part of his final single collec­
ts For a discussion of the different approaches to subjectivity in modern and postmod­
ern discourse, see Charles Davis, "Our Modern Identity: The Formation of the Self,"
Modern Theology 6/2 (January 1990), 159-71.
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tion of poetry. Altitudes and Extensions 1980-1984 {NSP 1-85). The poem 
begins with that moment in which the self confronts the world in its 
tense power, and the world becomes not a thing but another self. In the 
terminology of Martin Buber, for whose thought Warren had a great affin­
ity, the world is transformed from It to T h o u . 26
Clouds clamber, turgid, the mountain, peakward
And pine-pierced, toward the
Vulgar and flaming apocalypse of day.
In which our errors are consumed 
Like fire in a lint-house - 
Not repetitious
But different each day, for day to day nothing 
Is identical to eye or soul.
At night, at a late hour, I
Have asked the stars the name of my soul (NSP 84).
Warren envisions here an apocalypse of nature which happens each day but 
is never the same from day to day. Each apocalypse is unique, as indi­
vidual as each day is, and each consumes our errors of the everyday. 
Every apocalypse is a moment full in itself and never identical to 
another moment. But each and all point toward the inability of the poet
to speak the name of his own soul. Even as in other poems Warren lis­
tens to nature to speak the name of the world, so here he interrogates 
the stars to hear them speak his own name. The timing of his interroga­
tion is significant: he petitions the stars after the apocalypse has 
burned up his sins like fire on the altar, after he has been cleansed so 
that he might hear what is spoken. In the second stanza, he states his 
question and receives a response:
"Oh, what shall I call my soul in a dire hour?"
But there is no answer from
Heavenly algebra, and you are left with
26 "Before entering upon this topic we must, however, grant that in all times and 
places man has necessarily lived a large part of his life in what Martin Buber calls 
the realm of It - the realm of economics, politics, science, military activity, labor, 
and so on - as contrasted with the realm of the Thou, in which massive relations of 
recognition and reverence may prevail." DP 57. See also DP 36, 90-91.
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the implacable gaggles and military squadrons
Of ignorance, which have no
Originality and know
Nothing but repetition, and which
We call constellations.
The poet's question is filled with a sense of urgency because of the
"dire hour," that moment in which he must speak but cannot. If the day
is able to consume his errors, then the night should be able to tell him
what he might call his soul. But, when the poet asks the stars the name
of his soul, he learns that they are unable to give him the answer that
he desires. The source of this inability appears to be that the stars,
unlike the daily apocalypse, are locked in a repetition from day to
d a y . 27 Each night is identical to them because they do not have a soul
which cries out in the dire hour. It is significant, though, that the
poet is able to name this "Heavenly algebra" even when he does not know
the name of his own soul. He is able to discern the constellations, and
though they know no originality they speak within their unending. When
the poet questions the stars regarding his own name, all he hears is
their "implacable gaggles," their own unrelenting questioning which
announces t h e m s e l v e s .28 The self, though, is confronted with its own
originality and each day's lack of repetition. In the final stanza, the
poet ponders what then is available to him in light of life's necessity:
who knows his own name at the last?
How shall he speak to a soul that has none?
"Tell me that name," I cried, "that I may speak 
In a dire hour." The dire hour 
Is the time when you must speak 
To your naked self - never 
Before seen, nor known.
2? Notice how the "Not repetitious" of the first stanza falls into pieces in the 
"Nothing but repetition" in the second stanza.
29 Warren seems to play here upon the word "gaggle" which can be either the noise a 
goose makes or a flock of geese. The stars, then, hang in the heavens like a flock of geese.
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The self is caught in the necessity of having to speak, but in order to 
speak the self must know its own name. There is an important shift from 
the apocalypse of the day in the first stanza to the apocalypse of the 
self in the final stanza. The apocalyptic moment of the self - that 
simultaneous time of uncovering and hiding, of scattering and coming 
together - is the dire hour, the moment when of necessity "you must 
speak/ To your naked self...." In that moment, the name is hidden from 
sight, but the self is revealed; what has never before been seen or 
known is brought to the light and made known, though the poet remains 
unable to give the final name for the soul.
The name of the self, like the name of the world, appears to be a 
significant part of that "given" toward which Warren contended the poet 
must work. It is not a given, just as identity is not a static and iso­
lated entity or quality. Rather, to speak the name is to say the unsay- 
able. But how can one do this, poet or otherwise? In Warren's vision, 
the self which we wish to name must be created via the imagination. But 
this creation is not abstracted from life in the world; the world shapes 
and influences, even as it is shaped and influenced- In the creation of 
the self, there is a sort of reciprocal relationship. Like the poem, 
the self is a "made thing," as he put it in Democracy and Poetry. We 
find early evidence of this line of thinking in "The Ballad of Billie 
Potts," in which Little Billie is made and remade, as is revealed 
through the narrator's emphasis upon the "new name,"29 However, Warren 
states his understanding of the creation of the self more explicitly in 
his discussion of Coleridge's distinction between the primary and sec­
ondary imagination in "A Poem of Pure Imagination." The connection War­
ren makes in this essay between the imagination and the self is not only
29 For a variety of discussions on this poem, see for example Burt 84-91; Justus 57- 60; Strandberg, Colder Fire 114-38 and Poetic Vision 148-63; and Walker 68-9.
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crucial for understanding his later comments in Democracy and Poetry, 
but it is also an important addition to the on-going reading and inter­
pretation of Coleridge's aesthetic. Warren's interpretation, if not 
quite unique, does pursue a valid line of thinking which is often over­
looked in Coleridge criticism. After quoting in full Coleridge's dis­
tinction and definition of the primary and secondary imagination, Warren 
goes on to comment:
It is the primary imagination which creates our world, for 
nothing of which we are aware is given to the passive mind.
By it we know the world, but for Coleridge knowing is mak­
ing, for, "To know is in its very essence a verb active."
We know by creating, and one of the things we create is the 
Self, for a subject is that which "becomes a subject by the 
act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which 
never is an object except for itself, and only so far as by 
the very same act it becomes a subject."...The point, for 
present purposes, is that Coleridge attributes to imagina­
tion this fundamental significance ("APPI" 342).
Warren does not interpret Coleridge's primary imagination as being the 
divine logos or even God himself. Rather it is rooted in the imago dei 
which is revealed in the unconscious yet ever-present imagination by 
which we perceive all things. Thus, it is only by the primary imagina­
tion that we know the world or the self; the primary imagination creates 
both, and in this creation there is a fusion of the two horizons of sub­
ject and object. When Warren turns to the secondary imagination, the 
necessity of creating the self becomes all the more obvious. Here he is 
dealing not with "creation at the unconscious and instinctive level" 
(343) but with creation as an act of the conscious will. There is 
clearly an analogous relationship between the poem and self, in that 
they are both made things. In both cases, the act of creation is never 
pure in itself, free from the tension of the world.
Does Coleridge imply, however, that the poet in composing
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his poem acts according to a fully developed and objectively 
statable plan, that he has a blueprint of intention in such 
an absolute sense? To this question the answer is no (343).
Neither the poem nor the self is created according to an objectified
plan or "blueprint of intention." while the act of creation functions
according to an unconscious activity, it does not deny the role of the
conscious will. Warren reconciles this "both/and" argument of Coleridge
in the following way;
It seems clear that the secondary imagination does operate 
as a function of that permanent will, and in terms of the 
basic concerns by which that will fulfills itself, but the 
particular plan or intention for a particular poem may be 
actually developed in the course of composition in terms of 
that "unconscious activity," which is the "genius in the man 
of genius," and may result from a long process of trial and 
error....In other words, the plan and meaning of the work 
may be discovered in the process of creation. But it is to 
be remembered that this process is a function of the perma­
nent will which constantly moves to fulfil itself in con­
sciousness (343-344),
Warren adopted this aesthetic in his own thinking about poetic creation, 
stating in an interview with Ruth Fisher in 1970 that "[the writer] is 
not working deductively from a highly articulated image, a careful 
scheme of values; he is trying to find the values, find the ideas, by a
process of trial and error, as it were" {Talking 171), This process, he
goes on to say, is a matter of the "test of experience" (171). In fact, 
"Life is a process of trial and error about our own values" (171). It 
is not only the poem that is created through this process of trial and
error, but the self, too, is created in this way. This process is
always carried out by the imagination. In the same interview, and in 
language drawn directly from his earlier reading of Coleridge, Warren 
explores the role the imagination plays in this process. He says that 
"the writing is the process in which the imagination take the place of
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literal living; by moving toward values and modifying, testing, and
exfoliating older values" (171-172).
The way in which the poem and the self are related in Warren's
aesthetic is confirmed in the second essay of Democracy and Poetry, In
"Poetry and Selfhood," Warren proposes to consider the therapeutic
aspect of poetry. "I am trying to indicate how, in the end, in the face
of the increasingly disintegrative forces in our society, poetry may
affirm and reinforce the notion of the self" (42). In the first half of
this essay, Warren traces out these disintegrative forces and the way
that they militate against the proper understanding of the self. He
argues that a relentless
contempt of the past inevitably means that the self we have 
is more and more a fictive self,...for any true self is not 
only the result of a vital relation with a community but is 
also a development in time, and if there is no past there 
can be no self (56).
He considers those forces within a democratic society which encourage 
"the abolition of the self" (68) rather than the establishing of the 
self. These work both from without and from within, but especially 
through the manipulation of images in a media culture which produces an 
endless string of fictive selves. Against this, he suggests that poetry 
is one of the things which serves to make democracy possible. "For 
poetry - the work of the 'makers' - is a dynamic affirmation of, as well 
as the image of, the concept of the self" (68). As a "made thing," he 
argues, the poem "stands as a 'model' of the organized self" (69). He 
goes on to say.
The "made thing" becomes, then, a vital emblem of the strug­
gle toward the achieving of the self, and that mark of 
struggle, the human signature, is what gives the aesthetic 
organization its numinousness. It is what makes us feel 
that the "made thing" nods mysteriously at us, at the deep­
est personal inward self (69).
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The poem is not a model for the self simply because both are static and 
discrete entities which reflect each other. Rather, the poem acts as a 
model for the self because each involves an ongoing struggle toward some 
sort of presence. The poem bears the mark of this struggle and becomes 
"the human signature" for the work. The relationship between the poem 
and the self is not, then, simply a formal one, but is a mysterious 
relationship in which the two echo one another. This continues to clar­
ify Warren's shift from formalist concerns to more openly ontological 
questions in his quest for the "unsayable." Warren does acknowledge a 
difference between the way poetry functions with regard to the self and 
the way other literary genres do. What distinguishes the poem is a 
unique form.
But the "made thing" that the poet produces represents a 
different kind of form from all the others we know. Its 
characteristic quality springs from the special fullness of 
the relation of a self to the world. The form of a work 
represents, not only a manipulation of the world, but an 
adventure in selfhood. It embodies the experience of a self 
vis-à-vis the world, not merely as a subject matter, but as 
translated into the experience of form....The "made thing," 
the "formed thing," stands as a perennial possibility of 
experience, available whenever we turn to it; and insofar as 
we again, in any deep sense, open the imagination to it, it 
provides the freshness and immediacy of experience that 
returns us to ourselves and, as Nietzsche puts it, provides 
us with that "vision," that "enchantment," which is, for 
man, the "completion of his state" and an affirmation of his 
sense of life (72).
The poem is a moment of the self's "being in the world." It is a moment 
of vital experience and enactment within the world. That experience is 
not simply an objectified "subject matter" which can be studied; rather 
the relation of the self to the world provides the basis for the form of 
the poem. As we have already seen in Warren's attention to the language
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of the world, it is the tension of the world experienced by the self 
which provides the basis for the poem itself. In turn, then, the poem 
becomes a possibility of experience which not only "returns us to our­
selves" but returns us to the world, as well. And the vision which this 
provides is necessary for the fullness of selfhood.
Warren says later in the same essay that the self is not "a preex­
isting entity" nor "a Platonic idea existing in a mystic realm beyond 
time and change" (88). Neither is the self "an object like the nugget 
of gold in the placer pan, the Easter egg, under the bush at an Easter- 
egg hunt, a four-leaf clover to promise miraculous luck" (88). This is, 
he says,
the essence of passivity, to think to find, by luck, one's 
quintessential luck. And the essence of absurdity, too, for 
the self is never to be found, but must be created, not the 
happy accident of passivity, but the product of a thousand 
actions, large and small, conscious or unconscious, per­
formed not "away from it all," but in the face of "it all," 
for better or for worse, in work and leisure rather than in 
free time (88-89).
Warren's language here echoes his analysis of Coleridge's imagination in 
his earlier essay. By virtue of the exercise of the conscious will, the 
self must be worked towards. It cannot be found by the passive mind, 
"for nothing of which we are aware is given to the passive mind" ("APPI" 
342), least of all the self. The actions which create the self do not 
form an "objectively statable plan" or "a blueprint of intention in such 
an absolute sense" ("APPI" 343). Rather, these "thousand actions" form 
that process of trial error which is life, in Warren's vision. And 
these actions are enacted (to use another of Warren's terms) in the face 
of, in the presence of, in the being of the world.
One of the necessary actions by which the self is created is the 
act of naming the self. In this act, the self is returned into its own
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presence through the poem. Toward the end of "Poetry and Selfhood," 
Warren states.
Poetry even, in the same act and the same moment, helps one 
to grasp reality and to grasp one's own life. Not that it 
will give definitions and certainties. But it can help us 
to ponder on what Saint Augustine meant when he said that he 
was a question to himself (92).
The question of the self, and of the self's name, is really the only 
answer that the poet can come to, as Warren suggests in his 
"Afterthought" to Being Herat "Here, as in life, meaning is, I should 
say, often more fruitfully found in the question asked than in any 
answer given" (107-108). It is this question which accounts for so much 
of the fruit of Warren's late poetry. In a number of poems, Warren con­
fronts this question of the self in a very raw and exposed way; the 
question is a relentless quest after what in the end may not be fully 
spoken. This is what we find in "Immanence" {RV 61-62). In a series of 
fifteen unrhymed couplets written in varying meters, Warren pursues the 
name of the self as it relates to identity:
Stop! Wait! Wherever you are.
Whatever your name. It may well be
At the corner of one of the Fifties and Fifth Avenue,
Where the City of Things gleams brightest, and
Your name does not matter. If you have your credit card.
But sometimes its referent is obscure to you, and then even
The card is of no help. Except, of course, for the purchase. Or 
The event, in fact, may well be elsewhere, at night.
In bed, and you lost and unsure what
Bed, or breath there beside, and a crusting on
Dong. Like an orchid, now darkness 
Swells, benign, benign —  or inimical --
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In immanence. Yes, something
Plays cat-and-mouse with you, veiled, unrevealed, though you
Sometimes relax, pretend not to notice, thinking
You'll be the cat, and catch
It unawares. Unwary. Trapped
In your stratagem. For if
Its face is seen, name known, it.
Then powerless, like mist, may be shifted by
Whatever slight movement of air, and in anguish
Flee, with a scream of such
Desolation that a heart as horn-scabbed as yours would be stabbed
To pity. But no. You must ponder yet the teasing enigma. But
Suppose you never succeed? Or worse.
The swollen Immanence turns out to be all? Is all? And you.
Yet yearning, torn between fear
And hope, yet ignorant, will, into
The black conduit of Nature's Repackaging System, be sucked.
But that possibility is simply too distressing
To -- even — - be considered.
The beginning of the poem suggests that one's name ("whatever your 
name."), if it can be known, cannot deflect the urgency of self- 
knowledge, nor can one's position within the world. Even where "the 
City of Things gleams brightest," the need for self-knowledge will find 
"you," even if your name does not matter there. The crux of the matter 
is that the referent for your name - the signified of the signifier 
which is your name - "is obscure to you —  " Speaking the name cannot 
simply designate the self and then seal it off. There is still this 
matter of the obscurity of the self, which parallels the darkness in the 
middle of the poem, that darkness which swells like an orchid. The
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obscurity of the darkness, though, is that it appears as benign and 
inimical; its intention is hidden in its own darkness so that you cannot 
know if it means good or ill. The poet contends that all you can know 
is the immanence of this darkness and obscurity. In the immanence of 
the darkness, "something/ Plays cat-and-mouse with you, veiled, 
unrevealed...." Warren uses the same image of "cat-and-mouse" in an 
earlier poem in Rumor Verified, "What Was the Thought?" (57-58). There, 
the cat has caught what the poet cannot catch - the elusive thought of 
the self that lurked the house through the night, when the speaker 
awakes, he is greeted by the cat, crouching at his knees and "There, 
blood streaking the counterpane, it lies - / Skull crushed, partly 
eviscerated" (58).
The "something" that plays the cat-and-mouse game in "Immanence" 
would appear to be the knowledge after which the self yearns. It is 
constantly veiled and unrevealed. If it could be unveiled and revealed 
so that "Its face is seen, name known," that knowledge would become pow­
erless and would elude the grasp. Its fleeing scream would bring pity 
to even a "horn-scabbed" heart, the poet says. But the possibility of 
trapping such knowledge remains just that: a possibility. This is the 
"teasing enigma" of the self. As in other poems where Warren uses the 
notion of Zeno's paradox to portray this relentless quest, here he uses 
the notion of the enigma; it is the riddle of the self which the poet is 
trying to solve. And yet the question is the only answer he will 
receive. If he were to be able to name the self, the self would disap­
pear in a consummation like the apocalypse of the "dire hour" which War­
ren confronts in "Sunset" {NSP 84). But the poet remains convinced that 
there is a telos, that there will be a day of unveiling and revealing.
If not, then the only option is the naturalistic vision which he consid-
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ers at the end of the poem. If the "swollen immanence turns out to be 
all," the self —  "Yet yearning,.../ yet ignorant..." —  will only be 
sucked into the abyss and into a blind chemical reaction. "But that 
possibility is simply too distressing// To —  even —  be considered." 
Rather, the poet clings to his yearning after the possibility that one 
day he will know and be able to speak the name of the self, within the 
nearness of the immanence, the poet carries on the guest and in the 
midst of that guest the unpresentable is presented in the act of crea­
tion.
Warren pursues this same quest in a similar poem in Rumor Veri­
fied, "Nameless Thing" (27-28). As in "Immanence" and "What Was The 
Thought?," Warren here attempts to track down the relationship of the 
name to the self or to identity. He is continuing to explore the matter 
of the referent for the name.
I have no name for the nameless thing
That after midnight walks the house, usually
Soundless, but sometimes a creak on tiptoed stair.
Or sometimes like breath screwed down to a minimum.
But sometimes in silence the effluvium 
Of its being is enough, perhaps with a pale.
Not quite sickening sweetness as though left 
By funeral flowers, or sometimes like sweat
Under gross armpits. It is the odor of 
A real existence lost in the unreality 
Of dead objects of day that now painfully try to stir 
In darkness. Every stone has its life, we know.
In this poem, Warren explicitly confronts the paradox of his quest.
This nameless and soundless thing evokes a vital presence within the 
poem through a barely-noticed occurrence. Though it is absent, it makes 
its being known through the experience of the speaker. Caught between 
the silence and the sound, it reveals itself through "the odor of/ A
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real existence lost in the unreality...." This odor partakes of the 
paradox; it is both sickening and sweet. The image of the funeral flow­
ers is powerful; even though the flowers might suggest life, they will 
nonetheless themselves die, and their death is made known through the 
scent of the not-yet dead flowers. The effluvium of their death points 
to the time when what is nameless will be finally named, in death. More 
strikingly, though, it is a "real existence" perceived in the "unreality 
/ Of dead objects of day...." That which is nameless though real is 
made known through that which is unreal; being is announced in the midst 
of non-being. It is a "real existence" rather than simply an idea or a 
thought. The irony of the final line of the third stanza is sharp: we
know that every stone has its life, and yet we cannot name that which is 
of the fullness of being.3o But the speaker tries to hunt down the 
nameless thing, only to be confronted with being in the midst of unreal­
ity;
Barefoot, in darkness, I walk the house, a heavy
Poker seized from the hearth. I stand
Just by the door that seems ready to open.
I wait for the first minute motion, first whisper of hinges.
I hold my breath. I am ready. I think of blood.
I fling the door open. Only a square
Of moonlight lies on the floor inside. All is in order.
But once, on a very dark night, it was almost different. 
That night I was certain. Trapped in a bathroom!
I snatched the door open, weapon up, and yes, by God! —  
But there I stood staring into a mirror. Recognition
Came almost too late. But how could I 
Have been expected to recognize what I am?
In any case, that was what happened. I now lie 
Rigid abed and hear namelessness stalk the dark house.
90 This notion of the stone having its own life looks forward to such a poem as "Myth 
of Mountain Sunrise." See our discussion of this later poem in Chapter Six.
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I wonder why it cannot rest.
Warren suggests here a conviction similar to what he states in "Sunset," 
that nature is unable to give us the name that we seek so diligently. 
Here, as the speaker stalks the nameless thing, he opens a door to find 
"Only a square/ Of moonlight" on the floor, moonlight which is unable to 
give the name he seeks. However, that nameless thing subtly intimates 
itself as he goes back to bed and hears "the blessed heart beat there." 
What is implied at the end of this stanza is only made explicit in the 
following stanza when the speaker is not simply confronted with his 
heartbeat but with himself. It is in the aporetic moment when 
"Recognition/ Came almost too late," in that moment's hesitation, that 
this nameless thing dwells. It creeps out from the fissure between rec­
ognition and non-recognition, between life and death, between existence 
and unreality. And in that moment, the speaker almost smashes the bath­
room mirror, thinking to kill the nameless thing. His question - "But 
how could 1/ Have been expected to recognize what I am?" - reveals this 
tension of the moment, a tension between "I have been" and "I am." And 
yet that is where the self lies. To know this, however, does not mean 
that you finally know the name after which you sought; rather it remains 
nameless, but it continues in its restless existence. In its nameless­
ness, though, the self is propelled into that space and moment in which 
it might continue to pursue the name.
5.4 Conclusions
In his pursuit of the name, Warren's engagement with the enigmatic 
nature of language brought him face to face with the very nature of 
being itself. On the surface, his inability as a poet to perform what 
appears to be a very simple task - that is, to speak a name - makes obv-
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ious his sense of finitude within the tension of the world. However, 
this radical tension declares that the poet's desire to speak not just a 
name but the name is never simple though it is necessary. Warren's 
vision of language and speaking is indeed a sacramental vision; it looks 
toward an ultimate blessing in the midst of the present tension. And 
yet this vision of blessing is endlessly deferred. He can imagine the 
time and the place from which he will be able to know the name of the 
world and to name even the fullness of his own self. But that place is 
only found in the consummation of the self, that moment in which the 
self Is, in its truest and fullest sense, and in which it is radically 
altered. He may not know how it is altered, though, until he dies.
Death is the very real horizon of life and being in Warren's vision; it 
is the moment when the self may know even as it is known. It is also 
for the poet the moment of linguistic fullness in which the sayable and 
the unsayable converge and are said in that one word. While there is a 
sort of eschatological hope in his vision, the name of that hope can 
never be spoken, or it will disappear into the mist. Rather than being 
given over to a linguistic determinism, though, Warren persists in his 
conviction that language is the only means of articulating that hope. 3i 
Limited, arbitrary, and unstable as it is, language nonetheless provides 
a means of experiencing that hope of a possibility in the present 
moment. And it is in the poem that language speaks and provides the 
ground for such a hope. This is the hope given by poetry itself.
Though it bears the tension of the world, that tension points to a hope 
beyond it. For Warren, it is the real, though undefinable, presence of 
the unsayable which makes speaking at all possible. At the end of 
Democracy and Poetry, Warren makes his vision explicit. If what he
91 Thiemann uses the phrase "linguistic determinism" in his first chapter. Compare his discussion in Original Sin and Redemption: Philosophy of Language In Robert Penn 
Warren's Poetry.
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calls "the oscillation, [and] the vibrance" of the tension of the world
ceases, then "life as we know it and esteem it, will cease" (93). He
then quotes the end of Alexander Pope's Dunciad (1728) as evidence of
this nihilistic vision:
Thy hand. Great Anarch! let the curtain fall;
And Universal Darkness buries All.
We are not, however, for all our dunce-ness, necessarily 
condemned to that —  even if process may be thought to be 
all, even if there is to be no millennium of any kind. As a
last word, i'll quote again from the Confessions of Saint
Augustine;
There is a dim glimmering of light unput-out in 
men; let them walk, let them walk that the dark­
ness overtake them not (93-94).
The presence of the unsayable does not condemn us to a darkness which
buries us under the limits of the sayable. Rather, it is the
"unsayable" which reveals itself in the sayable as a dim-glimmering 
light which gives us a hope to speak at all. Bolstered by that hope, 
Robert Penn Warren continued to walk in the world and to love it.
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Chapter Six 
Warren as Witness to the 
Unpresentable
6 . 1 The Postmodernity of Robert Penn Warrem
In its relentless movement toward the unsayable, Warren's later 
poetry finds itself dwelling somewhere between the Romantic and the 
Postmodern. It experiences a nearness to both of these because the two 
are not as far removed from one another as might be thought. Coler­
idge's formulation of the imagination and the symbol clearly undergirds 
Warren's consistent recourse to the notion of tension. These matters, 
however, were not merely aesthetic or formalistic for Coleridge; their 
sustained paradoxes incorporate all the areas of Coleridge's varied 
thought, especially his theological and philosophical speculations. It 
is precisely the role of paradox in thought that brings Warren's later 
poetry also near to the Postmodern. Martin Heidegger's later essays on 
poetry and language have formed a clear sub-text running throughout this 
study. They have acted as a backdrop against which Warren's own thought 
has been brought into relief. Heidegger's thought is also bounded by 
Romanticism and Postmodernism, situated between Holderlin on the one 
hand and Derrida on the other. In assessing the "postmodernity" of Hei­
degger, Richard Palmer describes his "special kind" of thought which 
"resists categories, so that [Heidegger] himself wishes to leave it in 
the nameless" ("The Postmodernity of Heidegger" 87). Palmer observes, 
though, some of Heidegger's "suggestive articulations of the path of 
thought: the step back from metaphysical thinking, the search for the
1 Regarding the broad outlines of this argument, I am indebted to Richard Palmer's 
essay, "The Postmodemity of Heidegger" in MHQL, ed. by William V. Spanos (Bloomington, IN, and London: Indiana University Press, 1979), 71-92.23 3
2 See Frederic Jameson's comments i.n his "Foreward" to Lyotard, The Postmodern Condi­
tion viii-ix. 23 4
unthought within the thought, the between-character of man's existence, 
the importance of co-responding to the Saying of language, and so on" 
(87-88), Although Warren's later poetry also resists categories, we 
have been able to find in it some of its own suggestive articulations of 
Warren's path of thought: in its step back from the formalistic to the 
ontological, in its pursuit of the unsayable within the sayable, in its 
sense of being as "in the midst of" the world, and in its response to 
the saying of language. In Warren's movement toward a postmodern poet­
ics, his poetry has shifted its sights from representation "as the 
reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it," 
to presentation in which language becomes the matter itself and the 
agent of poetic creation.2
Having traced the development of Warren's thinking about language 
and the "unsayable" in several of his critical essays and in his later 
poetry, we want now to trace out whatever claims are supported by these 
developments and modifications in Warren's poetry and to see how those 
claims fit within critical discussions of postmodern thought contempo­
rary with this later poetry. Our reading of this poetry must take into 
consideration both the developments in warren's understanding of lan­
guage and these contemporary discussions about language and poetics. Our 
goal in reading Warren's later poetry and criticism in this postmodern 
context, however, is not to try to fit his work into a definition of 
postmodernism. Such an effort would inevitably subordinate the impor­
tance of Warren's contribution to questions about defining the postmod­
ern, questions which are at best difficult. Instead we are concerned 
with the character of Warren's contribution toward contemporary discus­
sions about language and its agency in aesthetics and in theological
thinking.
Warren's passion for the unsayable discloses a degree of consist­
ency with the thought of certain postmodern thinkers contemporary with 
his later work, most notably with that of Lyotard, who distinguishes the 
modern from the postmodern in terms of the question of the unpresent­
able. 3 For Lyotard, the distinction between the presentable and the 
unpresentable is rooted in the ontologically prior question regarding 
the means of legitimating knowledge. In his "Introduction" to The Post­
modern Condition (1979), Lyotard states, "Postmodern knowledge is not 
simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differ­
ences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its 
principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy" 
(XXV). Knowledge in the postmodern condition is rooted in the instabil­
ities of thought rather than in the presumedly stable categories of met­
aphysics and philosophy. No longer can our knowledge be legitimated by 
"the expert's homology" which is rooted in agreement, correspondence, 
and identity. The unified word of the expert presents a discourse of 
calculation in which the unpresentable may finally be presented through 
both progressive rational thought and the nostalgic s u b l i m e .4 Homology 
"allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing 
contents," and in the poetry of the homologous word, "the form, because 
of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the reader... 
matter for solace and pleasure" (81). However, postmodern knowledge is 
instead characterized by the paralogy of the poet. The poetic word is 
the unexpected and uncertain word which dwells within the tension of the 
incommensurable. In that poetic word there is the play of creativity by 
which the unpresentable is not simply presented as the "missing cont-
9 See Chapter One for an initial discussion of Lyotard's version of what he calls the 
"postmodern condition."
4 See Lyotard 81.
23 5
dualism, or double coding" of postmodernism, in which the traditions of 
the past are used and simultaneously transcended.6 warren holds in con­
tempt the idea of tradition "in the sense of formula"(47); rather, his 
recurring question is, "what is the legitimate use of the past?" Rooted
5 NSE 29-53.
6 Jencks, What is Postmodernism? 10, 14. 236
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ents" of our speech which are reinscribed within the sayable, but is 
approached within the midst of the world. According to the paralogy of 
the poet, then, the unpresentable is put forward in the act of presenta­
tion itself, a move which "denies itself the solace of good forms" and 
"searches for new presentations... in order to impart a stronger sense of 
the unpresentable" (81). If, according to Lyotard, the modern form of 
legitimation leads to narcissism and nihilism as the ends of a natural­
istic and deterministic perspective, then postmodern legitimation which 
is indeterminate, on-going, ex-centric could lead to a hopefulness in 
the midst of the limitations of our knowledge and understanding.
In Warren's later work, we find both a similar concern for the 
effect of the unpresentable upon human understanding and a similar dis­
tinction between the homologous word of closure, meaning, formula, and 
Truth and the paralogous word of the poet, which calls upon insight and 
creativity in its ongoing questioning and refusal of nostalgia. The 
poetic word does not work from a stable given but toward what might be 
known as language speaks through the world and through the poem itself.
In a late essay entitled, "The Use of the Past," Warren rejects any 
means of legitimating historical knowledge rooted in the expert's homol­
ogy which would seal off the past as a self-contained and absolute enti­
ty, s His concern precisely for the use of the past bears similarities
;
both to Lyotard's emphasis upon the necessity to tell our "little narra­
tive" {petit récit) and to Charles Jenck's notion of the "paradoxical
in this question is the poet's concern for the character of our knowl­
edge not only of ourselves but also of the world in which we dwell. His 
contempt for tradition as formula also reflects a clear incredulity 
toward that metanarrative of American history which would destroy the 
necessary sense of temporality for living in the world. This contempt 
for the past ironically is bred by a discourse which has envisioned 
America as a new Eden in which "the dimension of space redeemed man from 
the dimension of time" (32).7 This discourse denies the relation of 
the self to time through an ongoing sort of nostalgia for the "Edenic 
moment" (36) of America's founding, "We began our great project with 
the notion that with the past wiped out, perfection and universal pros­
perity were just around the corner" (33). But Warren rejects this sort 
of American idealism which "runs true from Emerson's drip-dry Christian­
ity, with no Blood of the Lamb required, to B.F. Skinner's Walden II" 
(3 3 ).8 Inherent in this line of thinking is a danger of "moral narcis­
sism" ; "If perfection is just around the corner, and we have the blue­
print, the magic word, and a Hot Line to the Most High, who can prevail 
against us?" (33). For Warren, however, the importance of the study of 
the past is not found in any nostalgia by which the past forms the given 
from which the poet or individual may work. Warren rejects such nostal­
gia and argues instead that the past must be worked toward. Only then 
can the past give us a sense of time within which the self may be creat­
ed.
The past must be studied, worked at - in short, created....
There is no absolute, positive past available to us, no mat­
ter how rigorously we strive to determine it - as strive we
must. Inevitably, the past, so far as we know it, is an
1 Compare Spanos' argument about the way modernism in Western literature "is grounded 
in a strategy that spatializes the temporal process of existence" (115). See 
"Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle: Towards a Postmodern Theory ofInterpretation as Dis-closure," 115-148.
9 For a lengthy discussion of Warren's quarrel with Emerson and the tradition of Amer­
ican idealism, see Burt, Robert Penn Warren and American Idealism.
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inference, a creation, and this, without being paradoxical, 
can be said to be its chief value for us. In creating the 
image of the past, we create ourselves, and without that 
task of creating the past we might be said scarcely to exist 
(51).
■i
Warren's remarks about the creation of the self expand his earlier 
notions developed in "A Poem of Pure Imagination," as we saw in the
iprevious chapter. Warren emphasizes here, though, that "the self...is 
never finally created" (51). The act of creation never ceases so that 
knowledge is never completed or totalized. There is, for Warren, no 
finally self-transparent identity of the self which may be found. Rath­
er, the self is formed within the play of difference. "Without differ­
ences, any recognition of identity would be meaningless" (46). We need 
knowledge both of identity and difference, a knowledge which operates 
according to a symbolic understanding within the imagination.
For we need difference and identity, fused in the thing 
created by the imagination, to make us comprehend imagina­
tively our own nature and our own plight....The shifting 
arcades and perspectives of being and fate, the wilderness 
of mirrors, the ever unfolding and fluctuating ratio of 
identity and difference - we need these things in all their 
increasing complexity if we are to pursue the never-ending 
task of knowing the self (46).
We see here a tension within Warren's discourse: though he speaks in
terms of "fusion," this must be understood as an emphasis upon symbolic 
understanding in which identity and difference are not finally resolved 
but are held together without mixture or confusion. Precisely because 
we cannot apprehend the fullness of identity as an infinite concept, the 
imagination falls back into difference, into "the wilderness of mirrors" 
in which there is no clear distinction between discrete object and 
reflection.
Warren's sense of working toward the past and the self helps to
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clarify his notion of continually working toward the unsayable. He 
observes a similar play within the tension of identity and difference in 
the poet's confrontation with the sayable and the unsayable, for it is 
in poetry that we are confronted with these shifting arcades and per­
spectives of being. Poetry presents the increasing complexity and the 
ever unfolding quality of difference which is necessary for understand­
ing, Just as poetry provides a means of pursuing this "never-ending 
task of knowing the self," so it furnishes the moment in which the poet 
may approach the unsayable through a persistent questioning and open­
ness. Such poetry does not achieve closure through form but strives for 
a dis-closure through continual and new presentations of the unpresent­
able. Throughout Warren's later poetry, there is this ongoing repeti­
tion of the moment - not the recollection of some absolute and origi­
nating moment, but the repetition of moments at the borders of our 
experience.9 The word of the poet is that paralogous word which is 
beyond calculation and which functions through questioning to move us as 
readers to the boundaries of being. The poet, then, is that man 
described in Heidegger's "A Dialogue on Language":
Hs Man is the message-bearer of the message which the two- 
fold's unconcealment speaks to him.
Hi Then, man, as the message-bearer of the message of the 
two-fold's unconcealment, would also be he who walks the 
boundary of the boundless.
J: And on this path he seeks the boundary's mystery...
Hi ...which cannot be hidden in anything other than the 
voice that determines and tunes his nature.lo
In Heidegger's vocabulary, the "two-fold" hearkens to what he considered
5 For a discussion of Kierkegaard's distinction between repetition and recollection, 
see Spanos, "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle; Towards a Postmodern 
Theory of Interpretation as Dis-closure," 115-148.
10 Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language" in On the Way to Language, trans. by 
Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), 41. The dialogue is car­
ried on between Heidegger and "a Japanese."
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to be the originating issue of philosophy, that is the difference bet- %
ween being and beings, a difference which is never overcome nor resolved
in identity, 11 Heidegger insists that it is language which defines the t
■J
hermeneutic relation between man and the two-fold as it shows itself in S
1,what he calls "the presence of present-beings" (30). In the apocalyptic
I
moment of the unconcealment of this relation, then, it is language which 
speaks. The poet is the message-bearer who walks along this boundary of 
the boundless which is hidden in language itself. And it is language 
which is the voice that determines and tunes the nature of the poet.
For Heidegger and Warren alike, the poem is this moment of unconcealment 
—  this apocalyptic moment —  which brings us up against that mysterious ir
boundary time and again and reveals to us the boundary of our own death.
This is what Warren considers to be an important use of the past: it
reminds us of our own mortality by telling "us that we, too, shall soon %
be part of the past" (53).
When William Spanos wrote his introductory essay for the volume, %
Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature (1979), he perceived 
that he was writing in a literary critical context still governed by 
"the continuing authority of the formalist interpretive orientation of 
the New Criticism in literary studies and broader semiotic contexts"
(XV). He perceived that even then in 1979 New Critical formalism was 
"an authority in the process of being" and that it was not superseded by 
but was being "theoretically shored up by Structuralist poetics" (xv).
In this context, he describes a postmodern poetics —  schooled in Hei­
degger's concern for time and language —  which is marked by
...experiments in open, or, as I prefer to call them, "dis- 
closive" or "de-structive," forms of much of the most dyna­
mic and powerful contemporary writing; forms whose mastered
:*i.
11 See David Couzens Hoy, "The Owl and the Poet: Heidegger's Critique of Hegel" in iï
MHQL, ed. by William V. Spanos (Bloomington, IN, and London: Indiana University i;
Press, 1979), 64. 240
irony assigns us as readers to ourselves and activates 
rather than nullifies consciousness of being-in-the-world as 
our case (xv).
Although Warren would appear to be associated by contemporary criticism 
with "the formalist interpretive orientation of the New Criticism," his 
later poetry is marked by these very "postmodern" characteristics 
described by Spanos. We have already observed in the last two chapters 
how this poetry becomes "dis-closive" and activates our consciousness of 
being-in-the-world through its pursuit of the unsayable in the language 
of the world and in the Name. As we turn to Warren's final volume. 
Altitudes and Extensions 1980-1984, we continue to encounter these con­
cerns as the poetry presses the boundary of the boundless and self­
consciously brings the matter of the unsayable to the forefront. 12 Here 
we find a poetry which resists closure by persisting in an openness to 
and an expectancy for the speaking of language in its approach to the 
unsayable. It is a poetry of a radically temporalized poetic space. No 
longer does form provide a sufficient solace in the presence of the 
unsayable, nor can structure wrestle time into its boundaries. Instead, 
we find among these poems a poetic which often subverts structure and 
form through what Spanos calls the "generous measure" (xii). It is a 
poetry of "mastered irony" which reveals its own limitations and possi­
bilities, and in so doing, it assigns us as readers to ourselves. This 
is something which Warren emphasized in Democracy and Poetry (1975) and 
reiterated in "The Use of the Past" (1976); the acts of poetic creation 
and of reading poetry enact a plunge into the abyss of the self for poet 
and reader alike. But Warren follows Henri Bergson in suggesting that 
the power of the work is that, in the abyss, it returns us to ourselves.
12 Published as the first section of Warren's final selected volume. New and Selected 
Poems 1923-1985 (1985).
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"into our own presence."i3 within the abyss —  the fissure or RiB, to 
use Heidegger's term —  we find the moment of possibility.i4 Returned 
and assigned, the reader is then engaged in an on-going participation of 
being-in-the-world. is
This poetic is a sort of exploration as a calling into question 
and dis-covering (as an uncovering). It is this searching out activity 
that Heidegger described in "A Dialogue on Language": what we need is
"to give heed to the trails that direct thinking back into the region of 
its source" (37). He emphasizes that these trails may not be found in 
our own attempt. Rather, "I find them only because they are not of my 
own making, and are discernible only quite rarely, like the wind-borne 
echo of a distant call" (37, emphasis his). Warren's later poetics is a 
searching out of these trails which leads back into the region of poet­
ry's source, which is language itself. These trails are not of the 
poet's own making but are announced to him by the voice of the world. 
However, neither do these trails lead back to an "absolute, positive 
past" (Warren's phrase) or an "absolute origin" (Spanos' term); instead, 
these trails are the Holzwege described by Heidegger which lead into 
that forest which is the "region of its source" and soon disseminate 
among the trees.is According to Miller, "a Holzweg is a woodcutter's 
path that goes into the forest and stops, peters out. It is not a way 
to get from here to some definite 'there'."i? The trails are working
13 See Demoaraay and Poetxy 71 and "The Use of the Past" 46.
14 According to J. Hillis Miller, "The RlB is both the cleft of an abyss opening into 
'nothing' (in Heidegger's sense of that word: nothingness as as manifestation of 
Being), and at the same time the sharp incised line, the 'trait' making a design that 
is a meaningful sign, whether letter or picture." Illustration (Cambridge, MA: Har­
vard University Press; London: Reaktion Books, 1992), 87.
15 This sheds some light on the inseparability in Warren's thinking of literature and experience, or language and experience.
1^  Holzwege is the title of the volume in which Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of 
Art" was originally published (1950), together with other essays which included "What 
Are Poets For?".
17 Illustration 84.
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toward what might be revealed as language reveals itself in the poem. 
Throughout warren's poetry, the poet hears and heeds the "wind-borne 
echo of a distant call" of some bird, whether the owl, crow, or whippo- 
will. As we consider several poems from Warren's final volume, we will 
seek to follow him along these trails back to the region of language.
6.2 "Three Darknesses" and the Imaginative Regress
In Warren's final volume, we find poems which lead the reader 
repeatedly to that uneasy edge between the sayable and the unsayable, 
that continually shifting non-site where the process of generation never 
ceases or is overcome. This poetry brings us to the boundary of the 
boundless, or to the eschatia, which is the furthest part of being and 
the verge of understanding. This boundary, though, is not found in some 
indefinite "out there" beyond the concreteness dwelling in the world; 
rather this boundary is found within these concrete actualities. The 
boundless is encountered within the bounds of the bounded. Altitudes 
and Extensions begins with a poem which is perched at this eschatologi- 
cal edge. 18 "Three Darknesses" (AE 3) assigns us as readers to plunge 
in and explore the possibility of our own abyss, confronting the dark­
ness of the abyss from three possible perspectives.is The first poem of 
this sequence is ironic, though, in that it begins at the end, only to
fall back upon the supposed innocence of childhood and memory. The poem
begins at the limit of the poet's thought:
There is some logic here to trace, and I
Will try hard to find it. But even as I begin, I
Remember one Sunday morning, festal with springtime, in 
The zoo of Rome, in a natural, spacious, grassy area,
A bear, big as a grizzly, erect, indestructible.
Unforgiving as God, as rhythmic as
This poem was originally published in Poetry Review 74/4 (1985), 46.
19 See Demooracy and Poetry 71, Compare Spanos's statement regarding his own preface 
to MHQLi "It is intended, that is, as a plunge in the midst: not to inform, but
simply to provide a point of departure for an access into the 'open' hermeneutic cir­
cle" (xvii, emphasis his). 243
A pile-driver - right-left, right-left - 
Slugged at an iron door. The door.
Heavy, bolted, barred, must have been 
The entrance to a dark enclosure, a cave.
Natural or artificial....
The poem begins at both a moment and a place. It brings us to a place 
called "here," which is not located in the zoo of Rome nor in the poet's 
mind but is announced in the poem itself. Here is both everywhere and 
nowhere. This place, however, is not spatially isolated from time, 
locked in timelessness; it is defined temporally as the poetic moment of 
life in the world, what Warren called in his 1977-1980 volume, "being 
here." Within the space of the poetic moment, we are brought to the 
edge of the unpresentable, the end at which the poet hopes to find the 
logic which he might trace out in order to provide a sort of wisdom for 
being in the world. Behind this wilful statement —  "There is some 
logic here to trace..." — • there is a yearning for identity and resolu­
tion, for that final place in which the poet may find the absolute ori­
gin. But as the poet approaches this edge of understanding and experi­
ence, there is the engagement of the self through the imaginative enact­
ment, "...and I / Will try hard to find it. But...." But human effort 
cannot find the essential place beyond space and time; the human imagi­
nation fails to find the final logic. But this failure does not result 
in passivity for the poet but the active engagement in a grasping after 
whatever traces of meaning and truth he might find through his experi­
ence in the world.
As soon as the poet attempts to approach final meaning in identi­
ty, he is thrown back upon difference, and there is an unending deferral 
of meaning. We find in this poem another attempt to name the unname- 
able, a concern we considered in Chapter 5. The poet can neither name
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the logic of his own existence nor name the place in which such a logic 
might be found. But it is the weight of the unnameable which bears so 
heavily upon the poet and the presence of the unsayable which compels 
him to speak. As we saw with the final poem of Being Here, "Passers-by 
On Snowy Night," the poet may not name the logic after which he seeks 
but may only name the journey in which he must continue as he walks in 
the world. This is the poet's giving heed to the trails that direct 
thinking back into the region of its source. He pursues these trails, 
though, not at the outer limit of his logic but in the world. As he 
tries hard to find this logic, he is thrown back into the world to a 
springtime Sunday morning in the zoo of Rome. It is through the poet's 
relation to the world in language that he is able to begin searching out 
the vestige or trace of this logic. Within the world, the unsayable 
announces itself through the rhythmic beating of the bear against the 
iron door.
,,.Minute by minute, near, far.
Wheresoever we wandered; all Sunday morning.
With the air full of colored balloons trying to escape
From children, the ineluctable
Rhythm continues. You think of the
Great paws like iron on iron. Can iron bleed?
Since my idiot childhood the world has been 
Trying to tell me something. There is something 
Hidden in the dark- The bear
Was trying to enter into the darkness of wisdom.
Here we move beyond the conviction that the "world means only itself," 
as Warren asserted in "Riddle in the Garden" {Incarnations 1966-1968) to 
the understanding that "the world declares itself" (Section IV, Audu­
bon) , speaking of its own mystery. The poet must listen for that which 
may be brought to light in the act of poetic creation as the voice of 
language is heard in the midst of the world. It is the sound of the
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bear's slugging against this iron door that follows the poet throughout 
the poem; its sound and rhythm are "ineluctable." He cannot escape the 
repetition of the beating, just as the poet cannot escape the repetition 
of moments in which he presses the boundary or the eschatia. This repe­
tition does not look back, though, but is the forward-looking movement 
generated by a yearning for the other.20 Even so, this confrontation 
with the borders of our knowledge and understanding are inescapable, and 
in this poem the imagination provides the notion of its own failure.
The exploration of the poetic moment in "Three Darknesses: I" fol­
lows the movement of what Kant called the "imaginative regress." In 
"Sublimity and Theatricality: Romantic 'Pre-Postmodernism' in Schiller 
and Coleridge,"21 Linda Marie Brooks examines that aspect of Kant's 
notion of the sublime in which the "reconciling or connecting function 
of the imagination...fails," so that what remains "is the component of 
the imagination that makes no attempt to draw relations, that does not 
connect or reconcile randomness but simply engages it, unordered, in all 
its chaos" (945). While Coleridge's notion of the imagination is dis­
tinct from Kant's formulation, it does bear some important similarities 
to Kant's description of the "imaginative regress." In the moment of 
regress, the imagination is confronted with its own inability to fully 
apprehend the "manifold" character of being or reality and, after halt­
ing this effort to apprehend infinity, the imagination within a single 
moment comprehends multiplicity in such a way that it "is able to con­
tain or circumscribe a type of whole, an entirety in which all the dis­
crete entities of phenomena can be 'intuited,' in Kant's words, to 
'coexist'" (946). Coleridge's description of the imagination and the 
symbol makes it clear that, because the imagination, unlike the fancy.
20 See Richard Jackson, "The Deconstructed Moment in Modern Poetry," Contemporary Lit­
erature XXIII/3 (1982), 319.
21 Modem Language Notes, 105 (1990), 939-964.
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recognizes this limit, the symbol becomes this means of engaging the 
unordered chaos. The symbol is a means by which the poet engages dif­
ference, and if there is to be understanding, then this engagement with 
difference in not only necessary but "ineluctable." This is the pos­
sibility presented by Warren's poetry. But this is not a possibility 
that resides in specific symbols; thus, our concern has not been War­
ren's use of specific symbols throughout his poetry. Rather, the pos­
sibility which his poetry offers rests painfully in the symbolic under­
standing, which is characterized by recurring moments of engaging dif­
ference through imaginative regress.
It is in the symbolic moment that the imagination grasps the mul­
tiplicity of experience. Warren described the imagination in a similar 
way in "A Poem of Pure Imagination": "The symbol affirms the unity of
mind in the welter of experience; it is a device for making the welter 
of experience manageable for the mind - graspable. It represents a 
focus of being and is not a mere sign..." (352). It is important that 
Warren does not speak of the "unity of experience" but instead speaks of 
the "unity of mind" as that moment in which the welter of experience is 
grasped in all its chaos. This moment is, for Warren, "a focus of 
being" in the moment. Coleridge's formulation of the symbol, then, does 
not present a unified whole of apprehended infinity but presents what in 
postmodern discourse is called an aporetic moment: it does not unite
but brings into light the gaps and breakdowns of language and under­
standing. Even here, though, the formulation of the "aporetic moment" 
must be seen as a radically metaphorical construction which grasps at 
the unsayable. It is in this illuminating function that the symbol, for 
Warren and Coleridge, provides a means of thinking theologically through 
the aesthetic encounter with a finite multiplicity. And as Brooks
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points out, following Rudolphe Gasche, "what is seen in this moment of 
imaginative regress is the 'unseeable'" (946).
6.3 "Mortal Limit" - The Boundary of the Boundless
In "Mortal Limit" {AE 6), the second poem of Altitudes and Exten­
sions, Warren continues to explore the way that poetry takes the reader 
to the edge of the abyss in the symbolic moment of grappling with dif­
f e r e n c e .  22 The poet returns in this poem to his familiar territory as 
he envisions the the hawk set against the sunset sky. The limit that 
the poet confronts in this poem is that eschatia of language itself.
I saw the hawk ride updraft in the sunset over Wyoming.
It rose from coniferous darkness, past gray jags 
Of mercilessness, past whiteness, into the gloaming 
Of dream-spectral light about the last purity of snow-snags.
There - west - were the Tetons. Snow-peaks would soon be 
In dark profile to break constellations. Beyond what height 
Hangs now the black speck? Beyond what range will gold eyes see 
New ranges rise to mark a last scrawl of light?
The poem follows the hawk's motion of rising in the first stanza and 
reaching the mortal limit in the second. Within this motion we confront 
the tension of the world, as this moment places us between day and night 
and between darkness and light.23 This is again the moment not of recol­
lection but of repetition. The hawk rises from the "coniferous dark­
ness" of the landscape, floats past the "gray jags" of the mountains, 
and even passes "whiteness" and "purity" before reaching "the gloaming / 
Of dream-spectral light" of the twilit sky. At the peak of its upward 
motion, though, the hawk does not experience the pure identity of 
vision, but it has a view of difference: its vision is bounded by the
horizon of snow-peaks that are discernible because of the their dark 
profile against the star-light. Even the furthest point within this
22 "Mortal Limit" was originally published in the SR 91/4 (1983), 566.
23 Compare the similar sort of motion in "Milton: A Sonnet," NSP 75.
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vision is marked by the scrawl of light.24 As it reaches the moment of 
mortal limit, the hawk finds itself in that place where it might have a 
wider vision, but to remain in this place would mean its death.
Or, having tasted that atmosphere's thinness, does it
Hang motionless in dying vision before
It knows it will accept the mortal limit,
And swing into the great circular downwardness that will restore
The breath of earth? Of rock? Of rot? Of other such
Items, and the darkness of whatever dream we clutch?
This moment of turning is the moment of the "dying vision." in that 
place the atmosphere is thin and tastes not of immortality but of mor­
tality - death. The eschatological moment, then, is a moment which both 
reaches to the uppermost limits and falls into the lowest of depths. It 
can take the reader to the uttermost point where, after all saying has 
ceased, all that can be presented is the unpresentable. And in this 
confrontation there is a returning to a possible new understanding.
This motion toward the eschatia and then falling away back from it is 
similar to what John Burt calls "a simultaneous evasion and experience 
of primary truth" in Warren's poetry (Burt 112), But that truth is what 
may not be named or spoken; it may be known only in death. This is the 
limit which Warren confronted in the unnameable, as we saw in Chapter 
Five. Death is the horizon of being but it is also the ultimate moment 
of ripeness or of turning. It is a fullness which is also a consumma­
tion. 25
The mortal limit confronted by the hawk is the same limit that the 
poet confronts when presented with the unsayable and the unpresentable,
24 Compare the description in Auduhon of the heron's hieroglyphic motion.
25 Ironically, Warren's notion bears a certain similarity not only with Heidegger's 
conoeption of death but also with the aestheticism of Walter Pater, who in Marius the 
Epicurean proposes such a view of death as consummation. This is interesting, too, 
because of the influence of aestheticism, linked as it was with Symbolism, upon the 
origins of Formalism in American literary criticism.
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and like the hawk, the poet too is turned back to "swing in that great
circular downwardness. The hawk does not take what Coleridge called
the salto mortale into some existence beyond "the gloaming / Of dream
spectral light above the last purity of snow-snags," but somersaults
back into the material world. Coleridge wrote in his Notebook of the
tendency for the imagination to continue adding description upon
description "and as if to hide from itself its perpetual failure...it
takes the salto mortale, and vaults at once into the transcendental Idea
of Infinity."2s Brooks argues that Coleridge's notion here is ironic and
that, similar to Kant's notion of the sublime, his notion has in view a
sort of regressive move. She describes Kant's notion in this way:
Instead of soaring upward in some transcendental flight 
toward the "supersensible," toward some immaterial "truth" 
decreed by Reason as the "ground" of thought - Wholeness,
Unity, Coexistence and the like, as Kant had expected - the 
subject vaults, in a kind of regressive somersault or salto 
mortale, into the non-rational "substrate" or incomprehensi­
ble materiality of the negative sublime (949).
The poet's vision is not some soaring flight into the transcendental or 
into identity, but it is a dying vision which confronts his own finite 
existence with the insurmountability and intractability of the world in 
which he walks. In such a vision of the poet's vision, then, what is 
the substance of poetry itself? It is the radical materiality of life 
found in the concreteness of language. And it is this experience of his 
own limit at his own death and in the death of language that provides 
the grounds for his speaking in the world. It is a vision not of the
blessedness of immateriality but of the possibility of understanding
rooted in materiality. In Warren's vision, this salto mortale can be 
restorative within the fallen and finite experience of reader and poet,
but there are limits to what can be restored. What is restored to the
26 CN III.4047; see also Brooks, "Sublimity and Theatricality" 950-51.
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liawk is the breath of earth, rock, rot, and other elements of this dark­
ness in which we live. Among these concrete elements of a fallen world, 
the poet must find traces of the unpresentable and vestiges of the 
unsayable. In this way the eschatological moment in Warren's poetry is 
also an apocalyptic moment; at the borders there is a pulling back of 
the veil so that we see our experience for what it is, even if that is 
"the darkness of whatever dream we clutch."
"Mortal Limit" also illustrates another critical shift in Warren's 
understanding of poetry and language. While modernist poetry would not 
deny or reject these claims about the unpresentable or the mortal limit, 
it functions according to a formalism in which poetic structure might 
erase the boundary of the unsayable so that there might be the communi­
cation of truth. However, in this poem the poet rejects any effort to 
try to traverse this mortal limit by attempting to cancel it through 
word-play or poetic structure. He refuses the nostalgia of good forms 
which would contain truth through statements about language and the 
unsayable. But this would only be a transgression of the limit. Warren 
manifests the poet's confrontation with the "mortal limit" of language 
even in the formal structure of the poem by allowing content to subvert 
form. In effect, Warren defamiliarizes the familiar form of the sonnet. 
The poem follows the pattern of an Elizabethan sonnet in its rhyme 
scheme and in its division into quatrains, and yet this use of the son­
net form displays the poet's mastered irony: this "constructive" struc­
ture designed for the communication of meaning is not able to sustain 
the poem as it becomes de-structive and collapses in on itself. The 
language here is what it says it is; the mortal limit. Rather than 
ending with a final conclusion to the problem raised, the poem ends with 
a dark question that returns us to ourselves. The form is deceptive;
25 1
though there is the positive element in the rhyming of the lines, this 
is subverted by the question that the poet asks. Here Warren uses form 
as a negative means of communication, turning upside down the concern 
among early Formalists and Symbolists "with form as a viable communica­
tive instrument. "27 if warren's use of the sonnet form is an instance 
of the sublime, then it is a presentation of the negative sublime. The 
presentation of the unpresentable is not attempted through supplying 
what Lyotard calls "the missing contents." Rather, it is only present 
in its absence, named only as the unnameable. The mortal limit remains.
In light of the claims that Warren makes about the act of poetic 
creation, we may make certain concomitant claims about the act of read­
ing. Reading takes us to that place of the dying vision where the 
atmosphere is thin and we stand motionless before the mortal limit. We 
are taken to the verge of our understanding and ability. In this act of 
reading we are confronted with a paradox: in death do we find life, in
the emptying of ourselves do we find fullness. The poem returns us to 
ourselves by bringing us as readers to the edge of this abyss and read­
ing becomes a plunge into this abyss. But Warren does not see this 
plunge as being nihilistic; rather it offers the possibility of the cel­
ebration of life itself. As in the act of poetic creation, the symbolic 
moment in our reading is one that simultaneously shapes and dissolves, 
or, to borrow another phrase from Coleridge, one that "fixing unfixes . "28 
This eschatological moment is also an apocalyptic one in which what is 
buried may be uncovered, and in this uncovering there is a celebration 
of life. The dying vision has the power to give new life to our under­
standing. Upon this view of reading, though, it is not the reader who 
operates upon the text, but it is the text which "reads" the reader.
27 Hawkes, Structujrallsm and Semiotlas 60.
28 CN III.4066.
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Warren states this more explicitly in "A Poem of Pure Imagination":
...we may say that the reader does not interpret the poem 
but the poem interprets the reader. We may say that the 
poem is the light and not the thing seen by the light. The 
poem is the light by which the reader may view and review 
all the areas of experience with which he is acquainted 
(347).
The reading of poetry, then, becomes this simultaneous and paradoxical 
moment of blessing and cursing which Warren observed in the poet's act 
of creation in The Ancient Mariner, To have your experience interpreted 
by the poem necessarily involves both a blessing and a cursing, that is, 
a consecration of life in the world and an affliction of the knowledge 
of the reader's own fallen and finite ability. In the apocalypse of 
reading, there is an unveiling of the incommensurate relationship of our 
yearning to our ability; our yearning far outweighs our ability. But it 
is an activity that calls for response as well; in the apocalyptic qual­
ity there is an implied ethic, a call to live willfully and not passive­
ly. So, Warren says in Democracy and Poetry that poetry "demands par­
ticipation" through "imaginative enactment" (89). Poetry is symbolic in 
its call for the reader to participate through a sort of sacramental 
engagement.
6.4 The Whole Question of Language
The significance of Warren's contribution toward contemporary 
thought about language and poetics does not lie in his having formed a 
new linguistic philosophy or in the claim to have developed a new prin­
ciple of poetic creation. Rather the significance is found in his 
poetry itself and in the way that it calls into question our notions of 
language and our understanding of "being here" in the world. The symbo­
lic vision of his poetry suggests certain possible ways of thinking that 
challenge and engage the reader with the unsayable. In "The Whole Ques­
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tion " (AjE 54), the poet calls for a thorough questioning of "the whole
question" of existence-29
You'll have to rethink the whole question. This 
Getting born business is not as simple as it seemed.
Or midwife thought, or doctor deemed. It is.
Time shows, more complicated than either - or you - ever dreamed.
If it can be said that you dreamed anything 
Before what's called a hand slapped blazing breath 
Into you, snatched your dream's lulling nothing­
ness into what Paul called the body of this death.
You had not, for instance, provisioned this terrible thing called
love.
Which began with a strange, sweet taste and bulbed softness while 
Two orbs of tender light leaned there above.
Sometimes your face got twisted. They called it a smile.
We find a similar movement here as in "Three Darknesses: I"; the poet
begins at the end, at the edge of the boundless. But after voicing his 
sense of urgent need "to rethink the whole question," there is a similar 
motion of imaginative regress: from the ultimate question, that of
being, the poet does not make the death leap into the infinite but is 
thrown back upon the concrete materiality of existence within space and 
time. The poet finds, however, that the question of being leads him to 
the question of language. To rethink what is real leads one to the 
source of understanding the real, which is language in all of its con­
creteness. So Warren explores here the inadequacies and possibilities 
of language. On the one hand, it is the limitations of language which 
make it necessary to rethink the whole question. Throughout the poem, 
the speaker highlights the ways that we use language to try to nail down 
concepts of being, but he recognizes that language cannot be nailed down 
in order to fulfill his yearning for a final answer. In the second
29 This poem was originally Published in the American Poetry Review 11/6 (1982), 47, together with "You Sort Old Letters" (uncollected).
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stanza, he alludes to "what Paul called the body of this death"
(emphasis mine). In the third, he speaks of "this terrible thing called
.
love" and describes how the infant's twisted face is "called" a smile 
(emphasis mine). In these early stanzas, the poet is calling into ques­
tion the ability of language to provide an adequate understanding of 
experience in the world by raising the problematic of referentiality.
The poet's emphasis upon naming and calling has to do with the referen­
tial quality of language, but reference does not answer the question 
that he is asking. There is the sense in each of these statements that 
the reference always goes wide of the mark. The poet has a deep sense 
of the hamartia of language in its fallen and finite c o n d i t i o n . 3 o  in 
light of the instability of reference, one cannot, then, attempt to 
understand his being in the world by virtue of vocabulary or diction.
The accumulation of words still leaves you with nothing:
You noticed how faces from outer vastness might twist, too.
But sometimes different twists, with names unknown.
And there were noises with no names you knew.
And times of dark silence when you seemed nothing - or gone.
Years passed, but sometimes seemed nothing except the same.
You knew more words, but they were words only, only - 
Metaphysical midges that plunged at the single flame 
That centred the infinite dark of your skull; or lonely,
You woke in the dark or real night to hear the breath 
That seemed to promise reality in the vacuum 
Of the sleepless dream beginning when underneath 
The curtain dawn seeps, and on wet asphalt wet tires hum.
Though the speaker may know more words, he cannot avoid the "times of 
dark silence" in which the presence of nothing announces to him the 
weightlessness of such accumulation of words. This negative presence
30 Compare Bloom's statement ; "We are given a poetic art that dares constantly the 
root meaning of hamartia: to shoot wide of the mark." "Sunset Hawk: Warren's Poetryand Tradition" 73.
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persists through the years under the realization that words are only 
words. In this instance language collapses in its own apocalypse as it 
plunges "at the the single flame" of the mind. This sense of nothing, 
though, is countered by the seeping in of the dawn light and the humming 
of the tires.
There is in this poem a clear refusal to become nostalgic about 
language and experience. One way the poet could answer his "whole ques­
tion" would be to invoke the expert's homology - to return to Lyotard's 
terms - by which he could then make the move to absolutizing thought, 
especially thought about language. This would then be a return to the 
logocentrism of metaphysics. But such a return would have the effect of 
destroying experience. To absolutize would end in death. Coleridge 
makes a similar point in his reading of Schelling, rejecting the way in 
which Schelling makes nature absolute by reducing multeity to that which 
may be thought rather than remaining at the level of the imagination. 
Coleridge writes, "It cannot be thought - the thought would destroy, 
annihilate. Annihilation of all reality would be the consequence" {CN 
4449). It is the imagination, though, that can grasp in the symbolic 
moment the plenitude of multeity without annihilating it in an absolu­
tizing thought. But this moment is not the timeless and ego-centric 
measure of an earlier modernist poetics but is the moment in which the 
self is decentered in what Spanos calls "the ec-centric measure of mor­
tality" (xiv). Even so, Warren here brings us to the edge of the abso­
lute without jumping into an absolutizing language and can only fall 
back on the limitations of language. There is in this poem a movement 
toward a sort of Heideggerian overcoming of metaphysics. The poet is 
denied access to a metaphysics of language as a presence which secures 
and defines reference between our words and our experience. What is not
256
available to him is an. "aesthetics that is grounded in metaphysics."3i
'5.1
"
However, Joan Stambaugh notes in her translation of Heidegger's 
essay, "Overcoming Metaphysics," that "overcoming" has the sense of 
incorporating instead of defeating or leaving behind: "Thus, to over­
come metaphysics would mean to incorporate metaphysics, perhaps with the 
hope, but not with the certainty, of elevating it to a new reality."32 
Warren's vision has overcome his earlier formalistic concerns and sug­
gests a certain amount of hope for the possibilities of language and 
articulation. By confronting the limitations of language, he avoids the 
annihilation which a nostalgia for a sort of innocent, Adamic language
would entail. His hope, though, is precisely a poetic hope, that poetry
can provide the moment of a possible means of recovery through language.
Such a recovery would not be a recapturing of a lost linguistic 
innocence, nor would it be a mere rehabilitation of our own fallen lan­
guage. The recovery would come from the power of fallen language to 
bring us to the edge of the unpresentable and to provide, in Warren's 
vision, a sort of momentary but real redemption. The hope that pervades 
his final stanza is not simply ironic -- although it certainly involves 
paradox —  but it is a hope vested in poetry itself.
Yes, you must try to rethink what is real. Perhaps
It is only a matter of language that traps you. You
May yet find a new one in which experience overlaps
Words. Or find some words that make the Truth come true.
As the previous stanzas have revealed, it is precisely the limitations 
of language that traps us and bars us from the absolute and the pure 
origin of identity. It is language which obstructs any final rethinking 
of the real. But such a situation does not negate the necessity to try
to rethink what is real, for it is language which offers the possibility
31 Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," 42.
32 Martin Heidegger, "Overccaning Metaphysics" in The End of Philosophy , trans. by 
Joan Stambaugh (London: Souvenir Press, 1975), 84.257
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and. the hope of being brought back again and again to the unsayable
which makes speaking or articulation possible. Warren's hope here seems
to point again to the consummating and apocalyptic moment of death in
which we will find that language "in which experience overlaps / Words."
In that moment, we will find that death is the word which makes "the
Truth come true. "33 There must be a continuation to speak even within
the confines of a fallen language. What the poet has learned is that he
may no longer speak about language. Heidegger makes this point in "A
Dialogue on Language":
Hi Speaking about language turns language almost inevitably 
into an object.
Ji And then its reality vanishes.
Hi We then have taken up a position about language, instead 
of hearing from it,
J % Then there would only be a speaking from language..,
Hi ...in this manner, that it would be called from out of 
language's reality, and be led to its reality (50-51).
The danger of letting language become an object of our thought and 
speech is that our understanding of reality - not simply the reality of 
language - vanishes, for both Warren and Heidegger presuppose that lan­
guage defines the relation of our being in the world. But the position 
of the poet must be one of humility in which he listens to language and 
he speaks from its reality so that he might be led back to the region of 
the source of thinking. In this way, Heidegger calls for the very thing 
that Warren yearns for: saying, in the sense of letting language show 
itself, letting it appear and shine, letting it insinuate itself in the 
articulation of the poet.34
6.5 Myth of Mountain Sunrise and the Agony of the Poet
In the final poem of Altitudes and Extensions, "Myth of Mountain
33 Compare Robert Penn Warren, Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce (New York: Random House,1983), 5-5.
34 See "A Dialogue on Language," 47.
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Sunrise" {AE 85), Warren seems to have heard that wind-borne call of the 
voice of the world and to have followed the trail announced by that call 
back to the region of poetry's source-35 He comes in these lines to a 
moment of articulation, that moment toward which the poet has striven. 
But in this moment, it is not so much the poet who speaks as it is lan­
guage itself. This poem opens up the time of language's own saying in 
which it brings to light truth in the event of its own speaking.
Frances Bixler helpfully points out Warren's careful placement of this 
final poem in New and Selected Poems after one entitled, "Sunset," sug­
gesting that they appear to be "companion poems" which elucidate War­
ren's characteristic dark/light contrast.36 m  each poem we find our­
selves at the borders of experience as Warren continues to overturn our 
notions of beginning and ending. Whereas the first two poems of this 
collection brought us, as a beginning, to the end of logic ("Three Dark­
nesses: I") and to the edge of the day at sunset ("Mortal Limit"), so 
here we find the poet bringing us to an ending in "Sunset" which is 
overturned by an apocalyptic beginning in "Myth of Mountain Sunrise." 
However, the more striking contrast between the two poems is found in 
the distinction between the poet's striving to speak his own name in 
"Sunset" ("Who knows his own name at the last? / How shall he speak to a 
soul that has none?") and the outward bulging and announcing character 
of language itself in "Myth of Mountain Sunrise," In the former poem, 
we overhear the yearning of the poet for a way to speak, for a place in 
which he can articulate his own being. He longs to know his name so 
that he might speak "in a dire hour," and yet this name appears as the
35 This poem was originally published published in the New England Review and Bread 
Loaf Quarterly 6/3 (1984), 418, together with "Arizona Midnight" {AE 15), "Winter 
Wheat Oklahoma" (AE 67), and "Instant on Crowded Street."
36 See "Robert Penn Warren's Varied Voices: An Approach to the Late Poems" in 'To
Love the World So Well ' : A Festschrift in Honor of Robert Penn Warren, ed- by Dennis
L. Weeks (New York; Peter Lang, 1992), 95.
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unpresentable- But this contrast is made clear in the absence of the 
poet's "I" in the latter poem. The cry voiced in "Myth of Mountain Sun­
rise" comes from language through the world.
Prodigious, prodigal, crags steel-ringing 
To dream-hoofs nightlong, proverbial
Words stone-incised in language unknowable, but somehow singing 
Their wisdom-song against disaster of granite and all 
Moonless non-redemption on the left hand of dawn:
The mountain dimly wakes, stretches itself on windlessness. Feels
its deepest chasm, waking, yawn.
In the sunrise, there is an uncovering of a space in which the poet may 
approach the unsayable as he discerns the saying of language in the 
voice of the world. The poet finds that this concrete saying gives what 
he is unable to speak about. This is not a language posited upon refer­
ence or representation but upon the power of language itself in the 
function of the pure imagination, what Coleridge called the verbal imag­
ination. This poem does not refer to any single mountain or to some 
extra-verbal notion of mountain-ness; rather, it creates and transfig­
ures a world as a possibility. This is a poem of concrete images in 
which the language is what it says.
In this prodigious and prodigal poem, we are brought to a sacra­
mental moment in which the language, the reader, and experience partici­
pate together in this striving toward the unnameable. We are reminded 
of the similar beginning of Audubon, in which the artist sees
Eastward and over the cypress swamp, the dawn.
Redder than meat, break;
And the large bird.
Long neck outthrust, wings crooked to scull air, moved 
In a slow calligraphy, crank, flat, and black against 
The color of God's blood spilt, as though 
Pulled by a string (I[A]}.
The calligraphy of the heron inscribed upon God's spilt blood is trans-
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fomed here in "Myth of Mountain Sunrise" into the wisdom-song of joy 
sung by the mountain. Just as the heron in Audubon appears to be writ­
ing what has already been written, so Warren presents here the vision of 
a language already written and already spoken in the concrete existence 
of the mountain. The mountain is brought into being by "proverbial/ 
Words stone-incised in language unknowable...." In this mountain we see 
what Coleridge called the coinherence of act and being.37 But this coin­
herence sustains a tension between the sayable and the unsayable; these 
crags of the mountain are etched out in a "language unknowable" but they 
are "somehow singing / Their wisdom-song...." The poet is a witness to 
that audible song which eludes his comprehension, which cannot be 
reduced to thought. Even the song of the mountain participates in a 
sort of imaginative regress which cannot transcend the agony of the fal­
len creation nor does it lift its voice beyond, but it is uttered 
against and amidst the disaster and non-redemption. The song is a nega­
tive utterance "against disaster of granite and all / Moonless non­
redemption on the left hand of dawn." In this tension the act of speak­
ing and the condition of being inhere in the same moment; if the poet 
questions the one, then he must question the other.
In the second section we find a similar sort of yearning as in 
"Sunset," but here it is the agony of the mountain's inwardness which 
"strives dayward," as darkness moving toward light.
The curdling agony of interred dark strives dayward, in stone
strives though
No light here enters, has ever entered but
In ageless age of primal flame. But look! All mountains want slow­
ly to bulge outward extremely. The leaf, whetted on light, will
cut
Air like butter. Leaf cries; "I feel my deepest filament in dark
rejoice,
I know that the density of basalt has a voice."
37 See CTÏ IV.4644.
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However, inasmuch as the language is what it says -- that is, if we can­
not divide the mountain from the language in the poem —  it is language 
that participates in this agony of outwardness; language strives in its 
own "curdling agony of interred dark," wanting to slowly bulge outward. 
Even the poet's line cannot contain this outward bulging, as the word 
"slowly" breaks into pieces within the text's terrain. The mountain's 
yearning is given voice in the cry of the leaf, which, being one with 
the mountain and earth, feels its "deepest filament" rejoice in the dark 
agony of the mountain. The leaf "whetted on light," however, does not 
rejoice in that light but in the consummation of the mountain's striving 
in its own entrance into the brightness of dawn. The agony and the 
voice of the mountain find their destiny in the cry of the leaf; "I 
know that the density of basalt has a voice." But, if what is envi­
sioned here is the yearning of language itself, then where does the 
agony and voice of language find its destiny? Language finds its des­
tiny in the agony and voice of the poet, who feels his "deepest filament 
in dark rejoice" and who knows the density of the darkness within lan­
guage. The poet perceives how language resists being contained within 
thought but wants to give outness to thought; he knows the slow but 
extreme outward bulging of language. And, like the leaf, the poet cries 
out in the midst of the world.
This is the poet's passion, as we discussed in Chapter Three. The 
poet carries with him the agony of words and of language, which is dis­
played in a simultaneous burden and hope. Like the Mariner of Coler­
idge's poem, the poet seeks that place of articulation which is rooted 
in a "woful agony." The agony of language is inescapable, though, if 
one is to be able to speak; just as the agony provided for the Mariner 
the "strange power of speech," so for the poet it provides his moment of
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rejoicing which is the moment of a r t i c u l a t i o n . 38 The burden of this 
agony is its insatiable quality; language will ever strive outward. But 
it is the agony which continually inspires the poet; i t  is his life.
But, the agony affords a moment of hope and possibility as well. Like 
the Mariner, the poet finds himself bearing the possibility of bringing 
the word of salvation which cannot save himself.
In the final section of "Myth of Mountain Sunrise," the poet turns
to the powerful effect of this outward movement from dark to light.
How soon will the spiderweb, dew-dappled, gleam
In Pompeian glory! Think of a girl-shape, birch-white sapling,
rising now
From ankle-deep brook-stones, head back-flung, eyes closed in
first beam.
While hair - long, water-roped, part curve, coign, sway that no
geometries know -
Spreads end-thin, to define fruit-swell of haunches, tingle of
handhold.
The sun blazes over the peak. That will be the old tale told.
It is not simply the leaf which rejoices in the midst of the light, but
now it is the spiderweb that is also whetted on light as it gleams "In 
Pompeian glory." Bixler points out the irony of this phrase; "Dashing 
the reader against the stern memory of what happened to mortals at Pom­
peii, the poet acknowledges his mortality— .Human existence is, indeed, 
most fragile and most ephemeral" (96). But the poet seems to be consid­
ering more than his own mortality here, as the images of the spiderweb 
and the "birch-white sapling" imply. What is in view here is the para­
doxical moment of consummation which is both violent and lovely. The 
consummation of the "glory" of Pompeii consists in the extreme outward 
bulging of the lava through the basalt and the crust of earth and in its 
eruption, that is, its striving into daylight. This eruption is an out­
growth of the "ageless age of primal flame." The eruption participates
38 Compare the leaf in the poem.
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in the outward bulging of language. The image of the Pompeian glory 
also coalesces with the image of sexual consummation and climax; the 
"girl-shape, birch-white sapling" flings its head back with eyes closed 
while hair falls in such a way as "to define fruit-swell of haunches, 
tingle of hand-hold." This consummation, however, eludes the coign of 
fundamental perspective and the knowledge of geometry. It is a consum­
mation found only in the blazing light over the peak. It may not be 
reduced or translated. And it is this irreducible moment which "will be 
the old tale told."
The tale which is told is the myth of the mountain's sunrise. In 
"John Crowe Ransom; A Study in Irony" (1935), Warren summarizes Ran­
som's use of the term "myth" into a working definition for his essay; 
"myth represents a primary exercise of sensibility in which thought and 
feeling are one: it is a total communication. "39 His notion of myth in
this latest poem, though, would appear to have retained the concern for 
the "primary exercise of sensibility" while rejecting the possibility of 
total communication. By virtue of the sacramental quality of the vision 
intimated in this poem, we may consider this primary and irreducible 
tale as the logos. Coleridge proposed that the logos consists in a 
coinherence of act and being and forms the grammatical correspondent of 
the absolute I AM of the Jewish and Christian scriptures.40 Warren, how­
ever, seems to find in this poem not the equivalent of the I AM as a 
total communication but the trace of the unsayable after which he sought 
in "Three Darknesses." He has not found a final logic which will pro­
vide the archimedean point from which he may rethink the whole question 
of being; rather he has found a trace of the power and energy of lan­
guage through the act of poetic creation which enables thought to begin.
39 Virginia Quarterly Review XI (Winter 1935), 93-112,
40 CN IV.4644.
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He has not been able to finally define the appropriate relation between 
mind and nature,4i but he has caught a glimpse of the energy which might 
possibly speak to the condition of man's being in the world. His notion 
of the logos here follows Heidegger's use of the term: an overcoming
return to the logos not as absolute presence but as legeln, saying. And 
in this movement there is a return not to Truth but to truth which 
uncovers what has been forgotten. Palmer states that for Heidegger,
;"The concept of truth...is not a matter of correspondence to an already 
perceived nature of a thing; it is a matter of placing that thing in the 
light of understanding for the first time."42 Truth is an event of
:
being, and the moment of that event is, for Warren, the saying of lan­
guage in the poem, in which language shows itself to be that "shaping, 
projecting, light-shedding structure in which every extant thing is 
'announced' in a certain way as it is 'seen'" (Palmer 82). Warren makes 
a similar point in "A Poem of Pure Imagination" when he says that "the 
poem is the light and not the thing seen by the light. The poem is the 
light by which the reader may view and review all the areas of experi­
ence with which he is acquainted" (347). Warren's vision seems to have 
found the moment - the eschatia - from which he may speak, a site which 
avoids definition and is continually shifting, but one in which the 
logos of "the old tale told" provides the space and time for the symbo­
lic understanding. The logos as an understanding of the power and 
nature of language provides a means of interpreting. Warren's vision is 
that of a logos which circumvents logocentricity. No longer founded 
upon the notion of absolute presence in language or upon the idea of 
final identity, this vision of the logos opens itself to new possibili­
ties in which presence and absence mingle and in which meaning recedes
41 See McNiece, The Knowledge that Endures 2.
42 Palmer, "The Postmodernity of Heidegger" 82.
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just over the horizon of your sight.
In the end, Warren's search for and yearning after the given of
'later' what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impos­
sible" (441, emphasis his). In Warren's notion of logos, we find this
1
language brought him back in the end to the source of poetry itself. |
However, his logos cannot be reduced to the name or the concept, as
such, of this given. Rather, it names the ongoing reading of and 
responding to the tale. In his seminal essay, "Différance," Jacques 
Derrida writes of this notion which "is neither a word nor a concept"
(441). He states that the term both "indicates difference as distinc­
tion, inequality, or discernibility" and "expresses the interposition of
delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until |4
!deferral of the possible which is presently impossible. Derrida expands 5
this tension later in this essay as he expounds his reading of Heideg­
ger's 1946 text, "Der Spruch des Anaximander." In the context of that
discussion, Derrida writes,
'Older' than Being itself, our language has no name for such #
a difference. But we 'already know' that if it is unname- 
able, this is not simply provisional; it is not because our 
language has still not found or received this name, or 
because we would have to look for it in another language, 
outside the finite system of our language. It is because 
there is no name for this, not even essence or Being —  not 
even the name 'difference', which is not a name, which is 
not a pure nominal unity, and continually breaks up in a
chain of different substitutions (463).
Though language is for the poet that given toward which he works, it 
remains unnameable. The poet never becomes the master of language.
What is called for, though, is a new conception of language which is 
affirmed in the play of différance. What is not available to the poet 
is a nostalgia for an Adamic language, or as Derrida puts it, "the myth
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of the purely maternal or paternal language belonging to the lost 
fatherland of thought" (463). However, Derrida affirms that on the 
other side of nostalgia there may be what he calls "Heideggerian hope" 
in "the guest for the proper word and the unique name" (463, emphasis 
mine). This quest, following Heidegger's trails back to the region of 
thought, is carried on through persistent questioning. Heidegger 
states.
Thus, in order to name what is deployed in Being, language 
will have to find a single word, the unique word. There we 
see how hazardous is every word of thought that addresses 
itself to Being. What is hazarded here, however, is not 
something impossible, because Being speaks through every 
language; everywhere and always (4 6 3-6 4 ).43
Warren's later poetry takes up this hazardous quest after the 
unique word with all the joy of the poet's persistent, active engagement 
with language. It is a joyful labor, for in the moment of poetic crea­
tion the poet hears the voice of being speak in language. Like the Mar­
iner of Coleridge's poem, the poet's heart burns with a mixture of joy 
and agony as he encounters this "strange power of speech." It is joy 
which sustains him in the quest and joy which rejoices to return to the 
region of the source of thought - language itself. For language is the 
poet's own country.44 When the poet has the vision of his country, he 
experiences joy as language speaks in the midst of silence and the 
silence sinks like music on his heart.45 But the silence does not negate 
the poet's role as a witness to the unpresentable.46 Rather, as Heideg-
43 Derrida's translation in "Differance."
44 See Coleridge, The Ancient Mariner 11. 464-467.
45 See Coleridge, The Ancient Mariner 11. 478, 80, 98-99. Compare one of Warren's
earlier poem's, "Joy" {You, Emperors, and Others: Poems 1957-1960 [I960], 76):
If you've never had it, discussion is perfectly fruitless.
And if you have, you can tell nobody about it.
To explain silence, you scarcely try to shout it.
Let the flute and drum be still, the trumpet footless.
46 See Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 82.
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ger suggests, such silence remains the constant prologue to the authen­
tic saying of l a n g u a g e . 47 silence characterizes and distinguishes the 
poet's testimony: no longer is he speaking about language but letting
language speak in order to return the reader in its light to the world 
in which he dwells.
6.6 Wrestling with the Angel
For Warren, the returning of the reader is one of the effects of
the pure imagination which operates in poetry. The illuminating quality 
of language makes the reader a creative being, as it brings him within 
the poetic moment to the place where language speaks. Neither the poem 
nor language are final or complete; both bear the scar of the Fall in 
that fissure into which poet and reader alike are thrown. But from that 
fissure, in the moment of the poem, there comes a shining forth of 
truth. Warren seems to adhere to a notion of truth similar to that of 
Heidegger, for whom truth was a-letheia, a revelation which brings the 
truth into the o p e n . 48 Truth is an event of uncovering the quest after 
language and of overcoming the forgetfulness which obstructs our being 
in the world. The poem then becomes a moment of possible authenticity 
for the reader, calling him to actively engage in the being of the world 
about him. 49 The poem moves the reader in a yearning "toward truth as 
experience" ("The Use of the Past" 48) so that he might continue the
constant work of understanding the self in the world.
When the poet comes into his own country of language, he may not 
take his repose, as if he has conquered language and brought it within 
his mastery. Rather, he must continue to grapple within this sphere of 
language with language. There is no point outside of language from 
which he may gain an advantage on it; he is instead always within its
47 "Ai Dialogue on Language" 53.
48 See J. Hillis Miller, Illustration 79.
49 Compare Stanley Corngold, "Sein and Zeit: Implications for Poetics" 112,
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boundaries. In two late texts, Warren probes this notion of the poet in
active engagement with language through the image of Jacob wrestling
with the angel in the desert night. In a poem entitled "Dream" {NT 29),
the poet affirms the necessity of this struggle:
Yes, grapple - or else the Morning Star 
Westward will pale, and leave 
Your ghost without history even, to wander 
A desert trackless in sun-glare.
For the dream is only a self of yourself - and Jacob
Once wrestled, nightlong, his angel and, though
With wrenched thigh, had blackmailed a blessing, by dawn.
In "The Use of the Past," Warren makes a statement which appears as his 
own interpretation of this poem, considering specifically the self of 
the writer.
He is like Jacob, who wrestled the angel all night in the 
place to be called Peniel and, though at the break of day he 
received the mystic wound in the thigh, would not let go of 
the mysterious stranger until he had exacted the blessing he 
craved and could say that he had "seen God face to face"
(47).
Both of these passages provide a vital image of the inescapable confron­
tation between the poet and the other of language. On the one hand it 
is a violent meeting submerged in darkness which ends in Jacob's being 
wounded. On the other, this is a critical moment of blessing, exacted 
by Jacob's tenacious hold upon the stranger. That blessing, we learn in 
Genesis 32, is his name: "Your name will no longer be Jacob, but
Israel, because you have struggled with God and with men and have over­
come" (32.28). But when Jacob asks the stranger to tell him his name, 
to identify himself, his request is denied. The wound that Jacob 
receives when his thigh is wrenched by the angel —  what Warren calls 
the "mystic wound" — - would appear, in Warren's vision, to be "the
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strange power of speech" {Ancient Mariner 1. 587). This is a wound that 
is never healed but is opened afresh in every poetic act, for every poem 
is a moment of struggling and of wrestling, who is the angel with whom 
the poet wrestles, though? in "Dream," Warren intimates that the angel 
is "only a self of yourself." In "The Use of the Past," he identifies 
the mysterious stranger as God, whom Jacob saw face to face. On one 
level, these are the very things that Warren's poetry has sought after: 
an understanding of the self and of God. He has tirelessly dealt with 
the agony of being in the world as a means toward finally being able to 
know the self and to love God.so But, on another level, these concerns 
of the poet cannot be separated from his unending confrontation with 
language.
The poet's yearning pursuit of language cannot avoid the ongoing 
wrestling with its accompanying agony. This agonistic wrestling is the 
heart of poetry as the poet finds himself bound by the tension of the 
world, which is the tension between identity and difference, and bearing 
the pain of finite language yearning to express the infinite. The poet 
must grapple if he is to work toward the given and the unsayable.
Poetry is, then, an antidote for passivity, as Warren asserts in Democ­
racy and Poetry.51 it involves activity and engages the pure imagina­
tion. But this activity is not merely the assertion of the poet's own 
will. Like Jacob as he wrestled the angel, the poet must grapple even 
as he is grappled with. The pure imagination curses the poet with its 
mark of the Fall. But, even as it curses, so it blesses the poet. Lan­
guage gives of itself; or, as Heidegger said, language speaks and in its 
speaking it bids the poet to enter into the tension (difference) of the
50 See "Masts at Dawn" {NSP 236). See also Warren's comments in Talking 243 and our discussion of this passage in Chapter Four.
51 See p. 89.
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w o r l d . 52 This is the blessing craved by the poet in his yearning toward 
the other of language.
52 See Martin Heidegger, "Language" in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 206-10.
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Postscript
"There's worse, I guess, than in the end to offer 
Your last bright keepsake, some fragment of the vase 
That held your hopes, to offer it to a child.
And the child took the crazy toy, and laughed."i
In this thesis, I have asserted that Robert Penn Warren's under­
standing of language shifted in his later poetry away from a concern for 
the poetic use of language and toward a preoccupation with the problem­
atic nature of language, which he perceived to be an unresolvable ten­
sion between its limit and its power, or between the sayable and the 
unsayable. Following Coleridge, Warren held that language is the living 
power and agent by which the imagination functions not only in the act 
of poetic creation but also in any enactment of being in the world, by 
which I mean the exercise of the conscious will in the creative engage­
ment with the world. By language, Warren did not conceive, though, of 
simply a linguistic system made up of signifiers detached from that 
which is signified. Rather, like Heidegger, he understood language as 
that which speaks and declares the condition of our being in the world. 
And, as we have shown, his poetry suggests that the poet may speak only 
after he has listened to the speaking of language itself, which Warren 
apprehended in the voice of the world. The poet's experience with lan­
guage, though, is marked by his continual confrontation with the limit 
of the sayable and by his desire for some means of articulation within 
that limit. His hope is not that he will be able to say the unsayable 
but that the unsayable will be spoken by the voice of language itself.
Warren's poetic vision was rooted in his concern with poiesis
itself, with the act of creation. His understanding of this concept, vi
1 BD 79 22.
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though, moves beyond any static definition which focuses attention 
simply upon what is created. For Warren, poiesis is not merely the mak­
ing of an object, constructed out of the material of language so that 
the poem becomes either a "verbal icon" or a "well wrought urn."
Instead, his emphasis repeatedly falls upon the act of creation: poie­
sis becomes as much a matter of doing as a matter of making, and lan­
guage itself becomes the life-giving energy which generates this act.
The act of poetic creation does not cease when the poem is "completed," 
but it continues on through the event of reading, as well, in which the 
reader's activity - itself enacted by language - participates in the 
poiesis. The notion of enactment runs throughout Warren's poetry and 
criticism; most notably, it forms a central concern in his reading of 
The Ancient Mariner and pervades his own recasting of the poet as artist 
in Audubon: A Vision. Warren's attention to the moment of enactment in
the poem helps to define the Romantic quality of his thought; the poem 
ceases to be a mirror which reflects and explains and becomes the lamp 
which illuminates.2 The poetic moment does not describe another "lost" 
moment which is given temporal and ontological precedence before the 
poem itself and of which the poem at best becomes an accurate reflection 
and at worst can only haltingly refer through approximating language.3 
Rather, the poem is the moment, not because of its mimetic capacity 
{mimesis) but because of its illuminating capacity {poiesis). Language 
has become for Warren, as it was for Coleridge, a living power by which 
"the things of most importance to mankind are actuated..." {Aids to 
Reflection 10). Heidegger presses this even further when he says, "The
2 See M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: W.W. Norton, 1953), 57-69.
3 This is not to deny the place of real historical concerns in Warren's thought or to 
suggest that he did not draw upon biographical material for many ideas which are 
invariably a part of the poetry. But our understanding of the relationship between 
Warren's impulse toward historical thinking and his later poetry needs to be checked 
by our reading of his essay "The Use of the Past," where he clearly states that even "historical thihlcing" is creative.
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word alone gives being to the thing" ("Nature" 62). As we have demon­
strated, Warren's later poetry continually reenacts the moment in which 
language illuminates being through the exercise of the "pure imagina­
tion . "
In this moment of enactment, the poem illuminates being by uncov­
ering the unsayable within the sayable itself. When the poet asks in 
Audubon why "truth [is] the only thing that cannot / Be spoken?" he can 
simply reply, "It can only be enacted..." (IV[E]). The poem does not 
uncover the unsayable by reifying it into a tangible object. The poem 
does not become a statement of the "contents" of the unsayable. The 
unsayable cannot be equated with any one thing or any single statement; 
for Warren it cannot be reduced to the concept of truth - although truth 
certainly seems to be a symptom of the unsayable in his thinking. This 
is not to suggest, however, that the unsayable is not "real." On the 
contrary, it is the magnitude of its reality which presses so upon the 
poet and finally makes any speech or articulation possible. This would 
seem to be precisely what Warren means by "the real" which he claims 
must be re-thought in "The Whole Question." The reality of the unsay­
able can only be located within the void of the said, or in what Budick 
and Iser call "negativity."4 Its presence fills a non-site somewhere 
within what is said; like the "curdling agony of interred dark [which] 
strives dayward" ("Myth of Mountain Sunrise"), it is a presence which is 
conspicuous by its powerful absence. Just as "All mountains want slow- 
/ ly to bulge outward extremely," so the poem bulges slowly but 
extremely with the presence of the unsayable. within this paradoxical 
tension, the poem bears an irreducibility as it generates its own sort 
of hermeneutic circle. It is language as the unsayable which provides
4 Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, eds.. Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of
Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989).
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the illuminating power within the said of the poem, and yet what is 
illuminated is the unsayable itself. It is not the poet who finally 
says the unsayable. As we saw in the withdrawing of the poet in "Myth 
of Mountain Sunrise," it is language which says the unsayable through 
its own speaking. Apart from this, the poet could not speak.
The poem brings us into the absent presence of the unsayable by 
bringing us to the very limits of the sayable. Budick and Iser put it 
this way: "Once we have encountered the limits of the sayable, we must
acknowledge the existence of 'unsayable things' [Wittgenstein's phrase] 
and, by means of a language somehow formed on being silent, articulate 
that which cannot be said" (xii). The poet's encounter with the limits 
of the sayable in the act of creation wounds him and results in an agony 
which cannot be mastered or finally defeated. This wound may only be 
healed through the continued risk of wounding which the poet takes as he 
wrestles, Jacob-like, with language. This is the agony which the poet 
continually bears. In the experience of this agonistic encounter, War­
ren's poetry also repeatedly presses us as readers to that edge where 
language bulges to the point of rupture. What is beyond this eschatia 
or limit of language is not simply "the unsayable" as an entity (the 
"unsaid") but that which cannot be said, when confronting the limits of 
language, the poet could simply choose to remain silent, in which case 
he has been overcome by silence. Warren, however, avoided this kind of 
linguistic determinism. On the other hand, the poet could deny the 
reality of these limits and attempt to overcome silence through a final 
defeat of the unsayable, Warren also denied this artistic delusion of 
"pure" poetry. Rather, what we find in his later poetry is a speaking 
which has incorporated silence in such a way that silence has become 
part of the substance of speech. It is an articulation rooted in lis­
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t e n i n g .  B y c o n t i n u a l l y  s e e k in g  t h i s  la n g u a g e  o f  i n c o r p o r a t e d  s i l e n c e ,  
W a r r e n  a p p ro a c h e d  a  p o e t i c  i n  w h ic h  h e  m ig h t  a r t i c u l a t e  t h a t  w h ic h  c a n ­
n o t  b e  g r a s p e d  w i t h o u t  e v e r  t r a n s g r e s s i n g  t h e  l i m i t  o f  t h e  s a y a b l e .
This threshold of language where the sayable and the unsayable are 
so vitally aware of one another bears the qualities of the sort of sym­
bolic thought which Warren observed in Coleridge and developed in "A 
Poem of Pure Imagination." To borrow Coleridge's phrasing, we may say 
that the sayable and the unsayable display a coinherence with one anoth­
er, The power of language rests in the reality of the one containing 
the power of two - the sayable and the unsayable. This is not to sug­
gest that the two are in opposition to one another. Rather, this symbo­
lic notion of language is one of "combined negations" (Budick and Iser 
XV) so that the resultant symbolic understanding does not finally 
resolve or harmonize the "tension of the world" but generates the play 
of thought within that tension so that the poet might speak in the pres­
ence of the unsayable. Warren's notion of the "tension of the world" 
brings to light this symbolic tension of language, as we observed in 
Audubon: A Vision. Following Derrida, it involves both a difference of
distinction and inequality and a tension of delay and deferral, both 
temporally and spatially, which "puts off until 'later' what is pre­
sently denied, the possible that is presently impossible" ("Différence" 
441). Thus it is the tension of language which provides the forward- 
moving motion of Warren's later poetry, so that the poet might continue 
to walk in the world. The symbolic tension calls for the persistent and 
repetitive telling of that story which Warren says will be the old tale 
told.
F o r  W a r r e n ,  t h i s  s y m b o l ic  a n d  g e n e r a t i v e  t e n s i o n  b e tw e e n  t h e  s a y ­
a b l e  a n d  t h e  u n s a y a b le  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  w h a t  h e  c a l l s  t h e  s a c r a m e n t a l
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vision- Such a vision, though, does not propose any theology as such; 
rather it espouses a view of language which makes all articulation 
finally theological. The relationship between the sayable and the 
unsayable in this symbolic tension is not only one of coinherence but 
one in which the sayable is consubstantial with the unsayable. They are 
bound together in such a way that the one partakes of the other. The 
sayable is not lost in the void of the unsayable, and neither is the 
unsayable vacated by the presence of the said. The sacramental vision 
of Warren's later poetry insists upon the necessity of embracing the 
unsayable in the sayable if one is to be able to speak at all. In the 
experience of this sacramental tension, the "heart is impacted with a 
fierce impulse / To unwordable utterance..." ("Heart of Autumn," NT 75). 
The vision also longs for that place in which poet and reader alike 
might
,..embrace
The world in its fullness and threat, and feel,like Jacob, at last
The merciless grasp of unwordable grace
Which has no truth to tell of future or past -
But only life's instancy... ("Youthful Truth-Seeker," BH 25).
The impulse toward the "unwordable utterance" paradoxically finds its 
rest in the "merciless grasp of unwordable grace" which the poet experi­
ences in the act of wrestling language itself. Though the poet seeks to 
embrace the world, he finds that he is himself grasped by language, and 
in its merciless grasp he receives the wound of language. In this una­
voidable and paradoxical tension, Warren's poetry offers the possibility 
of continued theological articulation under the postmodern condition. 
Such articulation, though, will inevitably be aporetic as it joyfully 
bears the wound of language as the mark of its own speaking within the 
limits of the sayable. It will be an articulation which does not har-
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luonize the tension of the world but will enter into that tension as it 
seeks "the word that is able to call one to faith and preserve one in 
faith."5 when such articulation is caught in the merciless grasp of 
unwordable grace, it may continue to tell its story, bearing the agony 
that brings about a strange power of speech. From this perspective, 
though, that story will be a poetic one: this view of theological
articulation is an act of poiesis which does not simply create an object 
but calls for the continual and regenerative act of speaking in the 
world. For poet and theologian alike, then, language becomes the 
source, the power and the foil.
Warren's "last bright keepsake" which is offered to us in the 
postmodern context is this story of the poet's own confrontation with 
the unsayable which provided the moment within which he could begin to 
speak. Although this keepsake may only be a fragment of that vase which 
once held our hopes, it nonetheless engenders a hopefulness in its frag­
mented condition as we embark on the hazardous course of encountering 
language. This offering not only has anticipated certain turns in post­
modern thought but also contributes a tireless voice to ongoing critical 
discourse. The voice speaks of the power of paradox and of the necess­
ity of meaning without allowing either to become rarefied into an 
abstracted foundational concept. The voice counters any sort of nihi­
listic tendency in postmodern discourse by calling the reader to con­
tinue to walk in the world. The voice also reminds us that there is 
always something more to be thought. This is certainly true of Warren's 
later poetry, which harbors a future of meaning which will ensure that 
it is read and reread.e We might even take this keepsake like a crazy 
toy and laugh.
5 Martin Heidegger, quoted in Kleiran 180.
6 See Kearney 110, 27 8
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